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Migration, work, and citizenship: 
COVID-19 and the faultlines of 
Indian democracy 
Kalpana Kannabiran, Asha Hans, 
Manoranjan Mohanty, and Pushpendra 
With an exodus of workers never witnessed before in Indian history, 
COVID-19 has posed deep and grave challenges to our understanding of 
labour, migration, differentiated citizenship, dignity, security, vulnerability, 
and deliberative democracy. There are several questions related to basic 
dignity that arise in this context: Why were workers ousted from cities, 
throwing them into hunger, starvation, and homelessness at four hours’
notice? Nearly half of those in the exodus were women and children. Even 
while we try to grapple with the human rights implications of those graphic 
visuals we were witness to for weeks on end, our questions are stacked 
along two tracks. The first and most obvious one is, of course, health – the 
range of concerns around the right to health generally, and policies for the 
containment and treatment of COVID-19-affected persons. The second set 
of questions pertain to our understanding of the intersections of caste, com-
munity, tribe, and class, each intersecting with gender in the reality unfold-
ing before us. At a political moment that sees a stark rise in violence and 
dispossession against marginalised groups, and a rise in violence against 
women and non-cis persons, how did the pandemic-lockdown impact con-
cerns of human security informed by gender? 
In exploring the unfolding crisis and its long duree impact, we use ‘pan-
demic-lockdown’ as a hyphenated descriptor to denote the twin effects of 
the public health crisis and the forced displacement of the worker popula-
tion as mutually reinforcing and inseparable from each other in any consid-
eration of state action. In the pandemic, it is health which is fundamental 
to human experiences. As Sharpe suggests, the health status of populations 
can serve as an indicator of ‘equality, trust and wellbeing’ and to improve 
health ‘we need to challenge the underlying injustices and social conditions’
(Sharpe 2019: 335). As faultlines in Indian democracy emerged following 
the lockdown, described by many as brutal, it had all the makings of an 
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unprecedented humanitarian health crisis, with no state response as the pre-
ceding two decades of the austerities of the public health system produced 
an uneven infrastructure in rural and urban India. In its place, the privatisa-
tion of healthcare puts access out of reach of the majority, overburdening 
the already fragile public health system which collapsed without an acces-
sible alternative in place. 
The epidemiological approach, in the case of the pandemic, ought to 
address not only the ending of the coronavirus, but also the violence in 
domestic and public spaces where the dignity of the displaced worker has 
been eroded. Mann (1998: 37) argues that violations of dignity should be 
considered as a form of violence as these infringements ‘are pervasive 
events with potentially severe and sustained negative effects’, and future 
generations may look back at the current limited and narrow understand-
ing of health and wonder how we could have missed seeing violations of 
dignity as sources of injury to well-being. The violence perpetrated against 
migrant workers resulted in their stigmatisation as ‘carriers of the virus’, 
depriving them of their dignity as human beings and as citizens. 
Examining the intersecting vulnerabilities of migrant labour – social 
location, gender, and place of residence – brings out the nature and magni-
tude of the faultlines, and the interconnections between layers of urban and 
rural sectors in the Indian political economy as well as the role played by the 
Indian state. Firstly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the health emergency 
was as challenging as the existential crisis facing labour, especially migrant 
labour – most evident in the states of Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, 
Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, but also at the all-India level. Although estimates 
vary, from 10 million to over 40 million of inter-state migrants were fac-
ing livelihood, displacement, and health crises (Srivastava 2020). Secondly, 
every agricultural worker, marginal and small farmer, small artisan, and 
worker in a small enterprise is a potential migrant worker, forced to migrate 
when the rural economy is unable to ensure their livelihood. It is widely 
recognised that the crisis had already begun to unfold with globalisation 
particularly the agrarian crisis before the pandemic. This demographic 
transition for new livelihoods formed the backdrop of the migrant move-
ment during the pandemic, which threw the migrant labour crisis into sharp 
focus. The third factor is the invisibilisation of the contribution of migrants 
workers to urbanscapes. 
The abdication of state responsibility is reflected in the manner in which 
government circulars, such as those for home quarantine, did not take note of 
people’s socio-economic circumstances. Norms of ‘social distancing’ were 
insensitive to the fact that migrant workers lived in overcrowded, cramped 
dwellings, sharing a room or toilet with 10–20 others. Privacy emerged as 






consent. The unregulated use of surveillance tools in the context of health 
threw democratic norms in peril. Nomani and Parveen (2020), carrying out 
a critical appraisal of the Indian public health legislation, argue that the 
constitutional obligation for the enactment of public health and emergency 
preparedness has not been discharged in the COVID-19 situations. 
The pandemic is a moment that is both epidemiological as well as polit-
ical. Tracking the uneven responses of states globally to the COVID-19 
crisis, Ranabir Samaddar suggests that this is in fact an illustration of ‘a 
long-term failure of liberal democracies to sustain public health and life, 
weakened as they had become due to their commitment to neoliberal agenda 
and the demotion of public welfare in favour of privatisation,’ and more 
fundamentally points to the incapacity of these regimes to secure life, their 
task limited to ‘arbitrating death’ (Samaddar 2020: 5). 
Upendra Baxi’s reflections on ‘exodus constitutionalism’ are pertinent. 
Underscoring the fact that we are speaking of constitutional and core human 
rights that must recognise the dignity of the human citizen, and that given 
the unpredictable and as yet unknown effects of COVID-19, all action by the 
state and judiciary must be tempered by ‘epistemic humility’ (Baxi 2020). 
He delineates four attributes of ‘exodus constitutionalism’ that acquire new 
meaning during the pandemic-lockdown: first, the reliance of constitutions 
on the ‘constitutional self’ and ‘constitutional other’ – the status of citizen-
ship as set out in Part II of the constitution is a sovereign decision of the 
state, not a fundamental right. Second, how then do shifts in the construc-
tion of citizenship inflect our understanding of the constituents of the exo-
dus? Third, the heightened vulnerabilities of populations affected by the 
pandemic-lockdown are not adequately captured by terms like ‘COVID-19 
migrants’. And finally, ‘exodus constitutionalism’ hinges on the devaluation 
of citizenship – as we see, for instance, with those forcibly displaced by the 
pandemic-lockdown. This is the new face of Internally Displaced Persons 
and must be thought through on those terms (Baxi 2020). 
This takes us directly into a consideration of vulnerabilities and social 
disadvantage. Drawing on nationally representative panel data for 21,799 
individuals between May 2018 and April 2020, Ashwini Deshpande and 
Rajesh Ramachandran find that although the sudden loss of employment hit 
people across social groups, the vulnerable groups – OBCs, SCs, and STs 
– suffered significantly more than the upper castes, with the gap between 
Dalits and upper castes being the highest. They suggest that this may be 
viewed against the fact of the higher presence of Dalits among the precariat 
and their overall lower levels of education. The heightening of pre-existing 
vulnerabilities and inequalities owing to social disadvantages and systemic 
discrimination against Dalit and Adivasi communities, by their argument, 
is likely to be exacerbated by the pandemic (Deshpande and Ramachandran 
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2020). The survey conducted by the Centre for Equity Studies (2020) found 
that although job loss was pervasive across social locations, the situation 
of daily wage earners and inter-state migrant workers and Muslim work-
ers was more precarious. Consistent with several other studies conducted 
across the country, the precarity of labour and insecure conditions of work 
over a long term made it impossible for workers to withstand the shock of 
the lockdown – and this was true across rural and urban locales. 
While the government announced stimulus packages, questions were 
raised by development economists such as Jean Dreze (2020) on the basis 
of their longstanding work on the labouring poor and rights in the informal 
sector regarding the veracity of these claims. 
Gender intersections are critical to an understanding of how the pan-
demic-lockdown spreads its shroud unevenly across sharply heteronorma-
tive spaces – public and private. While it is widely agreed that the informal 
sector is constituted by the largest section of the Indian workforce that 
is also predominantly female, the image of the male worker as the norm 
invisibilises the range of specifically gendered vulnerabilities that confront 
women and non-cis persons in the informal economy. These could take 
many forms, from wage discrepancies to specific stigmatising practices to 
vulnerability to routine sexual violence. Given the disproportionate respon-
sibility of reproductive labour on women (what has rather simplistically 
been termed the ‘double burden’ in literature historically), how does this 
mass displacement affect them disproportionately? What are the specific 
ways in which the pandemic-lockdown exacerbated insecurity on gender 
lines? Finally, there is the question of domestic violence. The gendering 
of pandemic vulnerabilities has been shrouded in the discourse around the 
‘shadow pandemic’. In a larger context of structural violence and systemic 
discrimination, the pandemic reinforces stratification, especially in relation 
to the gendered division of labour – in worksites and within the family. 
The rise in incidents of domestic violence during the lockdown across the 
world evoked a comment from Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Director of UN 
Women, that there is a shadow pandemic unfolding which locks women and 
girls into abusive homes (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2020). 
Further, the gendered implications of the pandemic are not restricted to 
this single issue. Sex work, workplace rights, surveillance, moral policing, 
extreme vulnerability to sexual violence, and the larger question of ‘repro-
ductive justice’ come into sharp focus in a pandemic-lockdown situation 
(Kannabiran 2020). 
Violence has been a daily occurrence during the lockdown, heightened 
by the presence of armed or police forces. Brutality during the lockdown 
became part of the ethos of a perverse deterrent practised to maintain ‘law 







migrants, doctors, nurses, frontline workers, and religious communities. 
Communalisation of COVID-19 has unravelled the injustices and inequities 
that underpin people’s lives. While some states have emphasised the impor-
tance of not stigmatising communities on the basis of religion, other states 
have used this pandemic to aggravate prejudice based on religious identity 
and vigilantism acting in concert with non-state actors. ‘Any attempt to 
shift accountability of a pandemic of this magnitude to a congregation of 
persons is deplorable and also counter-productive to public health efforts’
(Jan Swasthya Abhiyan and All India Peoples Science Network 2020). 
The construction of violence is also by other means such as a language 
which contributes to a violent situation. Although women frontline work-
ers, nurses, and others involved in taking care of the coronavirus have been 
designated as ‘Corona Warriors’, being instrumental in the ‘war’ against the 
coronavirus,1 unfortunately these warriors have been both underpaid and 
unprotected without the shields necessary when going into so-called ‘war 
zones’ created by the virus. It has to be recognised that the use of violent 
vocabulary militarises the public mindset, and violence becomes the public 
normal. It is time to recognise that this system of violence will become 
entrenched, so it must be challenged as the well-being of the human family 
depends on its removal. 
The chapters in this volume attempt to explore fresh contestations around 
the emerging nature of risk, new terminologies, unimaginable human rights 
abuses taking place against migrant labour, and the long walk home filled 
with tragedies. By revisiting work on labour control regimes through the 
COVID-19 lens, exploring new insights on mobility and new understand-
ings of the migrant body, we hope to initiate a discourse on justice in a 
larger context of hostile migration environments, exploring constitutional 
routes, with a focus on vulnerability. 
To build on this backdrop, we would need to think through a new method 
and epistemology that draws attention to democratic and constitutional 
accountability. It is time to start the pedagogic imagining and structuring of 
a future world that will open up to new possibilities. The questions before us 
are: what is normal and just, and how do we protect our fundamental rights 
when these rights are trampled on? In this context, questions we should be 
then asking are: what is the appropriate language to create a new alterna-
tive? How do we work in collaborative ways? We also need to ask: how do 
we stop this violence from becoming the ‘new normal’ in our lives? Are we 
prepared to re-imagine new worlds where security is dependent not on force 
but recognition of an interdependent world of collaboration? It is imperative 
to introduce different methods of development and a new alternative to the 
‘new normal’. Would this mean creating fundamental changes in our under-
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that strikes at the very core of our social structure calling for a reconceptu-
alisation of the vocabulary of change? We recognise that the pandemic has 
essentially affected our lives and our humanity and is the catalyst we hope 
for a new equal and just global system. 
What lessons can we draw from the migrant workers crisis and through 
that window about India’s political economy? Manoranjan Mohanty iden-
tifies some specific lessons that cannot be missed by close observers: the 
paucity of data, the absence of a support system for workers, non-imple-
mentation of labour protections, disabling of panchayats – all leading to a 
cumulative vulnerability of migrant workers. He argues for a new politics 
of workers challenging the fundamental premises underlying the prevailing 
political economy that can effectively address the issue of the vulnerabili-
ties that we saw during the pandemic-lockdown. 
Nasreen Chowdhory and Shamna Poyil focus on the precarity of migrant 
labour during times of COVID-19 and make a case for ‘pandemic citizen-
ship’. To citizen-migrants for whom mobile livelihoods are indispensable to 
the right to life – Article 21 – Chowdhory and Poyil argue that what appears 
to be a uniform restriction on mobility is in fact a measure of the dispropor-
tionate effect of ‘pandemic citizenship’ that divests citizen-migrants of any 
choice and constitutes the use of undue force by the state. 
While Part III – the Fundamental Rights chapter – of the Constitution of 
India is justiciable and strengthens the claim of citizens vis-à-vis the state, 
Kalpana Kannabiran and Sreekar Aechuri unravel the faultlines in COVID-
19 jurisprudence, by pointing to the uneven application of established con-
stitutional principles across different clusters of cases. What throws the 
faultlines of constitutional jurisprudence into sharp relief, in their view, 
is also the hyper-visible class biases in the jurisprudence on the citizens 
ousted by the pandemic-lockdown. 
Indu Agnihotri and Asha Hans explore the gendered specificities of the 
pandemic and the need to rethink questions of ‘gendered vulnerabilities’
in relation to work, social security, and health. They draw on evidence 
gathered during the pandemic to examine how the everyday life of migrant 
women was affected by the lockdown and suggest a new paradigm of analy-
ses from the lens of human security. 
Irudaya Rajan, Renjini Rajagopalan, and P. Sivakumar foreground the 
political disenfranchisement of migrants and their invisibilisation by state 
governments. Examining data of migrant workers, they suggest that port-
ability of political rights and social welfare, although contentious and dif-
ficult to implement, might hold the key to the realisation of full citizenship 
for migrant workers and the elimination of the vulnerabilities they face. 
Kerala has been celebrated as inaugurating a new grammar of gov-






   
 
          
        
 
    
   
                 
                
Introduction 7 
conferred by the state of Kerala on migrant workers, while it confers a
benevolence on inter-state workers, constructs them as ‘guests’ and ‘out-
siders’; in a simultaneous move, non-resident Keralites are conferred the
privilege of ‘belonging’. 
S. Anandhi and E. Deepa examine the issues faced by domestic workers –
a 1.8-million-strong female informal workforce in Tamil Nadu – during 
the lockdown through a field study in Chennai city. They work as part of 
a ‘dually informalised workforce’ in the informal private-domestic sphere 
with no access to basic labour and social security protections. The chapter 
attempts to understand how their specific vulnerabilities were exacerbated 
by the lockdown. 
Pushpendra and Manish K. Jha explain the journeys taken by migrants 
as the defining image of pandemic COVID-19. Using the theory of labour 
control regime they demonstrate how the state adopts the policy of interven-
tion by facilitating as well as restricting journeys of migrants. Drawing from 
the narratives of workers’ struggle for the journey, the chapter explicates the 
dynamic relationship between state, market, and migrants in times of crisis 
and emergency due to the pandemic. 
Note 
1 COVID-19: The New Normal: Militarization and Women’s New Agenda in India -
Global Campaign for Peace Education (peace-ed-campaign.org) accessed on 
29.12.2020. 
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2 Migrant labour on centre stage 
But politics fails them 
Manoranjan Mohanty 
Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the lessons we draw from the experience of the six 
months of COVID lock-unlock period and then explain them, especially 
the problematique represented by this scenario by examining the contend-
ing perspectives on labour that underlie the prevailing political economy. I 
argue that it is the politics arising from this perspective that makes it pos-
sible for the rulers to keep the workers continuously in a vulnerable condi-
tion and suppress their agency. In my view, the alternative is a new politics 
of labour that fundamentally challenges the political economy of gradation 
and degradation of labour and economies. It must reject the charity-and-
welfare approach of capital and state and affirm the rights approach instead, 
thus moving from an instrumentalist view to a substantive view of recognis-
ing labour as the principal force of civilisational development. 
Political organisation is understood here as a form of politics based on a 
relevant historical and theoretical perspective. No doubt, there are a number 
of structural factors arising from the political economy which constrain the 
ability of the migrant workers to overcome the vulnerability that they face. 
We focus here on the thinking and practice that has evolved over time lead-
ing to the present-day condition of the workers. 
Vulnerability, agency, and state responsibility 
The missing link between vulnerability and agency 
The migrant labour crisis in India, triggered by the COVID-19 lockdown 
in March 2020 was a window that vividly illustrated India’s unequal politi-
cal economy, precarious social ecology, and deepening faultlines (Mohanty, 
2020). The principal aspects of that picture became clear in the course of 
the unfolding scenario of the first six months of the lockdown and unlock-












a major social crisis was effectively pushed to the background by the rulers 
who encountered practically no protest. What was even more striking was 
the fact that despite the rise in COVID numbers, the regime went ahead 
with their neoliberal growth agenda of agrarian, industrial, educational, and 
legal reforms in an accelerated pace while negative economic indicators 
persisted. 
There were signs of workers’ agency, especially in the beginning, when 
most workers chose to leave for their villages when the work units were 
closed with the announcement of the lockdown. Faced with transportation 
difficulties and lack of amenities, thousands of migrant workers protested 
in many parts of the country. But the precarious conditions of their life and 
work became clear day by day. Their vulnerability enabled the rulers to 
carry on with their agenda. That between the workers’ vulnerability and 
their potential agency there was a missing link became clearer than before 
during the pandemic. That is the question I try to explore in this chapter 
and suggest that a lack of political organisation is the missing link that kept 
the workers continuously vulnerable and blocked their capacity to play the 
agency role. 
COVID-19 actually put labour on the centre stage of the spectacle of 
the unfolding scenario in India. In fact, all workers – both in formal and 
informal sectors of the economy – suffered losses due to the lockdown. 
Informal sector workers suffered more than the formal sectors workers, and 
among the former, the migrant workers were the greatest sufferers. After 
about two months and three spells of lockdown, gradual unlocking began, 
phase by phase, and the government and industry were keen to reopen the 
factories, shops, and other enterprises. They needed the workers, especially 
contract and migrant workers, to return to work. Some even took special 
steps, such as sending emissaries and making transport arrangement and 
paying advances, to get migrant workers back so that they could resume 
their enterprises and construction activities. Thus, the workers were on the 
centre stage not only as victims of lockdown and the disease but also as 
essential forces for recovery of the economy and society. 
But both the state and the capital tried their best not to acknowledge the
centrality of labour even in this situation. The economic recovery package
announced by the finance minister in five tranches between 13 and 17 May
mostly consisted of incentives to the employers, with a large set of support
measures for the big corporations. The few relief measures announced for the
migrant workers hardly met their basic requirements. Most conspicuously,
exactly at this time came a series of ordinances curbing welfare and organi-
sational rights of the workers. This presented the usual scenario evolved
during the neoliberal era, namely incentives for market-driven, capital-led
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the pandemic. The vulnerability of the workers, informal sector workers in
general and migrant workers in particular, was evident at every stage. 
Five lessons on migrant labour during COVID-191 
Magnitude high, but data missing 
Absence of data on migrant labour was a crippling factor during the entire 
process of the lockdown and reopening. The political system’s neglect of 
collecting data on migrant labour shows how precarious the condition of 
migrant labour was.2 There is need for a comprehensive disaggregated data. 
If the invisibility of migrant labour in India’s political economy was not 
bad enough, the particular way of invisibilisation of women among labour 
was especially disturbing. It is estimated that 40 per cent of migrant labour 
were women. But there are no reliable estimates on how many women were 
independent migrants. It is important that individual and family migration 
should be separately recorded. Migration of independent women should be 
specifically compiled. 
Denial of right to living wage and dignified livelihood 
Violation of the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution,
which includes the right to minimum wages and several other basic condi-
tions identified by the Supreme Court for living with dignity, was evident.
There was no heed paid to the ILO norms of decent work. The minimum
wage was paid in very few places, such as Kerala. The migrant workers were
always forced to work and live under the mercy of the dalal or middlemen,
officially called labour contractors, who exploited them in multiple ways.
The harrowing tales of their life and work came out in vivid details during
the lockdown. Payment of minimum wage varied from Rs. 750 in Kerala to
as low as Rs. 150 in many places. For the brick kiln workers, the average
earning was even less. Women were paid less than men for the same amount
of work. In most cases, the dalal paid an advance to the family in the village
and escorted the labourer to the destination. The advance amount was paid in
the lean season when the poor had no source of income in the village. Thus,
the condition of poverty turned the rural poor into bonded labour under the
patronage of the middleman to whom the poor household was beholden.
This story of ‘dadan labour’ in Western Odisha has been a longstanding phe-
nomenon which came out in full-blown details during the pandemic. 
Absence of a support structure from state, community, or union 
The COVID-19 lockdown brought to the open the clear absence of a sup-
port structure that could come to the aid of a migrant worker. The worker 
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was at the mercy of the employer, who pleaded inability to pay more than a 
meagre sum. A string of short-term ad hoc measures was taken by govern-
ments and the actual performance depended on the particular civil servant 
or politician or a voluntary group working in an area. The lesson is that 
there is a dire need for the state to systematically lay out a support structure 
for migrant labour in dealing with crises such as the pandemic lockdown. 
The concept of a community support linkage in the home area, be it the 
panchayat or the municipal ward that is familiar with the worker and her/ 
his household and can come to their support, does not exist. It was evi-
dent when the Odisha government decided to activate the panchayat sys-
tem to collect information about migrants, organise quarantine centres, and 
undertake relief measures, giving even the power of the collector in some 
respects to the sarpanch. By early May the incapacity of the local bodies 
got exposed. They had become so dependent on the civil servants for imple-
menting welfare programmes that came from above that they did not know 
how to discharge their new function. Again, Kerala was an exception in this. 
Where were the trade unions? In India the tragedy for the unorganised sec-
tor workers is the absence of effective trade unions. The double tragedy is 
the governing ideology of the trade unions that do not have any substantial 
degree of collective welfare programmes for their workers as a part of their 
normal trade union politics. 
Absence of a support structure meant that people placed in unequal con-
ditions got severely unequal support. The upper-caste male got quick relief 
from their connections while most of the Dalits and the Adivasis and lower 
OBCs who formed the bulk of the migrant labour were practically left to 
themselves. Women, especially from SC and ST communities, were left in 
the most disadvantageous conditions. Muslim minorities in many places 
had to face difficulties especially because of the Tablighi episode in Delhi 
in January–February (Rehman, 2020). Muslims returning from Gulf, even 
if well-to-do in many cases, also faced discriminatory treatment in many 
states. Most migrants were treated as automatic carriers of the COVID virus 
and were stigmatised in multiple ways (Srivastava, 2020). Thus, intersect-
ing inequalities on multiple fronts was most conspicuous in case of the 
migrants. 
Poor laws, indifferent institutions: Whose state? 
How little support was available from the institutions of state for the 
migrant workers became clear during the COVID-19 lockdown. Under the 
Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act of 1979 there were a number of provi-
sions which could provide protection to the workers, e.g., minimum wage, 
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facilities, and medical facilities, among other things. There was also the 
confusion about the remaking of the labour laws, reducing all the laws into 
four Labour Codes. Three of them were passed in the Parliament during the 
boycott by the Opposition parties on 22 September which were welcomed 
by the employers and condemned by all the trade unions. Firstly, now any 
enterprise employing less than 300 workers could prohibit organisation of 
trade unions. Second, the employer’s hiring and firing power, especially 
the power to terminate services, was enhanced. Thirdly, the working hours 
could be increased from eight to twelve hours and also the working condi-
tions could be altered.3 This further strengthened the hands of the corporate 
rich, especially monopolies who had been demanding ‘labour reforms’ to 
acquire ‘flexibility’ in utilisation of labour. 
Several such aspects of the political economy came to the open in the 
COVID moment. This experience alerts the workers organisations, human 
rights groups, and democratic forces to insist on affirming the basic rights 
of the migrant workers with strong legal safeguards. In this context the 
demand for setting up a statutory National Commission of Migrant Labour 
appears justified. 
Unequal political economy, faulty social ecology 
The real challenge that came out boldly during the COVID-19 crisis was the 
need to ensure everyone’s right to work with dignity in their home regions. 
Much of migration is distress migration. Therefore, the prevailing economic 
process must be re-examined so that people get work in their own village 
or town or nearby area and do not migrate. Thus, restructuring the politi-
cal economy to facilitate local employment and local development is the 
urgent need. Once an area is developed, the migrant labour, more as mobile 
labour, can go with a higher bargaining power and adequate facilities to 
help meet the labour demand in certain areas of the country or abroad. We 
need to initiate restructuring of the rural economy as a whole so as to pro-
vide long-term solutions to poverty and unemployment. Rather than aim-
ing at a five trillion GDP, achieving full employment should be our goal 
(Bhaduri, 2020). MGNREGS can be re-imagined to cover the entire rural 
economy rather than specific types of jobs listed in a schedule. A diver-
sified rural economy combining traditional and modern technologies can 
be planned by the panchayats as a zero-unemployment development strat-
egy. The prevailing system of neoliberal, growth-centric economic model 
steered from above which throws crumbs as relief to the poor under various 
programmes needs to be transformed into a decentralised self-propelling, 
sustainable development process at the grass-roots level that makes it pos-




Is the opposition, especially the workers’ rights movement, ready to face 
this challenge? I argue that to acquire that political capacity and enable 
workers to play the role of agency, there is a need for fundamental question-
ing of the basic assumptions underlying the current development strategy. 
Two premises are central to a new politics of workers: It must question 
the persisting idea of gradation and degradation of labour and economies. 
Second, it must strongly reject the framework of charity and welfare shown 
by the employers and the state and insist of the framework of rights to guide 
transformation of unequal distribution of material, cultural, and political 
conditions into a more and more equitable and just system. A new politics 
of labour based on these premises may promise to raise politics of workers 
from an instrumentalist frame to a substantive frame as a historical agency. 
COVID-19 may have generated some opportunities to reorient politics of 
working classes. 
Perspective on a new politics of workers 
Who are the builders of civilisation – labour or capital? Gradation 
and degradation of labour and economies in history 
There is a continuing struggle about understanding the history of civilisa-
tions and their builders. Dominant classes, castes, and races influenced the 
writing of the history of ideas in such a way that generations were made 
to believe that the possessors of wealth, knowledge, and status were the 
builders of civilisations. They set up power systems to enforce these ideas 
and oppressed large masses of people, terming them as ‘physical labour-
ers’, ‘men of appetite’, ‘slaves’, ‘untouchables’, ‘sudras’, ‘god’s inferior 
creatures’, and so on. The rulers claimed that they had ‘wisdom’, ‘mental 
faculties’, and ‘knowledge’, and were ‘possessors of superior abilities’ and 
‘god’s chosen few’ to be in the high pedestal and to exercise power. For cen-
turies these ideas flourished in course of the evolution of slave society, caste 
order, racial order, feudal order, patriarchal order, and many such unequal 
systems around the world. The distinction between manual labour and men-
tal labour originated from that history. But in all societies such hierarchies 
had been challenged from time to time. In the fifth century BC, Buddha’s 
frontal attack on the caste order and assertion of equality of all humans was 
among the first in world history. From then on different justifications of 
social hierarchy and caste order and their opposition in course of social and 
religious reform movements in India continued with many reincarnations 
and gradation of labour got legitimacy. 
In post-Renaissance Europe when the ‘principle of equality of all men’
began to acquire support, it accepted the gradation of labour as a foundational 
  
 
Migrant labour on centre stage 15 
premise. The equality principle was now applicable among one category of 
people. That premise guided the evolution of capitalism. The distinction 
between manual and mental labour got many divisions and subdivisions 
and skills were put in their descending order of value. Mental labour was 
put far above manual labour, which was degraded. Accordingly, money and 
status were assigned. Education and training in skills were organised on that 
basis. Rewards and remunerations were paid according to such gradation. 
Universities were set up with disciplines in arts and sciences, furthering the 
hierarchy of labour. Thinkers and theorists were put at a higher pedestal 
than those who ‘applied’ that. Colonialism propagated and institutionalised 
the capitalist notion of gradation of labour throughout the world. This is the 
brief outline of how the value of labour of vast masses had been suppressed 
through history. 
For three hundred years or so rulers put capital as the central force 
for building society, making progress and advancing human civilisation. 
Attempts were made from time to time by social reformers to challenge it 
and assert that it is labour, human labour, that is the central force driving a 
society’s development. All labour, manual, mental, and spiritual, involved 
all faculties of the human being. Labour, by definition, is the application of 
human energy on nature and society, seeking to add value. And that applica-
tion of energy in every case involves application of the mind irrespective 
of who performed it. When industrialisation made rapid progress and the 
size of the working class grew, there was the beginning of some recognition 
of the contribution of workers to the production process. But the grada-
tion principle still held fast. There were compromise frameworks presented 
in economic theory that descriptively identified four factors of production: 
‘land, labour, capital and organisation’. Such a view hides the reality that 
capital controlled the entire process and how labour, the principal force of 
production, was suppressed. It believes that capital – the class of entrepre-
neurs who take initiatives, use capital intelligently, understand the market, 
take risks, and improve their technology and management systems con-
stantly to generate surplus and make profit – are the builders of the civili-
sation. The workers are supposed to be with limited understanding of the 
society and the economy, ill-equipped to take major decisions and fit only 
to follow production plans and technology developed by the capitalists and 
their expert advisers. 
This history of capitalist treatment of labour had another element built 
into it, namely divisions among sectors of society and sectors of economy 
which were also subject to gradation and degradation. Industrialisation in 
Europe needed labour from the countryside move to cities, which became 
centres of mass production. Until then, cities were centres of trade and 





routes. This began the process of urbanisation becoming a mark of progress. 
Agrarian society was considered backward, and industrial society was a 
sign of development. Population got gradually concentrated in urban cen-
tres. Population migrated to cities and towns to seek jobs and avail better 
living conditions. Rural-urban contradictions gradually grew in terms of 
income, access to social services, and standard of living. 
This process produced depressed conditions in the rural economy with 
many traditional occupations disappearing as a consequence of the availa-
bility of industrial goods. Colonial regimes enforced this political economy 
causing de-industrialisation of Asian, African, and Latin American socie-
ties. They not only degraded rural agrarian economy as backward but also 
degraded the local knowledge that guided the multifarious economic and 
social and cultural processes in the rural and tribal areas as ‘unscientific’
and ‘lagging in the progress of civilisation’. What was remarkable was that 
the post-colonial era saw the continuation of the same process of indus-
trialisation as development under national leaders. The normal process of 
expanding employment opportunities attracted rural labour to migrate to 
the cities and industrial centres. But when rural economy was unable to 
provide adequate employment, rural labour was forced to migrate in condi-
tions of distress. In regions of continuing poverty distress migration thus 
became a regular phenomenon. For mining, industries, and construction of 
roads, bridges, housing and public buildings, and malls and highways more 
and more labour were needed as the process of development made steady 
progress. 
Gradation of economies continued to grow. Industrialisation in the man-
ufacturing stage was regarded less advanced than in the stage of service 
industries with finance capital, research and development, education and 
health services, and especially economic management being an advance 
over that heralding the Second Industrial Revolution. Manufacturing units 
which were also polluting industries were shifted to ‘less developed econo-
mies’ in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Next was the stage of develop-
ment of information and communication technology, which was described 
as the Third Industrial Revolution. The current stage is supposedly a fur-
ther advance with e-governance and artificial intelligence handling ‘big 
data’ replacing human labour. This is regarded as the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution. 
COVID-19 gave a rude shock, questioning this eschatology of progress. 
Many people all over world began to review this notion of development that 
had not only caused environmental decay, inviting pandemics and climate 
change, generated multiple inequalities and sources of alienation and vio-
lence, but also created many scarcities of essential goods in countries and 
regions during the health emergency when transport and communications 
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were suspended. It was realised by many all over the world that all the forms 
of the economies – agriculture, handicrafts, and various forms of industries 
manufacturing to services, ICT, and AI – were all needed simultaneously 
and had equal value. 
When we put these two dimensions of history together – the gradation of 
labour and degradation of manual labour, and also gradation of economic 
activities and degradation of agriculture and rural economy following mod-
ern European history – we can understand the predicament faced by migrant 
labour today. 
Instrumentalist view of labour 
The dominant belief held by the rulers does not admit the centrality of 
labour in the production process. Labouring population has to gradually 
become ‘middle class’, which the European and US elites believe to be 
their agenda. This trend was accompanied by strong initiatives by neolib-
eral regimes for ‘labour reforms’, which meant giving added power to capi-
tal to restrict labour rights. 
This perspective on the value of labour in production and the civilisa-
tional development has been a core principle of socialist tradition and Marx’s 
critique of capitalism. But when the communist parties translated this prin-
ciple into policy and practice it turned out to be an instrumentalist view 
of the role of labour in society. The Party as the vanguard of the working 
class accumulated power and exercised it in a centralised fashion. Instead 
of workers at every level exercising self-governance to realise the vision of 
a socialist society, the Party developed its notion of the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’. The Party leadership set up a centralised state machinery in the 
name of the workers and developed a planned economy that it claimed had 
represented the interest of the workers. This system of political economy 
in the USSR under different leaders over its 70-year history, no doubt had 
many achievements, but it did not pursue socialist democracy at the grass-
roots level. Its planned economy had the same economic goals of indus-
trialisation and urbanisation with more and more advanced technology to 
achieve higher growth as in the capitalist society. 
Liberation of labour from multiple bondages of class oppression 
remained a theoretical objective rather than a lived experience. In China 
it was called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ also with a one-Party 
dictatorship called People’s Democratic Dictatorship, pursuing the goals 
of industrialisation and higher growth. Not only did the extent of social 
inequality and regional disparity remain high and environmental degrada-
tion persist despite many measures to stem it, but the workers did not enjoy 





trade unions (Mohanty, 2018). The stated goal of China’s ‘reforms and 
open door’ strategy was to create an expanding middle class and achieve 
higher levels of economic growth by using more and more advanced tools 
of scientific and technological innovation. Thus, the CPC as the vanguard 
of China’s working class is the instrument for building a prosperous indus-
trial society on the model of the Western advanced capitalist society. Deng 
Xiaoping’s theoretical framework that guided this development strategy 
had identified three instruments of historical development in the modern 
age: ‘science and technology, market and management’ that did not have 
class character according to him. 
That thinking enabled China to adopt Western science and technology, 
management practices, and market techniques from capitalist practice, and 
make economic progress. The contemporary Chinese political economy is 
governed not by the labour perspective on development but by the logic of 
capitalism (Mohanty, 2014). COVID-19 put the Chinese system to test too. 
The migrant labour who had been stranded in their native places where they 
had gone for the Spring Festival holidays faced enormous difficulties. Many 
of them did not return to their workplaces either because they were not 
welcome back in their former enterprises or because it was too risky under 
the prevailing health conditions. There were no employment opportunities 
to absorb them back in their villages and towns either. In fact, the crisis in 
the countryside during the past two decades had forced a large number of 
them to migrate to cities seeking work. Thus, China’s cities currently have 
nearly 500 million ‘floating population’ looking for employment according 
to unofficial sources, even though the official estimates put them at 250 mil-
lion (Roberts, 2020). 
China presented the paradox of a Communist Party–ruled state where 
workers both in the city and the countryside faced a great deal of inse-
curity and tensions. Among them, the women workers, workers belonging 
to minorities, and workers living in underdeveloped regions suffered even 
greater hardships, discriminations, and repression in case they resorted 
to protest action. The Chinese case illustrated not only how gradation of 
labour continued under what was described as a form of socialism, but even 
how degradation of manual and similar forms of labour became a part of the 
education and evolving culture as their education, culture, and media were 
also patterned after the advanced Western capitalist systems. 
Just when this trend of minimising the value of labour was gaining 
momentum in the neoliberal era of globalisation promoting growth came 
the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrating the critical role played by labour 
in the production process and as a social force. In all countries labour was 
persuaded to return to work so that the economy could be reopened. It 
exposed how a well-organised system of exploitation of labour had evolved 
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using the vulnerable sections of society from far off regions of poverty 
and destitution for accumulation. Using cheap labour to construct modern 
infrastructure illustrated this phenomenon. Building smart cities out of the 
labour of the poor and perpetuating unequal living conditions in cities and 
villages was the norm. 
The instrumentalist view of labour is manifest not only in centralised rule 
in the name of being the vanguard of workers but also in having an undiffer-
entiated and monolithic view of the working class in the name of maintain-
ing solidarity and thus not paying attention to issues of gender, caste, race, 
religion, disability, sexuality, and other characteristics of labour. In fact, true 
labour solidarity should result from acknowledgement of the intersectional-
ity embedded in the class struggle against capitalism (Mohanty, 2019). 
COVID-19 put to test the entire theory of progress that accompanied 
capitalism (Patnaik, 2020). The most developed countries suffered the larg-
est fatalities. They regretted that several products that they needed urgently 
were not manufactured locally. There were reports from many parts of the 
world on the celebration of indigenous agriculture and tribal people’s tradi-
tions of production and their knowledge systems as nature friendly and most 
relevant as a response to COVID-19-type infections. More and more people 
came to believe that climate change and destruction of natural environment 
by the current model of industrialisation and urbanisation had created the 
conditions for the viruses to spread and cause the pandemic (Vohra, 2020). 
In other words, the gradation of labour and economies was fundamentally 
challenged. 
But the rulers still refused to accept this reality. They were busy trying to 
recover economic growth and restore ‘normalcy’. 
Rights vs. charity and welfare 
The reopening of the economy would indeed need labour to resume manu-
facturing and construction and maintain the supply line. For that the prime 
minister of India announced a few ‘welfare measures’ (Kalyan Yojana) to 
provide immediate ‘relief’ to the migrant workers and the poor in general. 
These included a small, monthly cash payment of Rs. 500.00 into their bank 
accounts and free ration for 3–6 months. The employment opportunities in 
the rural areas were supposed to be enhanced to absorb returned workers. 
At the end of six months since the lockdown was announced, none of these 
measures proved adequate to meet the requirements of the millions of work-
ers. Behind this way of treating the workers there is a perspective which 
must be understood. It is about capital and the state providing ‘welfare’ to 








History shows how the gradation of labour played out and the value of 
labour was not acknowledged. As mass production grew and working-class 
population expanded, factory owners started giving ‘welfare benefits’ to 
workers. In feudal systems the estate owners and religious establishments 
distributed charity among the peasants and workers. After working-class 
movements were born and launched campaigns for workers’ rights, charity 
was replaced by ‘welfare’. Since the successful strike of workers in 1861 in 
Chicago for the eight-hour working day, this battle between ‘welfare’ and 
‘rights’ perspectives has gone on. 
Foundation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1919 put 
the rights perspective on the global agenda of states. But interpretation of 
its Charter provisions and their implementation have kept the ‘welfare’
perspective in the governing position, leaving the rights of workers to the 
specific campaigns in various countries. The Constitution of India puts 
workers’ rights not in the chapter on Fundamental Rights but in Article 41 
in the Directive Principles of State policy, which is not justiciable. But as a 
result of many movements the rights perspective has gained ground. Some 
important laws have been enacted guaranteeing minimum wages, regulat-
ing working conditions, protecting the right to form trade unions, and so 
on. Some landmark judgements by the Supreme Court such as the PUDR
case of 1982 guaranteeing minimum wages and the Bandhua Mukti Morcha
case of 1984 abolishing bonded labour both under Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution have further expanded these rights. 
Between 2004 and 2009 some major laws were passed to give rights to 
some basic facilities to citizens of India, such as the Right to Information 
Act (RTI), Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA), Forest Rights Act (FRA), Right to Education Act (RTE), 
and the Food Security Act (FSA). They created a climate of great optimism 
about the coming of an era of people’s rights. No doubt they were very 
welcome measures that addressed some basic needs of the common people. 
But very soon it became clear that they did not carry the full support of the 
capital and the state leadership who thought these were the case of wastage 
of funds that would violate fiscal discipline and would make the country 
bankrupt. These ‘right-based laws’ were partly a product of the political 
arrangement as that was a time when the Congress-led UPA was also sup-
ported by the Left parties. There was also an economic rationality underly-
ing it. The advocates of these laws correctly pointed out that these public 
investments in human development would build a healthy, educated, and 
productive workforce for the economy and will also expand the demand 
side of the economy, giving more purchasing power to the poor and thus 
pushing the consumption demands especially in the countryside (Bhaduri, 
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was lukewarm towards this line of thought, especially the MGNREGA. 
When the NDA regime came to power in 2014, Prime Minister Modi’s 
statement on the MGNREGA in the Lok Sabha made the approach clear. 
He would continue the scheme, he announced, mainly to remind the country 
of the failure of the Congress’s rule over six decades in eradicating poverty. 
All those laws faced retreats thereafter. When repealing was opposed by 
widespread protest, as in the case of the Land Acquisition Law of 2013, it 
was diluted substantially in practice. 
Ironically, during the COVID-19 lockdown, it was the MGNREGA
which was of great use when the migrant workers returned to their vil-
lages. After reducing the budget allocation for it for many years, the gov-
ernment increased the budgeted allocation by another Rs. 40,000 crores.
But that was not enough to absorb the returned workers, many of whom
were skilled. 
The point of our discussion is that capital and state have not accepted 
the legitimate demands of workers as ‘rights’. Even when laws are passed 
codifying some rights in them, even when the Constitution is amended 
to enshrine ‘workers participation in management’, or some memorable 
judgements are delivered by the Supreme Court, they are assimilated into 
the dominant power process. In fact, in 2009 itself it was apprehended by 
many that these so-called ‘right-based laws’ may turn out to be mainly the 
legitimation strategies of the rulers to give further momentum to their neo-
liberal growth strategy (Gopalan, 2020). 
The tragedy is that all the mainstream political parties of India accept
the ‘welfare’ framework for the workers, and they carry on the neoliberal
agenda of economic growth propelled by privatisation and globalisation.
Unfortunately, this debate between ‘welfare’ and ‘rights’ has not occupied
series attention of the trade union movement of India. Even when they
have struggled for a ‘right’ of the workers, they have accepted a very lim-
ited liberal democratic concept of right as a ‘claim recognised by the state
through law’ rather than viewing rights as ‘political affirmations through
continuous struggle’. The COVID-19 experience brought out this paradox
vividly. 
To conclude, the migrant labour crisis vividly brought out how Indian
political economy in the era of neoliberal capitalism thrived at the cost
of the basic rights of workers. It carefully maintained their vulnerabil-
ity, effectively suppressing their capacity to play the role of agency. The
absence of a politics that fundamentally questioned the perspective of
the rulers that graded and degraded labour and economies is what makes
it possible for this system to keep going. That perspective based on an
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Notes 
1 This understanding is not only based on readings on this subject but especially 
based on the field reports and insights gathered from the weekly web discussions 
with activists and researchers from various parts of India, including Odisha’s 
KBK region, on the migrant labour situation, organised by the Development 
Research Institute (DRI) beginning April 2020. Many of the reports are availa-
ble on www.gabeshanachakra.org. See particularly, Deepak Mishra et al. (2020) 
and DRI (2020). 
2 The Minister of State for labour in a written reply to a question in Parliament 
on 11 September 2020, on how many migrant workers had died during the lock-
down, said that they had no data on migrant labour. For a detailed account see 
The Scroll, 14 September 2020. https://scroll.in/latest/973074/migrant-crisis
-no-data-on-deaths-of-workers-during-lockdown-1-04-crore-returned-home
-says-centre. 
3 In fact, several states, not only BJP-ruled states of UP, MP, Karnataka, and 
Haryana, but also Rajasthan, Odisha, and Punjab had passed ordinances during 
the COVID-19 lockdown increasing working hours and relaxing labour laws to 
improve ‘ease of doing business’ and fight to pandemic. See http://www.sacw
.net/article14312.html. 
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3 Mobile population, 
‘pandemic citizenship’ 
Nasreen Chowdhory and 
Shamna Thacham Poyil 
Introduction 
Constituting the lion’s share of workforce in India’s infrastructure, logisti-
cal and supply services, agricultural sector, and even engaging in menial 
jobs such as that of domestic helps or rickshaw pullers, the unskilled and 
semi-skilled migrant worker is the most indispensable yet the easily dispos-
able entity in our economic structure. The synergy between ‘informality’
and ‘mobility’ has pushed the migrant worker to a vicious cycle of precari-
ous labour, compounded by the ‘uncertainty’ of one’s livelihood, ‘insecu-
rity’ about one’s entitlements and possessions, as well as the ‘unsafety’ of 
one’s body and health (Bauman, 2000: 161). The usually precarious nature 
of the work done by migrant labourers elevates to a degree of ‘hyper pre-
carity’ (Lewis et al., 2015) when subjected to the devastating impact of 
‘pandemic citizenship’.1 Drawing on Agamben’s construct of exception and 
constitution of bare life, the chapter conceptualises pandemic citizens as 
those citizens who in the ‘state of exception’ conjured by the pandemic 
have forfeited their rights and freedom of movement. The hardships faced 
by the migrant labour are not just a function of the pandemic but indicative 
of the compounded structural exclusion that has relegated them to the socio-
political margins of the state and warranted their categorisation as ‘citizen-
migrant’. While the assertion of their agency emerges with their mobility 
and livelihood paradox, the internal migrants of the country get drawn to the 
spatial aberration in claiming citizenship rights and entitlements. By sub-
jecting citizen-migrants to the vagaries of pandemic citizenship, the state 
dispossesses them of the only modicum of agency that they could exert for 
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Constituting the ‘pandemic citizens’ from 
‘citizen-migrants’ 
In the context of the pandemic, a ‘pandemic citizen’ has forfeited the 
indispensability of rights that is central to citizenship. The constitution of 
pandemic citizenship can be tethered to Foucault’s (2003: 241) conceptu-
alisation of ‘non-disciplinary’ bio politics of the state that is subjected on 
the ‘living man’ or ‘man-as-having being’. This ‘politics of life’ comprises 
of the ‘power to make live and let die’ where the ambiguous equilibrium 
between right to life and right to death is perpetually balanced in favour 
of death over life (ibid.). This is contrasted by Foucault (2003: 273) with 
the conventional articulation of sovereign authority as classical biopower 
which ‘take[s] life or let[s] live’. Extending Foucault’s notion, Mbembe 
(2003) conceptualises necropolitics as the ‘administration of death’ which 
showcases the ongoing patterns of subduing life to accommodate the 
politics of death and thereby displays the ‘generalized instrumentation of 
human existence and material destruction of human bodies and populations’
(Vajpeyi, 2009: 301). Agamben, drawing from the same body of work, has 
furthered the understanding of ‘bare life’ of ‘homosacer’, where the inviola-
bility of life is adjourned and reduced to the bare minimum of human exist-
ence. The pandemic response mechanism of the state constitutes a ‘state of 
exception’ where the discriminatory and discretionary powers of the state 
acquire a false legitimacy in the urgency to ensure public health. When the 
Indian state brought about a gamut of restrictions that curtailed the right to 
mobility of a citizen, it was given statutory validation through the enforce-
ment of the Disaster Management Act of 2005. All citizens of the country 
were subjected to the new normal of restricted mobility, denying the right to 
freedom of movement ensured by Article 19(d) of the Constitution. Hence 
the suspension of laws and rights during the pandemic exemplifies the state 
of exceptionality as conceptualised by Agamben (1998: 170), where ‘sub-
jective right and juridical protection no longer make any sense’. When a 
citizen-migrant to whom mobile livelihood is crucial for sustenance is sub-
jected to this restriction as compared to other citizens for whom the same 
restriction would only amount to an added inconvenience in terms of limita-
tion of choices (and not a threat for survival), it unravels the disproportionate 
effect of the aforementioned category of pandemic citizenship. By reducing 
citizen-migrants to the status of homo sacer, who is excluded from living 
a politically proficient life, pandemic citizenship ensures that the ambit of 
state protection is reduced to a mere subsistence of their bare life. In the 
state of exceptionality that causes ‘inclusive-exclusion’ or ‘exclusive-inclu-
sion’ (Agamben, 2008), pandemic citizens lose the capacity to claim their 
‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1986). Faced with the lack of any alternative, 
  
 





26 Nasreen Chowdhory and Shamna Thacham Poyil
the pandemic citizens chose to defy the restriction when they decided to 
undertake a long walk home. Here biopolitics can be seen to transmute to a 
sort of thanatopolitics where a particular segment of the population is posi-
tioned outside the ‘sphere of immunity’ by the state (Esposito, 2008: 14). 
The death of migrant workers due to dehydration, exhaustion, hunger, and 
accidents in their perilous journey on foot effectively showcases the pan-
demic citizen as an embodiment of bare life who eventually become sub-
jected to the thanatopolitical ‘dispositif’ (ibid) of the state. Thanatopolitics 
is then a corollary to biopolitics, where population management becomes 
politics of death brought about by letting some die, where death is ‘elided 
and dismissed’ as the ‘necessary part of living’, such that they are never 
‘caused’ per se’ rather the state merely ‘allows’ it to happen as a ‘passive 
event’ (Murray, 2008: 204). The lack of statistical records of the death of the 
migrants and the absence of any concerted attempt by the state to enumerate 
such deaths not just showcases the apathy towards the vulnerable but also 
signifies the thanatopolitical apparatus of the state that normalises the death 
of those excluded. It is necessary to analyse the construct of citizen-migrant
to understand how their marginality conditions them to be expelled from the 
‘sphere of immunity’ of the state, thereby exposing them to the viciously 
disproportionate impact of pandemic citizenship. The shaping of citizen-
migrant can be zoepolitically seen as the starting point of his diminution 
from the politically qualified good life (‘bios’) to the bare and naked life 
(zoë) constituted by the pandemic. 
The inclusive-exclusion that characterises Agamben’s bare life is symp-
tomatic of the condition of citizen-migrant where the mobility for liveli-
hood excludes accessing rights based citizenship. Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to liberty, which is equivo-
cally the right to a dignified life. Although every state is the benefactor 
of the right to life of its citizens both legally and politically, various pat-
terns of exclusion relegate individuals to the margins of the body politic. 
This causes the right to life to be applied ‘universally but not uniformally’
among the citizens, triggering the state to develop ‘differentiated govern-
mental management of life’ (Nasir, 2017: 76). Right to dignified life neces-
sitates an individual’s access to basic healthcare and education, and for 
those underprivileged languishing in peripheries of state, like the internal 
migrants, dignified life entails support for food rations and even livelihood 
assistance. Rather than conceiving citizenship as a legal status that facili-
tates their political and civic rights, it would be more pertinent to look at 
citizenship as a conduit that sanctions their social rights. 
Building on T.H Marshall’s conceptualisation of citizenship as a pro-
gression of civil, political, and social rights and entwining it with Arendt’s 
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citizenship as the ‘foundational right’ that facilitates an individual’s ‘social 
inclusion in civil society as a moral equal’ and how the rights of vulnerable 
categories of citizens within a nation-state get degraded under the influence 
of market fundamentalism. Being a citizen does not automatically enable 
the internal migrants of the country to access the rights and entitlements 
accrued through citizenship, which showcases the inevitable chasm inherent 
between ‘status and the reality of citizenship’ (Houtzager & Acharya, 2011: 
4). Similarly, Solinger (1993) in his study of circular migrants in China sug-
gests that despite having legal citizenship the ‘floating populations’ were 
prevented from accessing rights and welfare provisions. To Fraser (1996), 
the tenets of entitlement are based on the notion of necessity for assistance, 
requisite of employment, and a membership in the society in terms of citi-
zenship.2 Though with inherent variations, most of the advanced socie-
ties hyphenate entitlements with ‘definition of citizenship’ premised on a 
‘continuous stream of income above poverty level’ or a stable employment 
(Bakker, 1994: 6). In countries like China, the system of entitlements was 
conditioned by acquisition of urban residence. Interestingly, the domain of 
social citizenship showcases the entwinement and mutuality of political and 
economic rights so much so that the deprivation of one would constitute the 
denial of other (Roy, 2010). Chhachhi (2004), in the context of an almost 
non-existent framework in India to ensure the provisioning of entitlements 
grounded on citizenship, considers it pertinent to ascertain the overt reli-
ability of the migrant on exchanging their labour as the primary means for 
subsistence. 
At the outset, it is important to both locate and differentiate the pre-
carious labour of the citizen-migrant within the predominant discourse of 
labour, in order to establish the necessity to introspect their vulnerability 
towards the citizenship rights of the state. Drawing on Marxian scholarship, 
Fraser (1996) considers disproportionate labour exchange to be a grave 
social injustice that involves tacit exploitation, where the benefit of one’s 
labour is appropriated for the advantage of others, thereby constituting their 
economic deprivation and marginalisation. The current ‘neo-liberal globali-
zation, along with hypermobility of capital’ has fortified the supply of such 
‘flexible labour’ (Chhachhi, 2014) by feeding on the inequality emerging 
from such marginalisation. This must be seen in the context of erosion of the 
decommodification of labour in the post-Fordist era marked by the ‘infor-
malization, precariatization and fragmentation of labour’ (Chhachhi, 2014: 
901). The welfare capitalism that emerged during the Fordist mass produc-
tion era saw the state’s effort to promise a gamut of social citizenship rights 
that was in turn influenced by the strategies of trade union tactics and labour 
mobilisation. This was primarily dependent on the centrality of decom-






28 Nasreen Chowdhory and Shamna Thacham Poyil
ultimate power and supremacy enjoyed by employers (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 22). The hyphenation between wage labour and social citizenship that 
was asserted during this period of welfare state had considerably brought 
down the inherent systemic inequalities and caused for a ‘social levelling’
(Breman & Linden, 2014; Chhachhi, 2014). The informality of the wage 
labour thereby challenged the hyphenation of employment with social citi-
zenship (Barchiesi, 2008) such that it was the nature of the employment 
(formal/informal) which was coupled with the realisation of social citi-
zenship. Chhachhi (2014: 903) opines that the bivalent narrative of labour 
that centres on the Marxian notion of ‘exploitation’ and Polanyian theori-
sation of ‘commodification’ can be contested by the Global South in the 
context of their uniqueness in terms of the development of working class 
under the influence of colonialism, relevance of various types of labour, 
entwinement of migration with labour, the function of post-colonial state, 
as well as the confrontation and struggle that workers underwent to attain 
both work-related and social rights. In alignment with postulations of other 
scholarship (Linden, 2008; Mezzadra, 2012; Chakrabarty, 2001), she opines 
that the labour question in post-colonial countries like India should recog-
nise the categorisation of novel configurations of labour such as ‘precariat, 
cybertariat, care workers, etc.’, and the ways in which this reconfigures the 
class divide in the milieu of prevalent procedures and patterns of capital 
accumulation. 
In spite of participating in the accretion of capital, the ‘reserve army of 
labour’ is structurally conditioned to be the perpetually deprived (Breman, 
2013) and characteristically compared to the ‘precariat’. While reconcep-
tualising the notion of ‘labour’ based on the distinctions of nature of work, 
labour power, and distinguishing the modes of income, Standing (2011) 
posits the emergence of a new labour class that he calls the ‘precariat’ char-
acterised by the distinctive features of uncertainty and elasticity of occupa-
tion, overt dependability on the apprehensive and flexible wages coming 
from undertaking such employment and the negligible realisation of sub-
stantive citizenship rights. Unlike the proletariat, they cannot be located 
specifically in the hierarchy of Marxist class relations in the context of 
capitalist patterns of production. While the prognosis and diagnosis of the 
proletariat question is conditioned specifically by the need to attain a sus-
tainable protection of labour within the place of employment that, in turn, 
can be affiliated or associated with (such as a factory), it cannot be the same 
for the precariat. The vulnerability of the circular migrant labour in India 
that qualifies them to be the precariat in terms of their mobile livelihood and 
diverse skill set also precludes them to develop long-term affiliation with a 
particular place or segment of employment. The solution for the precariat’s 




Mobile population, ‘pandemic citizenship’ 29 
rather should be simultaneously sought outside those limits of the place 
of their employment. It is here that one can approach the exclusion of the 
precarious migrant labour by reconciling both their economic vulnerability 
and their political existence. By building on the Polanyian theorisation and 
by emphasising the inadequacy of ‘industrial citizenship’, Standing (2009) 
had put forth the necessity to re-problematise the dominant approach by 
supporting the de-hyphenation of employment with social citizenship and 
advocating ‘occupational citizenship’ that associates all occupations with 
equal rights, recognition, and identity. This can prevent the alienation of the 
labourer arising from mass commodification of the post-neoliberal world 
order. Arguably, the variations brought about in the nature of labour invoke 
categorisations like the precariat that warrant a realignment in introspection 
by combining the need to secure ‘labour rights vis-à-vis capital’ (Chhachhi, 
2014: 903) that necessitates locating rights as the citizens of the state. 
Citizenship is about accessing the resources apportioned to the citizens 
as much as it denotes their social membership in a community (Turner, 
1990). Through making claims on the state for the resources and rights 
that they are entitled to, individuals are effectively ‘practicing citizenship’
(Kruks-Wisner, 2019: 8). According to scholarship like Lister (2000) and 
Molyneux (2000), the conception of ‘citizenship in practice’ requires a shift 
in the focus of citizenship as a ‘process’ rather than a ‘status’. The question 
of exercising agency, whether at an individual level or at a collective level 
is instrumental while looking at citizenship as ‘process’ (Ong, 1991). The 
practice of citizenship ascertains an understanding on active citizenship as 
conceptualised by Houztager and Acharya (2011: 3), where citizens attempt 
to traverse the conditions for their access to public goods and provisions 
through exercising their agency ‘in ways that are publicly sanctioned and 
protected’. Kruks-Wisner (2019) examines the notion of active citizenship 
by modifying the ways exerted by an individual to access the public goods 
and provisions, wherein a citizen could use both formal and informal, pub-
licly sanctioned and even unsanctioned means to claim rights. This reclama-
tion of rights substantively denotes the participatory notion of citizenship 
where an individual exerts his political agency (Lister, 1998:228). In the 
absence of an institutionalised state structure that proactively implements 
the constitutionally guaranteed rights and welfare provisions, despite being 
the bearer of those rights, the migrant worker faces impediments in exerting 
his agency and claiming those rights. Kruks-Wisner (2019: 9) opines that 
claim-making hyphenates two aspects of citizenship – citizenship as a status 
that bestows the civil, political, and social rights and the status of citizen-
ship acquired by the individual through their participation in the political 
community. Going back to Somers (2008), one can see the amalgamation of 
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as emanating from the impact of social mobilisation in turn conditioned by 
the same rights. If citizenship can be conceived as a bundle of rights to be 
allocated and duties, passive citizens would comprise the base while active 
citizenship would constitute progressively higher echelons of the hierarchy. 
The precarity of migrant labour is that their compounded structural exclu-
sion conjures a gap which is in turn constituted by both the spatial bias of 
our citizenship rights and the migrant’s mobility. 
Mobile populations constitute the ‘imperceptible lot’ to the political 
leadership of our country, working in towns and cities of their home states 
renders them incapable to cast votes in the villages where they are elector-
ally registered. Notwithstanding the numbers, they lack a concerted politi-
cal weight due to their inefficacy in comprising the ‘vote bank’. For the 
same reason, the working conditions, health care and housing provisions 
of these labourers do not figure as a pressing concern for the politicians at 
the places to which they have migrated for employment. The ‘political dis-
enfranchisement of circular labour migrants’ (Roy, 2016) is central to their 
political exclusion. The disparity in the enumeration of migrants as visible 
in census reports and National Sample Surveys is rather too trivial a matter 
for the state, considering the haphazard and ambiguous definitions used to 
even qualify someone as migrant within the country. The ill-informed pol-
icy-making of state on internal migrants not just overlooks but also deeply 
discounts the economic value of the labour they undertake, as a larger num-
ber of temporary/seasonal/circular migrants remain invisible. 
The way in which their workplaces are spatially dispersed across vari-
ous geographical locations (Ghosh & Bandyopadhyay, 2020), the nature of 
complicated subcontracting provisions, and even the sheer circumstantial 
variety of low skilled and unskilled occupations in the country make their 
static settlement in one location impossible, making the ‘floating popu-
lation’ in the suburbs and urban locations of the country. The collective 
mobilisation of the migrant labour so as to assert their rights or negotiate 
their political demands is very difficult. One cannot attribute this lack of 
collective assertion among the migrant workers completely to the infor-
mal nature of their work; Agarwala (2013) opines that close to nine million 
informal workers participate in a union, even though they lack formal work-
ing conditions. A combination of both informal employment and mobile 
livelihood precipitate the structural vulnerability of migrant labour in India. 
In addition, their inherent socio-cultural diversity in terms of the identity 
markers such as language, religion, or caste renders their collective organi-
sation as a homogenous group rather challenging. The faultlines of caste, 
class, and gender and the diversity of their inherent skill set have constituted 
hierarchies of labour. The migrant labour of the country comprises largely 
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2020). The nature of contractual labour recruitment for low skilled and 
semi-skilled jobs adds on to this complex hierarchical structure, where the 
migrant labour is prevented from accruing any tangible capital or resources 
and is perpetually subjected to the exploitation by middlemen in selling 
their labour. 
The socio-economic susceptibility of the migrant labour is characterised 
by the repetitive abnegation of their social rights where affordable hous-
ing, healthcare, basic education becomes inaccessible to them due to the 
invisible fissures in administrative design and institutional framework of 
distributing the welfare provisions of the state. Srivastava (2020) outlines 
four factors for continued precarity of migrant labour in India – first is their 
inability to establish a ‘civic identity and civic citizenship’ at the destina-
tion, second is the unfavourable terms of assimilation to the labour market 
when compared to the non-migrants, third being the weak social network 
pattern amongst the migrants, and finally the inherent complexity in ascer-
taining claims and entitlements such as shelter. The inability can be attrib-
uted primarily to the lack of prior experience in exercising their citizenship 
rights even at their place of origin. This precludes them from developing 
awareness on the prerequisite of necessary documentation that would make 
them eligible for the entitlements and sometimes they would not know the 
provisions or entitlements for which they are eligible in the first place. In 
a complex administrative and institutional arrangement of welfare system, 
though money for the scheme might be sanctioned by the central govern-
ment, their pattern and implementation design can vary from state to state, 
making it difficult for the labourer to move from his state of origin to the 
state of his employment to claim his entitlements from the state. The pri-
mary impediment in accessing welfare provisions is establishing their legal 
identity at address of domicile as identification systems like UIDAI cur-
rently can link an individual with only one address, making it difficult for 
seasonal and circular migrants to access the entitlements through a single 
address. Even the admissibility to be included in the target population of 
schemes such as Ayushman Bharat, P.M Awas Yojana, and National Food 
Security Act are determined on the basis of Socio-Economic Caste Census 
(SECC) updated every ten years. Except for the possibility of some being 
included in the state of their origin, the chances for SECC being inclusive 
of short-term migrants at any place are significantly less, in turn causing 
them to be excluded from being a targeted beneficiary for such assistance. 
Statutory provisions include the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation 
of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act of 1979, which was brought 
about by acknowledging the inadequacy of existing legal framework in pro-
tecting the interests of migrant workers in the country. It recognised the 
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from the vagaries of their informal work condition and exploitation at the 
hands of contracting middlemen (Varma, 2020). The structural vulnerability 
and socio-economic deprivation has rendered them frail to exert the agency 
required for claiming their constitutional rights. The awareness and ade-
quate understanding on the implementation of a statutory law for alleviating 
their exploitation at work is in principle a long haul. The attempt to bridge 
the lacunae in existing labour laws led to the introduction of Occupational 
Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code of 2019 in Lok Sabha in 
2019,3 which also failed to achieve its stated purpose. 
The political exclusion, marginalisation in acquiring a valid legal iden-
tity, and inability to access their entitlements create a precarious existence 
amidst their material hardships and socio-economic vulnerability. Such 
deprivation of their substantive rights and entitlements along with ‘other-
ing’ that they face in the host societies can be considered to be the materiali-
sation of an ‘eclipsed citizenship’ (Mander et al., 2019). Beyond the normal 
dichotomy of insider/outsider to the construct of citizenship, they opine that 
differential practices of membership within the nation-state causes some 
to be privileged as being ‘interior’ and others as ‘exterior’. The plight of 
the migrant labour is not just that he is an outsider to the state to which 
he migrated but also that he is ‘exterior’ to the states from which he has 
migrated. The compounded structural exclusion has turned the migrant 
labour to a lesser citizen of the body politic even in the pre-pandemic nor-
mality, and curtailing the mobility of people has been central to the response 
measures adopted by means of complete or partial lockdown and border 
closures. It is at this juncture that the notion of ‘politics of mobility’ has 
resulted in ‘pandemic citizenship’. Dobusch and Kreissl (2020) have opined 
that the nature in which states handle the response measures for COVID-19
can be likened to the way in which the crisis management transmutes as 
‘im-/mobility governance’. As a person’s mobility is what enables him to 
access his livelihood or sustaining his societal and personal relations, it is 
inextricably linked to the constitution and reconstitution of power relations 
within the society (Cresswell, 2010) and thereby emerges as the ‘most cov-
eted stratifying factor’ (Bauman, 1998). The statutory and non-statutory 
provisions intended to enable or curtail the mobility and thereby the partak-
ing of individuals across various aspects of life ensures the disproportionate 
endowment of mobility along the pre-existing faultlines of class, religion, 
ethnicity, or even gender. For a pandemic crisis where mobility-induced 
proximity of individuals is the primary causative factor, the curtailment of 
the very same mobility emerging as the principal response mechanism of 
the state was perceived to be fairly just. But the implementation of such 
response mechanisms exhibits the inequalities and asymmetric power rela-
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differential and viciously disparate treatment to migrant labour within the 
country in comparison to the effort and enthusiasm invested in the imple-
mentation of the Vande Bharat mission conceived so as to bring home the 
emigrant community from Middle East who were literally crucial to the 
inward remittance received by the southern states of India, like Kerala. 
Instead, the improvisation of state-dictated norms of mobility using hap-
hazard categorisations such as ‘stranded migrants’ failed to comprehend 
the diverse nature of the predicament of migrant labour, resulting in the 
reduction of individuals to graded bodies in which some citizens are more 
unequal than others. The pandemic reconstituted them as potential carriers 
of the virus, thus making the migrant labourer an ‘outsider’ or ‘other’ who 
can be thanatopolitically left to die than let to live. 
When citizen-migrants are subjected to a pandemic citizenship, it con-
jures a ‘contrast medium’ that amplifies and reveals the ‘ills that affect our 
society’.4 Their plight ought to be seen from the intersection of ‘process, 
agency, and multidimensionality of exclusion’, all of which create a situ-
ation of ‘thwarted citizenship’ (Roy, 2010: 176). The transition of migrant 
labour in India to a citizen-migrant to a pandemic citizen is marred with 
the masking, assertion, dispossession, and re-assertion of his agency. The 
economic marginalisation emanating from the informality of his labour 
and the compounded socio-political exclusion conditioned by his mobility 
had caused the state to precipitate structural conditions that masked him 
from exerting his agency required for the practice of citizenship. A citi-
zen-migrant is already a lesser, unequal citizen who was included and later 
excluded at the same time. Baubock (2011: 3) in conceptualising ‘partial 
citizens’ describes temporary migrants as those who could not partake in the 
political sphere for making the same laws that they were being subjected to 
and whose membership status is jeopardised by the ‘automatic acquisition 
or loss or as a result of mere change of residence’ along with the absence 
of a robust spatial affiliation that prevents them from ‘justifying fuller set 
of rights or motivating fuller participation’. The acquisition of livelihood 
is an exercise of their right to mobility, through which the migrant labour 
asserts limited agency. Overlooking of vulnerability and marginalisation by 
the state by means of imposition of a uniform blanket ban on mobility con-
stitutes a pandemic citizenship, i.e., one that completely dispossessed the 
citizen-migrant of any agency to a dignified life. As opined by Roy (2010: 
26–27), migrants who have been ousted from the ‘elite domain of civil soci-
ety’ for their incapacity to manoeuver the ‘skills’ required for citizenship 
are thereby perpetually condoned to the inferior realm of ‘residual citizens’. 
The analogy of pandemic citizen to homo sacer signifies how being cast out 
to the peripheries of citizenship exposes one to the bare life, where abstract 
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people been able to access at least their basic food ration through the Public 
Distribution System at their areas of domicile, the migrant exodus and con-
sequent cataclysm that we witness today could have been averted to a certain 
degree. When the citizen-migrants who are citizens deprived of substan-
tive citizenship become pandemic citizens, they face a complete absence of 
choice, such that they are reduced to the naked life of the homo sacer. By 
defying the restrictions imposed by the state, when they set out on barefoot 
for a ‘long march’ back home, they reassert agency for a dignified life. This 
exposes them to the state’s dichotomous choice of worthy citizens over the 
other insignificant citizens whose death are overtly or covertly instigated by 
the thanatopolitical practices of the state facilitated by the pandemic ‘state 
of exception’. Their death both literally and metaphorically signifies the 
process of exclusion of the citizen-migrant culminating as the erasure of 
pandemic citizen. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the compounded exclusion of migrants manifested by their
mobile livelihood puts them into a flux between their state of origin and
state of destination, which is juxtaposed against the spatial bias inherent
both in our citizenship framework and the institutionalisation of our wel-
fare provisions. These factors cause the migrant body to transmute to the
citizen-migrant as lesser, unequal citizen unable to claim entitlements, dis-
empowered to access rights. Agamben (2020) opines that response mecha-
nism of the state during pandemic is the manifestation of the predisposition
of the state to use a ‘state of exception as the normal paradigm of the gov-
ernment’. The reduction of individuals to their bare life of mere biologi-
cal existence devoid of any social and political dimension is normalised
and accepted in fear of survival (ibid.). The state of exception and politics
of mobility instituted by the state during pandemic creates the pandemic
citizen who has forfeited his claim to the indispensable right of mobil-
ity. Yet the structural vulnerability that has constituted the citizen-migrants
in the first place has made them most vulnerable to the adverse and dis-
proportionate impact of this pandemic citizenship, reducing them to the
disposition of homo sacer leading a ‘bare life’. For the citizen-migrants,
in the absence of an effective social security net and welfare provisions,
their assertion of agency to be mobile is the only factor that enables them
to earn the remuneration in return for the labour they engage in. While
for any other citizen the constraints on mobility have only limited their
choices and options in day-to-day life, the state has deprived the citizen-
migrant of their only choice and means to a dignified life. The partaking
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pandemic citizens becomes thanatopolitical in the way it facilitated life
for the equal citizens and death to the unequal citizen-migrant. The blatant
disregard for their structural predicament will cause the normality of the
post-pandemic society to be built on the edifice of the very same unequal
pandemic citizenship. 
Notes 
1 The term pandemic citizen has been adapted from the article ‘The biopolitics 
of pandemic citizenship’ by Adil Hossain (2020) but conceptualized differently 
from the original version. 
2 Cross cited from Chhachhi (2004). 
3 https://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/occupational-safety-health-and-working-c
onditions-code-2. 
4 Cross cited from Dobusch and Kreissl (2020). 
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4 Juridicalising justice? 
COVID-19, citizenship claims, and 
courts 
Kalpana Kannabiran and 
Sreekar Aechuri 
Introduction 
Since March 2020, India has been under a lockdown owing to the COVID-
19. In what was perhaps the ‘harshest coronavirus lockdown in the world’, 
this governmental measure saw an outpouring of workers from cities and 
towns they had migrated to in search of work, back to their native villages 
that they had left in search of better lives and survival with dignity. The 
turbulent waves of internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the highways 
and railway tracks heading back ‘home’ will remain an enduring image 
of the pandemic in India. As Upendra Baxi notes, ‘we must fully know 
the existential horror reflected in their social biographies: the economic, 
social and political conditions and contexts which make people move from 
the domicile of birth to the domicile (of their necessitous and precarious) 
“choice”’ (Baxi, 2020a). Brahma Prakash reflects on the spectre of internal 
displacement and the forced return of workers to villages they had left: 
‘The problem of migrant workers’, he observes pertinently, ‘is not to be 
defined in terms of a choice between village and city. It is about a condition 
in which they are neither part of the village, nor part of the city’, for we 
cannot afford to forget that migration of Dalits and other oppressed castes 
and classes out of villages is forced by the inhuman conditions in villages 
and the routine indignities they are forced to bear (Prakash, 2020). With 
worksites shut down, schools and colleges closed, curfew in place, hospi-
tals and medical facilities ill-equipped to deal with the crisis on hand, gov-
ernance floundered and rested on a series of arbitrary measures and hasty 
ordinances, with citizens as mere spectators and victims of the unfolding 
tragedy. Under the circumstances, the judiciary was the only check on the 
government and courts the only resort available to petitioners in urgent need 
of proactive intervention that was needed to protect and safeguard Article 
21 rights under the Constitution – to use Justice PK Goswami’s words, ‘last 
resort of the bewildered and the oppressed’.1 
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In the context of COVID-19, Upendra Baxi underscores the importance 
of the ‘peremptory jus cogens’ that categorically set out state obligations 
and goes on to observe, ‘only new forms of human compassion and solidar-
ity can help overcome this lethal and formidably grim challenge and [help 
build] a new future for global politics marked by empathy, fraternity, jus-
tice, and rights’ (Baxi, 2020b). 
In this chapter, we examine the cascading jurisprudence that sprang 
up from the lockdown, and reflect on trends in judicial deliberations and 
their implications for an understanding of justice and rights under the 
Constitution. The rights of internally displaced persons during the lock-
down and the forced migration that it triggered needs to be understood as 
constitutive of the understanding of justice under the ‘triadic ethical frame-
work of the Constitution’.2 
While arbitrary state action was a major issue in the declaration of 
lockdown as well as in state measures at containment for the most part 
(Kannabiran, 2020), broadly speaking, citizens petitioned the courts on (a) 
the right to health and (b) rights of internally displaced persons. Apart from 
the specific cases brought before the courts, there were concerns raised in 
the media about the unprecedented surveillance on citizens in the name of 
containment measures (Aarogya Setu and policing practices) and the dis-
mantling of labour protections by some state governments in the immediate 
aftermath of the lockdown as a way of safeguarding employers’ interests. 
Of particular interest is the direction in which jurisprudence has pro-
ceeded. To anticipate our argument, courts have engaged with these peti-
tions either with deference to executive or by urging the executive to think 
of better policy-making instead of discussing rights, fundamental freedoms, 
guarantees, and their enforcement. Except for one order of the Telangana 
High Court, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy vs. Union of 
India in the matter of the non-negotiability of fundamental rights has not 
been cited in any of the cases pertaining to/arising from COVID-19.3 What 
is the place of the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy 
in understanding and evaluating ‘COVID-19 jurisprudence’? (Kannabiran, 
2021). If, as Justice DY Chandrachud says, ‘it is the Constitution that is 
lynched when a person is lynched’,4 the deaths due to hunger, train/road 
accidents, physical exhaustion, custodial torture (which includes exposure 
to infection in custody), and custodial murders imperil the Constitution and 
its futures. 
The right to health 
In considering issues around access to health care as a core element in jus-
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the right to health as also health care access specific to the pandemic. Since 
COVID-19 is our point of departure in this chapter, it is important to point 
to the demands the pandemic places on the health care system, in order 
to then move to the ways in which these demands have impacted on non-
COVID health care needs, and then situate the specific ways in which courts 
have over five months addressed right to health concerns, as part of Article 
21 rights. While we have several documents, studies, and statements put out 
by various health rights collectives in the country, we draw from Srivatsan’s 
mapping of the pandemic in relation to institutionalised health care in 
Telangana state (Srivatsan, 2020). Pointing to the fact that in its fifth month, 
India is witnessing a full-blown community spread of COVID-19 in several 
states of the country, he estimates that in Telangana alone the cumulative 
mortality rate from COVID-19 will be over 57,000, with 90 per cent of 
those dying over 60 years of age. With 239,000 infected individuals seeking 
hospitalisation, the numbers of available hospital beds in private and public 
facilities falls far short – if pooled together, his estimates point to 99,919 
beds. Similarly, while the requirement for ICU units is around 43,000, avail-
able units (for the most part concentrated in private hospitals) total about 
5,000 in the state. There is little reason to assume a vastly different scenario 
in most of the other states. This then has an immediate impact on health care 
access for other emergency and critical cases. Anoo Bhuyan underscores the 
struggles of those with chronic illnesses unrelated to COVID-19 to access 
health care, emergency services, and affordable medicines (Bhuyan, 2020). 
Alongside this, triggered by the lockdown, health care needs of the exodus 
of workers and IDPs with no money, food, or shelter suffering deep trauma 
after being locked out and dispossessed in four hours, hunger, exhaustion, 
and utter neglect remain unaddressed. This is the largest section of people 
who do not enter the account of even trying to access institutionalised health 
care. Deaths – countless – in these cases are not counted as deaths caused 
by the novel coronavirus. They are also not deaths or morbidities caused by 
lack of access to care for chronic ailments, nor are their needs counted as 
critical health care needs. Where then does this aspect of COVID-19 mor-
bidity and mortality figure in our accounts of the right to health and the right 
to life? This is the backdrop against which the jurisprudence on health care 
access during COVID-19 needs to be situated. 
Although there were reports of pregnant women being turned away from 
hospitals and dying during or immediately after childbirth5 and countless 
women being deprived access to contraceptives in line with the advisory 
of Ministry of Health to suspend provisions of sterilisations and IUCDs,6 
the cases that drew the attention/ire of the courts were few. Addressing this 
urgent need to resolve questions of reproductive justice for women, Sama, a 
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2020, asking for reliefs against the denial of basic health care, and delivery 
and childbirth services to pregnant women and the barriers faced by fami-
lies in accessing maternal health care access.7 Despite detailed guidelines 
issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, 
for the delivery of essential medical services – which include reproduc-
tive services, treatment for communicable diseases, chronic diseases and 
emergencies, health care workers, particularly Auxiliary Nurse Midwives 
and Asha workers – these were unavailable on the ground for the care of 
pregnant women. In this case, the petitioners’ demand for a dedicated hel-
pline, provision of transportation services and access to health workers for 
pregnant women was agreed to by the ministry, which was also putting in 
place a helpline for senior citizens. This is especially relevant in the light of 
the observation of the Gujarat High Court: 
Ordinarily, the High Court would not interfere with the functioning of 
the State Government. The Court steps in by mandamus when the State 
fails to perform its duty. The true test of an efficient Government can be 
determined from its performance in times like the present one. 
In difficult times, it is expected of any Government to rise to the 
occasion and protect its citizens … All that we are doing is to remind 
the State Government of its constitutional obligations and the direc-
tive policies of the State. In such circumstances, we expect the State 
Government to accept our orders passed in the Public Interest in the 
right spirit bearing in mind the paramount consideration of the health 
and wellbeing of the people as imperatively implicit in the right to life 
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.8 
In exercising oversight over governmental measures for reining in private 
hospitals, increasing the number of treatment and care facilities available, 
providing facilities for doctors and medical personnel, taking over hotels 
for expansion of medical services, controlling costs and pricing by pri-
vate facilities and demanding detailed reports from the government, forc-
ing convergence between different departments, the Gujarat High Court, 
in response to a slew of petitions filed before the court on governmental 
neglect, addressed itself to the remit of the court in matters of emergency 
such as one triggered by COVID-19, and directed the state government to 
fulfil its obligations to the people under Part IV of the Constitution, rec-
ognising that ‘Public Interest Litigation is meant for the benefit of the lost 
and lonely and of those whose social backwardness is the reason for no 
access to the Court’ (para 53). The Telangana High Court, similarly passed 
orders ‘in the nature of Writ of Mandamus’, directing the state to report on 
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PPE to doctors, medical and para-medical personnel, non-availability of 
N-95 masks and sanitisers for the public at large, non-availability of daily 
essential goods at reasonable prices to the general public, and the absence 
of any provision for livelihood support, shelter, and protection for IDPs, 
homeless, students evicted from hostels, and itinerant communities, and 
inadequate testing facilities for COVID-19.9 Problems of short supply of 
medicines, beds, and medical care leading to exploitation especially by pri-
vate hospitals forced some states to cap prices related to medical treatment 
of COVID-19 with one of the first states – Maharashtra deciding on 22 
May 2020.10 Despite the Supreme Court’s direction to the centre to ensure 
prices are capped in private hospitals across the country,11 only around 12 
states complied,12 without any serious enforcement of the same with seri-
ous instances of exploitation by private hospitals persisting.13 In looking 
at testing policy, and asking Indian Council for Medical Research to be 
impleaded, the Gujarat High Court recalled the observation of the Supreme 
Court in Navtej Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India: 
The jurisprudence of this Court, in recognizing the right to health and 
access to medical care, demonstrates the crucial distinction between 
negative and positive obligations. Article 21 does not impose upon the 
State only negative obligations not to act in such a way as to interfere 
with the right to health. This Court also has the power to impose posi-
tive obligations upon the State to take measures to provide adequate 
resources or access to treatment facilities to secure effective enjoyment 
of the right to health. 
(para 28, 42/2020) 
What we witness in the case of Gujarat and Telangana, for instance, is the 
effective opening out of the jurisprudence of ‘continuing mandamus’ – ‘a 
process by which the constitutional court instead of delivering a conclu-
sive verdict, keeps the litigation ongoing, giving orders from time to time, 
monitoring governmental compliance through regular hearings’ (Poddar 
and Nahar, 2017). The important aspect of ‘continuing mandamus’ is of 
course the fact that state action on each of the problems addressed in these 
sweeping orders falls woefully short, forcing citizens to approach courts 
that may then force accountability on the government. In Telangana state 
especially, the sharp observations of the court and its stringent directions 
point to the utter inadequacy of state action that is self-driven and bound 
by constitutional obligations.14 In cases where ‘continuing mandamus’ is 
the approach of the courts, there is an implicit recognition by the courts of 
the need to closely monitor state compliance to constitutional obligations 
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inter-reading of Article 14 with the right to health in his discussion on the 
Supreme Court’s interim orders on free testing for COVID-19: 
the question is not whether a Court order interferes with the budget and 
is therefore illegitimate, but whether the Court order does or does not 
enforce a constitutional right. If it does, then the impact on the budget 
is a collateral issue … In the present case, therefore, the key issues are 
twofold: what rights are at play (… these are the rights to equality read 
with the right to health), and whether lack of access to testing consti-
tutes an infringement of these rights (… the nature of the coronavirus 
pandemic is such that it does).15 
We also see, in these cases, the interconnections between right to health and 
other Article 21 rights that, strictly speaking, may be delineated in distinct 
ways but cannot be disaggregated from the whole. This still limits the reach 
of measures to health care seekers. How many of the hundreds of thousands 
of IDPs – women and men – were able to effectively access health care, 
and how their health care needs remained unaddressed and subservient to a 
surveillant focus on their forced travels is a problem we must grapple with. 
Rights of internally displaced persons 
Any attempt to grasp and bear witness to the pandemic exodus ‘must fully 
know the existential horror reflected in their social biographies: the eco-
nomic, social, and political conditions and contexts which make people 
move from the domicile of birth to the domicile (of their necessitous and 
precarious) “choice”’ (Baxi, 2020a).16 As Deshpande and Ramachandran 
suggest, ‘the incidence of the disease is not class-neutral: poorer and eco-
nomically vulnerable populations are more likely to contract the virus as 
well as to die from it’, and the ‘economic consequences of the current pan-
demic are likely to be concentrated most on low wage earners’ (Deshpande 
and Ramachandran, 2020). Examining employment data for India pertain-
ing to April 2020, they find that the rise in unemployment immediately after 
the imposition of lockdown was far steeper for the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes than for the upper castes. This correlated with their earlier 
work of disparities in educational attainment by social group suggests again 
that it is the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes that faced the job losses, 
being concentrated in insecure precarious employment. 
The question that we will examine in this section is whether, in the fram-
ing of its jurisprudence on the COVID exodus, the constitutional court was 
in fact cognisant of the gravity of the infringement of constitutional rights 
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focus, therefore, is not as much on what specific reliefs the courts ordered 
on but how they framed this grant/denial (as the case may be) of reliefs. 
This holds important lessons for our future understanding on constitutional 
jurisprudence on forced migration in India, and the framing of state respon-
sibility in this situation. 
Within a week of the imposition of Lockdown 1.0, the very first order 
passed in the matter of two petitions before the Supreme Court of India on 
31 March 2020 by Chief Justice SA Bobde and Justice L Nageswara Rao 
is instructive in its framing of the forced migration triggered by the union 
government. The petitions, the court recounts, 
highlighted the plight of thousands of migrant labourers who along 
with their families were walking hundreds of kilometres from their 
work place to their villages/towns. The concern of the Petitioners 
pertains to the welfare of the migrant labourers. They are seeking a 
direction to the authorities to shift the migrant labourers to government 
shelter homes/accommodations and provide them with basic amenities 
like food, clean drinking water, medicines, etc.17 
The court then proceeds to detail at length the Status Report filed by the
union government in response to the petitioners’ concerns: the various steps
to prevent the spread of corona virus; ‘various other measures … dealing
with the needs of lower strata of society’ (emphasis added); relief package of
Rs. 1.70 lakh crore under Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana; ‘the exodus
of migrant labourers was triggered due to panic created by some fake/mis-
leading news and social media;’ ‘[t]he very idea of lock down was to ensure
that the virus would not spread. It was felt [by the government] that trans-
portation of migrant labourers would aggravate the problem of spread of
the Virus; on 31 March 2020, 21,064 relief camps had been set up, 6,66,291
persons were provided shelter and 22,88,279 persons were provided food.’ 
In presenting its status report, the government of India sought directions 
from the Supreme Court to (a) issue directions for compliance by state gov-
ernments of advisories issued by union government and (b) ‘prevent fake 
and inaccurate reporting whether intended or not, either by electronic print 
or social medial which will cause panic in the society’. 
The Supreme Court declared that it was satisfied with the steps reported 
by the union government to contain the spread of the virus, and in consider-
ing the situation of the exodus of workers, it went on to quote the director 
general of the WHO: 
We are not just fighting an epidemic; we are fighting an infodemic. 
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There was no attempt at this stage by the Supreme Court to arrive at an
independent assessment of the situation unfolding on the ground, nor was
there any attempt to engage with questions of proportionality, forced dis-
placement, forced migration, the question of dignity, and the possibilities
of an exercise of continuing mandamus demanding specific performance
of constitutional obligations by the state. The focus on ‘stopping the
spread of the virus’ rendered the suffering that the lockdown unleashed
opaque from the institutions of justice in the immediate aftermath. The
deflection of attention from those forcibly displaced to the diversionary
rhetoric of ‘fake news’ undermined processes of justice in fundamental
ways. The second petitioner in this case, Harsh Mander, in his rejoinder
to the Status Report filed by the state, pointed importantly to the problem-
atic reliance of the court on the status report alone in its response to the
matters raised in the petitions, both filed on the basis of a detailed ground
report and on-site assessment of predicament of pandemic IDPs.18 This
rejoinder details the specific problems faced by the ousted workers and
their families (including children), the inadequacy of the relief mentioned
in the status report, the inaccessibility of the Public Distribution System
(PDS) to most workers who had migrated in search of work owing to
the domicile requirement of the PDS, the total exclusion of workers in
the unorganised sector, notably construction workers to any manner of
relief, and the deaths of workers and kin within the first week of lockdown
owing to the disproportionate hardships imposed on them. The response
of the court in this matter was telling, with Chief Justice SA Bobde going
on record to ask the petitioner ‘why wages are required when meals are
provided by the government.’19 
This one statement by itself frames the approach of the Supreme Court 
of India to the Lockdown IDP’s right to citizenship claims and dignity, as 
also its approach to questions of empathy (on its own part and on the part 
of the state), compassion, and fraternity in the face of grave harms and dis-
proportionate suffering. 
Although the exodus began the night that the lockdown was imposed, the 
fact that hundreds of thousands of the country’s workers were on the road 
trekking infinite distances on the highways with their children and meagre 
belongings, no destination in sight, weeks on end, with no food or water, 
some dying of exhaustion, others in road accidents, others mowed down 
by trains while governments watched and barricaded state borders or aban-
doned workers at borders or sprayed bleach on returning workers, resulted 
in some scattered orders from different courts for ‘stranded workers’.20 
Finally, the Shramik trains that yet again did not match the numbers who 
needed to travel across the length and breadth of the network of the Indian 
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widely known and understood by those who needed to travel, prompted the 
NHRC to take suo motu notice and observe, 
A train getting late due to bad weather etc. for some hours is always 
considered beyond control of the authorities but trains getting lost dur-
ing journey, reaching unexpected destinations and taking more than 
a week to reach its scheduled station is hard to believe and require a 
thorough investigation into the matter.21 
A few states, including Gujarat, announced police action if migrants were 
to travel back to their states,22 while the Karnataka government cancelled 
‘Shramik Trains’ on a representation from the builders’ association so that 
the displaced workers could now be put to work on construction sites.23 This 
stands in stark contrast to the state of Kerala which set up a model contain-
ment and logistic policy that dealt with every aspect of the pandemic and 
the lockdown.24 
Courts did go as far as to observe that the migrants ‘are not afraid of
COVID but they are afraid they would die due to starvation’,25 and food
supply and glucose was provided in a few instances on highways.26 The
IDPs were not afraid of starvation, they were dying of starvation, and suf-
fering from hunger. Yet, the reason for their predicament remains unac-
knowledged both by states and courts. In response to an Interlocutory
Application seeking directions from the Supreme Court to District
Magistrates to identify and transport migrants on highways within their
jurisdiction to their home states,27 Justice L. Nageshwara Rao’s noncha-
lant observation, ‘How can we stop them from walking? It is impossible
for this Court to monitor who is walking and who is not walking’,28 and
Justice SK Kaul’s retort, ‘Will you go and implement government direc-
tives? We will give you a special pass and you go and check’,29 point to a
total absence of epistemic humility and judicial compassion in the face of
suffering. 
The jurisprudence of continuing mandamus that evolved quite quickly in 
several courts with respect to medical treatment, and access to health facili-
ties, did not figure at all in the jurisprudence on forced migration induced by 
the lockdown. The reliefs granted by courts in the matter of IDPs, whether 
related to food, work, wages, or transport, remained episodic and piecemeal 
over three months of the lockdowns. This has to do, we suggest, with the 
question of class – the description for instance of IDPs as ‘lower strata of 
society’ or the Supreme Court’s doubt about why workers needed wages 
if they were given food, put into stark relief the class-caste biases embed-
ded in the juridicalisation of the rights of forced migrants by constitutional 
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Finally, on the question of labour rights – the lockdown IDPs were all
workers – ostensibly in a bid to revive the economy and incentivise local busi-
nesses and foreign investors, the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
and Gujarat, among others, exercised their powers under Factories Act, 1948,
and other laws and issued notifications ‘relaxing’ labour laws.30 Some of the
effects of such relaxations would be extension of work hours to 12 hours a
day (without over-time wages), deprivation of access to raise disputes under
Industrial Disputes Act, and relaxation of measures on safety and hygiene in
factories (ironically during a health crisis), among others that constitute a seri-
ous derogation of basic standards of fair labour practice and dignity of labour.
Two PILs filed in the Supreme Court challenged the vires of the proposed
notifications and exercise of power as violative of the Constitution.31 The
petitioners argued that such relaxation would constitute forced labour and is
in violation of India’s commitments to international human rights guarantees. 
In relation to the question of labour protections, especially, we witness 
the rise of concerted coercive practices by the state – both directly and 
through the absence of due diligence – especially in relation to workers: 
forced displacement aggravated by forced labour proscribed under Article 
23 of the Constitution of India. 
Conclusion: Unravelling arbitrary state action 
In conclusion, we dwell briefly on the subject of arbitrary state action and 
judicial empathy during this time. In assessing the principle of proportion-
ality of any specific state action, disparities in access and disproportionate 
impact owing to social vulnerabilities are critical determining factors of 
‘manifest arbitrariness’ – with first measures requiring safety mechanisms 
to be put in place to ensure minimal adverse impact on the precariat. 
An important concern that figured significantly in judicial discourse 
which we have not been able to address at any length is the communalisa-
tion of pandemic vulnerabilities and the surge in ‘genocidal journalism’ in 
India.32 The refusal by the Supreme Court to restrain the media from inciting 
hatred against Muslims33 despite the violation of Rule 6 of Cable Television 
Network Rules, 1994 (which prohibits attacks on religions which promote 
communal attitudes), points to the earlier issue we raised about class and 
caste biases embedded in the juridicalisation of the pandemic, that were 
fundamentally majoritarian. 
There were important countermoves from the Madras High Court and 
the High Court of Bombay in cases related to the Tablighi Jamaat meet-
ing. The Madras High Court observed in the matter of the detention of 
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Covid-19 should teach us to care for each other rather than use the 
arsenal of law. Merely because the petitioners have contravened the 
visa conditions, they cannot be seen as criminals. The situation calls for 
empathy and understanding. 
(para 16)34 
The Bombay High Court observed: 
There was big propaganda in print media and electronic media against 
the foreigners … There was virtually persecution [emphasis added] 
against these foreigners … A political Government tries to find the 
scapegoat when there is pandemic or calamity and the circumstances 
show that there is probability that these foreigners were chosen to make 
them scapegoats … It is now high time for the concerned to repent 
about this action taken against the foreigners and to take some positive 
steps to repair the damage done by such action.35 
Can there be a sharper indictment of the government? And yet, the refusal 
of courts and governments to intervene to stop incitement in media points to 
the expanding field of impunity under a majoritarian state. 
On the subject of impunity, while the spike in state impunity through cus-
todial torture and death with numbers ranging over 7,000 custodial deaths 
in the period 2014–201836 is alarming and predates the lockdown, the use of 
lockdown and restricted mobility to bolster custodial torture (including wil-
ful exposure to COVID-19 in jails where political prisoners are detained) is 
especially a cause for concern. State violence on civilians ‘violating’ restric-
tions on mobility (such as the custodial murder of Jeyaraj and Bennix in 
Sattankulam in Tamil Nadu), curbing any congregation of protest against 
state violence as routinely witnessed in Kashmir, and the routine and aggra-
vated derailment of due process rights in matters of life, liberty, and dignity, 
as we witness in the case of the detention of a rape survivor and her counsel-
lors in Araria in Bihar, mark the lockdown, making it a more serious human 
rights concern than the pandemic itself. 
Public health emergencies have necessitated stringent measures of con-
tainment by states at different times in recent history, particularly through 
the imposition of restrictions on liberty such as quarantine, self-isolation, 
lockdowns, curfews, and mandatory distancing norms. However, it is pre-
cisely at times such as this that international human rights standards force 
obligations on states to be attentive to the limitations necessary on these 
drastic measures (Kannabiran, 2020). The place of empathy, transparency, 
and setting out blueprints of positive, enabling, non-coercive measures of 
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a situation where the certainty that the overwhelming majority of persons 
affected will be the precariat. 
In a rare (perhaps singular) expression of judicial empathy and humility, 
Justice G.R. Swaminathan observes, 
I feel sensitive to the petitioners’ misery particularly in these pandemic 
times. I posed a question to myself if I am acting beyond jurisdiction? 
… If I come to the conclusion that the petitioners have already suffered 
enough and that they are being put to ‘surplus or unnecessary suffer-
ing’, I am obliged to intervene. 
(paras 17–18)37 
A close examination of ‘COVID-19 jurisprudence’ (Kannabiran, 2021)
points to an uneven and inconsistent focus by courts – with continuing
mandamus invoked by a few courts for monitoring state action on the
right to health, and an episodic, inadequate response to forced migra-
tion and displacement triggered by an arbitrary lockdown. In the blanket
announcement of lockdown, the ends of justice and indeed its obligation
towards the triadic ethical framework of the Constitution, especially state
obligations under Part IV, were jettisoned by the state in stark ways that
were manifestly arbitrary both in the means (the process) and the end (the
measure). 
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5 The ‘new normal’ 
Making sense of women migrants’
encounter with COVID-19 in India 
Indu Agnihotri and Asha Hans 
Introduction 
The COVID-19 context 
This pandemic is deeply hurting the economic interests and well-being of 
our nation’s middle class, lower-middle class, and poor segments. In such 
a time of crisis, I request the business world and high-income segments of 
society to as much as possible, look after the economic interests of all the 
people who provide them services.1 
These words by the prime minister in the run-up to the lockdown as a first 
step towards dealing with COVID-19 raised many hopes. This was despite 
the fact that COVID-19 effectively descended on India with a deafening 
silence, ushered in by a stringent lockdown imposed at barely four hours’
notice towards the end of March 2020. However, the quiet was soon shat-
tered by a growing demand by migrant workers for food, shelter, and trans-
port. The most powerful images were of women and men with headloads, 
without footwear and bleeding feet, and a woman dead on a platform with 
a child trying to wake her. These visuals briefly turned the gaze on to a 
hitherto unrecognised reality: the existence of millions of internal migrants 
– homeless, invisible, and unrecognised, on whose intense labour the story 
of India’s double-digit growth has for long been written. 
The presence of the absence: Official response to migrant 
women’s needs 
The Government of India (henceforth GOI) started to respond to the migrant 
crisis with executive decisions which were, not surprisingly, insensitive to 
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GOI to curb movement of migrants who, faced with loss of work and no 
income to meet their daily food requirements, had no option but to throng 
to railway stations and bus stands or hit the highways, in an effort to return 
to their homes/source areas. GOI, meanwhile, called on States and Union 
Territories to take ‘strict measures’ to prevent the exodus, laying stress on 
the need to ‘prevent any disruption to law and order’ (GOI, 2020, emphasis 
added). In the meantime, under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana 
(PMGKY) food and minimal cash were offered to convince the migrant 
workers and homeless people to stay where they were. Purportedly aired 
over the public address system, the orders went unheeded, as hundreds of 
thousands of migrants, including women who, dependent on daily earnings 
for immediate survival needs, set out on foot, laying bare the unprepared-
ness of the state to handle the crisis. On 29 March 2020, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, GOI issued an order that this movement of large number 
of migrants in some parts of the country was a violation of the lockdown 
measures on maintaining social distancing. States were again directed to 
ensure adequate arrangements for food and shelter, ‘to mitigate the eco-
nomic hardship of the migrant workers’, while also proclaiming that ‘all the 
employers … shall make payments of wages at their workplace on the due 
date, without any deduction, for the period of closure during the lockdown’. 
Landlords too were directed not to ‘demand payment of rent for a period 
of one month’, with forceful vacation of rented accommodation or hostel 
premises being liable for action under the Disaster Management Act (GOI, 
2020a). A quick read of the orders issued indicates that there was no recog-
nition of specific needs or gendered vulnerabilities. 
Official responses, even as they referred to ‘stranded migrants’, remained 
frozen in the frame of maintaining ‘law and order’. These failed to accord 
dignity to men and women, whose hard labour had significantly contributed 
to the profits of the corporate world. The visible absence of women in the 
notifications pointed to a policy that did not address any women’s specific 
needs, leave alone take cognizance of their rights. The contrast was there for 
all to see: stay at home orders flying in the face with thousands of migrants 
out on the streets; starvation, disease, and death stalked them on their home-
ward journeys, even as deaths due to COVID-19 continued to increase. 
This chapter contextualises recent developments within the longer 
histories of issues concerning gendered migration (Centre for Women’s
Development Studies, 2012; Sansristi [Hans and Patel], 2006-2007, Patel 
and Hans, 2017). It pulls together selections from available evidence to argue 
that the marginalisation of women in the discourse on migration effectively 
aims at the denial of dignity and human rights to migrant workers, while it 
simultaneously reinforces gender norms and stereotypes. The obliteration 
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brick-kiln or sugarcane workers in rural and peri-urban India; garment or 
domestic workers in urban locations – allows for evading difficult ques-
tions with regard to narratives of the neoliberal paradigm. Narratives of 
migrant women’s lives, captured in studies, point to precarity and increas-
ing vulnerabilities, with food and livelihood security emerging as critical 
in the face of colossal job and income losses. True, individual stories of 
women’s and young girls’ courage and resilience continue to be highlighted 
by some media. Moreover, reports clearly point to the pandemic having 
exacerbated inequalities and raised the level of vulnerabilities. The accu-
mulation of uncertainties and insecurities in the lives of women, combined 
with a visible loss of work, portend increasing violence in lives steeped 
in the volatility of contemporary times. Rather, emerging trends underline 
how the convergence of poverty, gender, and marginalisation has played 
out during the pandemic, to render women, and specific categories amongst 
them, especially vulnerable. 
Central to the chapter is a concern that the discourse on migration
remains affixed to a gendered narrative with women migrants remaining
largely unrecognised or, at best, selectively ‘visibilised’. To compel pol-
icy to be more accountable to feminist concerns, there is, at the same time,
a need to critically examine the new vocabulary that has emerged with the
outbreak of the pandemic. How does this advance an agenda wherein the
nation’s needs and interests are spelt out in dissonance with the everyday
needs of women, putting at risk their right to a life with dignity? What
are the losses labouring people, especially women, are likely to suffer
with the enforcement of this ‘new normal’, which snuffs out channels
for articulation of dissent while it condemns the working poor to a life of
precarity through hastily adopted Labour Codes in pandemic times under
the garb of ‘labour reforms’, in the name of simplifying the labour regula-
tory regime? 
There has been a deep link between disasters, economics, and politics, 
but literature on this aspect is missing (Racioppi, 2016). Women in search 
of incomes and livelihood, facing enormous challenges in the labour mar-
ket as a result of declining opportunities for work, are likely to be doubly 
affected. Their daily struggle to feed their families saw no end in sight. 
Meanwhile, with domestic workers ‘locked out’, their contribution to city 
life became visible all of a sudden, their presence often taking on a politi-
cal hue, with claims being made to success in handling the pandemic. The 
visible lack of political will to address the governance challenges turned 
the health pandemic into a deep human tragedy, whose depth may not be 
fathomed for long years to come. The failure of the state to recognise and 
address the humanitarian crisis ushered in by the sudden lockdown virtu-
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indifference of the ‘strong state’ to the suffering of the masses may perhaps 
be the most significant learning from this pandemic. 
The context and contours of women’s migration 
While migration has a long history, India has seen a huge increase in its
scale since the adoption of neoliberal policies. This has its roots in agrar-
ian distress, which has visibly deepened since the 1990s (Krishnaraj, 2006,
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2004). The lack of employment opportunities
for both men and women, but more so for women, posed serious survival
issues, with a growing number exiting from rural India in search of employ-
ment, often having incurred huge debts. Marked by varied short and long-
term circulatory patterns, these defy classification as per usual typologies.
Drawing attention to the fact that migrants fall through the cracks in the
maze of clauses and conditionalities, scholars and activists have regularly
pointed to the need to extend coverage of social security benefits to migrants
along with portability of rights to enable them to avail of these (Srivastava,
2020). Identifying women and their specific needs within the histories and
experiences of migration poses both conceptual and methodological chal-
lenges. Firstly, a mono-causal approach to data collection typically presents
women’s migration as being linked to reasons of marriage, despite evidence
that while 
some implicit or actual labour migration by women may appear in the 
data as marriage migration or as other forms of associational move-
ment by women simply because both may coincide, but the social rea-
son is presumed to be all important. Even where women of a migrant 
family enter the paid or income earning workforce in their individual 
capacity at any given destination, it is still possible that marriage or 
family movement would be given as the reason for migration since 
the social (marriage and family) and economic (employment, business, 
etc.) reasons for migration are often congruent to the point of intersec-
tion in the case of women 
(Agnihotri et al., 2012: 18) 
This bias persists despite the fact that 
the rising numbers and proportions of women migrating for work are 
no less striking. Census figures showed a spurt in female migration for 
employment and business from around 41 hundred thousand (lakhs) in 
2001 to 85 hundred thousand (lakhs) in 2011, and an increased female 
share of such migrants from 12% to 16%. Census data also showed 
a shift in the pattern of female labour migration from predominantly 
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rural destinations to a distinctive tilt toward suburban destinations. 
Forty-seven percent of all women migrating for work/business were in 
urban areas in 2001. 
(Mazumdar and Neetha, 2020: 26) 
Gender work and the sexual division of labour 
I am aware of the problems you have faced – some for food, some for move-
ment from place to place … However for the sake of your country, you are 
fulfilling your duties.2 
This statement needs to be read alongside the official data on women 
workers, most of whom fall in the unorganised sector. According to the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), an estimated 400 million infor-
mal sector workers are at the risk of abject poverty in India, as a result of 
COVID-19 (ILO, 2020). It is well known that approximately 94 per cent 
of women workers are in the informal sector. The Periodic Labour Force 
Survey 2018–2019 estimates demonstrated the enormous gap between the 
male and female labour force participation rate (LFPR) and in the male/ 
female work participation ratio (WPR) (GOI, MOSPI, 2019: 4).3 
Alongside falling WPR, categories to measure work underestimate the 
contribution of women to the economy. The lack of recognition of women’s 
contribution in the rural economy is accompanied by the disguised nature 
of women’s employment in the brick kilns; in sugarcane cutting in Western 
India, and in domestic work, all sectors which have seen a significant 
increase in women’s migration over the last decade and more. This stems 
from women’s migration and their labour being perceived as part of a ‘fam-
ily’ unit, both with regard to migration and the labour recruitment process. 
Despite increasing numbers, given the prevalent gender biases there is no 
recognition of their migration histories nor of their ‘work’, leave aside reali-
sation of the need for gender sensitive regulatory frameworks in the specific 
sectors where women workers are concentrated. 
The last two decades have seen an overall decline in female employ-
ment, especially in rural India and an increase in women’s migration to 
urban areas. Women domestic workers have, in the meantime, seen an 
increase, with the supply of workers being maintained through a regular 
flow of distress migration. This work continues to be marked by informal-
ity, the absence of formal contracts, low wages, and poor bargaining condi-
tions. An inherent flexibility tilted towards performing additional domestic 
work overlaps with stereotypes of gendered work and the sexual division of 
labour. At the same time the work remains embedded within the inequalities 
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backward classes, scheduled castes, and upper castes represented in that 
order (Neetha, 2019: 2–7). 
Evidence collected by surveys and studies undertaken during and after 
the lockdown, highlights the fact that the pandemic has disproportionately 
affected migrant women, depriving them of opportunities to work with poor 
access to the schemes/welfare measures announced. A survey by the All 
India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA) of over 1,700 domes-
tic workers across 11 states found that at a disaggregated level, more than 
half had lost their jobs, the extent being dependent on the spread of the 
pandemic. Nearly 87 per cent families were without a mode of livelihood 
(AIDWA, 2020b: 10). Data from another survey demonstrated that during 
the lockdown, migrant women reported huge work loss: construction work-
ers being the worst hit (97 per cent), home workers (91 per cent) and waste 
pickers (86 per cent) (ISST, 2020: Table 3). 
The impact on domestic workers has to also take into account the differ-
ent layers of unacknowledged burdens, as for instance, when they became 
sole earners with husbands having lost their jobs, the paranoia around the 
pandemic put them under unusual stress and also increased their domestic 
responsibilities (AIDWA, 2020b: 10). Care burdens during the pandemic has 
had a multiplier effect. Besides care of children, the elderly, and dependents 
with disabilities in the family, there is the added burden of family members 
affected by COVID-19. The pre-pandemic imbalance in gender distribution 
also saw an increase in unpaid work within the household. Women’s care 
economy also affected the LFPR but without women’s contribution to care 
work the economy would slide further. 
During the pandemic the vulnerability to intersecting deprivations 
became more visible, with access to food and housing emerging as criti-
cal needs. Unable to access income/earnings, women and families with no 
other resources or assets had neither the means of survival nor any savings 
to counter the pandemic. Located at the intersection of social and economic 
inequalities, women continue to face gendered impediments to exploring 
their chances of securing work at all, leave alone on better terms even in 
regular times. Further, during the lockdown when ‘paid domestic “help” 
was unavailable, upper-class women were easily pushed back into gendered 
domesticity, proving the inadequacy of paid domestic services as a solution 
to mundane, back-breaking household work’ (John, 2020: 44–45). The pan-
demic exposed the faultlines in solidarities sought to be built along gender 
lines as also the persistence of intersectionalities across gender, caste, and 
class. Pre-existing inequalities along gender and caste lines are likely to get 
reinforced, unless the specific contours of disadvantage are recognised and 
addressed. In situations of severe economic shock in such contexts, wom-
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have limited resources and little or no savings to tide over a crisis. During 
the pandemic women reported having to sell these limited assets, including 
jewellery, to pay for family needs, or to arrange for stranded husbands to 
catch Shramik trains or buses home (Thomas and Jayaram, 2020). 
The absolute fragility of human lives – given the absence of a policy
which prioritises social security for all citizens – is perhaps the single most
important learning from the experience of the pandemic. The NREGA,
enacted in 2005, has emerged as the pillar of hope in these months. It
is imperative that steps be taken to put in place an Urban Employment
Guarantee Scheme through appropriate legislative measures to address
unemployment among men and women, including migrants, on a long-
term basis. Also required is an administrative framework which recognises
migrants’ entitlements to their citizenship rights in both source and destina-
tion areas; non-surveillant regulatory measures to enable migrants to access
welfare measures and schemes without making women more vulnerable;
and portability of rights to address the present restrictions on access to
entitlements in destination areas. The present conditionalities for benefits
result in added levels of insecurity, which again have specific meaning in
the lives of women. These policy interventions should be designed with
a commitment to inclusion of women, especially from the marginalised
social groups. 
Health and food insecurity: Interlocked in a systemic 
exclusion 
While the disease makes no distinction between people or genders, the fact 
is that the impact of the disease and strategies adopted to tackle it affect 
people in diverse ways, given the differential location, sustaining capacity, 
and health and financial status of the affected population. In the absence of 
universal health access and portage in social security systems, the pandemic 
hit everyone hard, with special problems being faced by migrants, of whom 
a large section were women. Faced with lack of money due to the sudden 
lockdown, thousands of migrants, women and children, were seen walking 
hundreds of miles to reach their homes. Babies were born on the roads, in 
auto-rickshaws at hospital gates, and in the Shramik trains. Deaths of moth-
ers and new-born babies increased threefold (AIDWA, 2020a: 4). Although 
data on migrant women’s morbidity and mortality is still not available, a 
study undertaken among informal workers in Delhi found that accessing 
transport was most difficult. This, in turn, constrained access to essential 
medicines and health services (ISST, 2020: Table 2). With priority being 
given to the pandemic, other medical services were put on hold, resulting in 
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Women migrant workers are known to face violence and physical injury, 
raising health concerns in their efforts to find work. Women in the sugarcane 
industry in recent years have been forced to undergo hysterectomy by con-
tractors in collusion with the private health establishments to prevent loss 
of work hours due to menstruation. This has had a serious impact on the 
long-term health of the women as they developed issues of hormonal imbal-
ance and mental health (Jadhav, 2019). During the pandemic this group of 
migrant women, with pre-existing health issues, were left out of the gov-
ernment schemes supposedly introduced to provide livelihood to returning 
migrant workers due to the COVID-19 lockdown (Kinjawadekar and Roy, 
2020). Work under the MGNREGS is known to provide a survival strat-
egy to women, even as the hard manual labour can affect their health. It is 
reported that with male migrants returning, women’s work saw a decline 
(Sharma, 2020). The pandemic has, as Deshpande argues, exposed the 
many faultlines that lay beneath the surface which have implications for 
women’s and children’s health outcomes. In addition to being important in 
themselves, these have implications for women’s ability to participate in 
paid work (Deshpande, 2020b). 
For women migrants returning home, especially those pregnant, no health 
care services were provided. The first point of contact for the migrants on 
their return home were the frontline workers, specifically the ASHA and 
Anganwadi workers, 90 per cent of whom are women. They have been 
intrinsically engaged in public health outreach work during the pandemic, 
despite not being recognised as ‘workers’ and denied a regular wage. This 
lack of economic protection and utter disregard for female care work/work-
ers should not be surprising in a system known for its apathy and lack of 
sensitivity.4 During the present health emergency and enforced lockdown 
the unavailability and increased costs of such essentials for women point to 
a health crisis in the making (Mendoza, 2020). 
Violence against migrant women is common phenomena (Hans and Patel, 
2006-2007); however, during COVID-19 no data on violence is available. 
Violence has broad parameters, be it physical, economic, or social. Since 
the beginning of the pandemic, a study revealed, a majority of households 
(80 per cent) were consuming less food (Kesar et al., 2020: 2). Another on 
migrants indicated that (60 per cent) faced severe shortages in food supplies 
of which construction workers and waste pickers faced the highest short-
ages in accessing food (ISST, 2020). Less than half the domestic workers 
accessed dry rations from the PDS shops, while the others, forced to buy 
from the open market, felt the impact of increasing prices, with no visible 
efforts made to regulate them. Not being able to buy/provide milk for chil-
dren was a new low point of the poverty visible because of the pandemic. 




The ‘new normal’ 61 
money – not a new issue – became life threatening for women at this time 
(Centre for Equity Studies et al., 2020: 40). 
The health sector saw no clear response or strategy to fight the virus 
during the lockdown. The funds sanctioned were less than 0.4 per cent of 
the GDP (Ghosh, 2020: 6). Despite a provision for cash transfers for mater-
nal health and institutional deliveries under the National Health Mission 
(NHM), the conditionalities for availing of schemes and the lack of port-
ability, posed serious limitations with few actual benefits reaching those 
who needed them. 
The pandemic points to the critical need to usher in policy changes to 
strengthen the public health care system through budgetary allocations, with 
special provision for women’s health needs. Social security measures incor-
porating gender concerns in health are required. In the absence of these, the 
‘new normal’ sought to be created in the pandemic is heavily slated against 
the vast majority of women, the poor, and migrants. It is imperative that 
policy discussions be made more gender sensitive to include the concerns 
of a critical mass who in all likelihood will be made to bear the social costs 
of the crisis. 
Conclusion: The pandemic, security, and women migrants 
Addressing the UN on 2 October 2020, the Indian Minister for Women and 
Child Development proclaimed that India had taken several measures to 
ensure the ‘safety, security, and well-being of women during the corona 
virus pandemic and continuity of care of women especially pregnant, lactat-
ing and women in vulnerable situations to build a just and equal world for 
women and daughters in the post COVID situation’ (Deshmukh, 2020). We 
have documented above that workers and migrants, without food or money 
to pay rents, required immediate relief, but the announcements by the 
GOI were a minimal financial support in Prime Minister Jan Dhan Yojana 
(PMJDY) accounts (Rs. 500) and free/subsidised ration to needy families
(GOI Ministry of Finance, 2020). There has been parsimony of relief meas-
ures, despite declaration of inflated official packages (Deshpande, 2020a: 
14–15, Ghosh, 2020: 4). Many migrants who did not have Aadhar (identity) 
cards could not access the relief. 
There was also violation of GOI’s 29 March 2020 order which stipulated 
that employers make payment of wages of their workers, at the workplace 
on the due date without any deduction for the period they are under clo-
sure during the lockdown (GOI, 2020a). Construction workers, including 
women, did not benefit from the above orders, given the ambiguity about 
who their ‘employer’ was. Despite substantial evidence, it is not officially 
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effectively informal workers with no social security benefits. Recruited 
through contractors, the names of a majority go unrecorded in muster rolls – 
allowing for the evasion of licensing procedures and denial of entitlements 
to social security benefits as per law. Women construction workers, living 
in shanties with no access to their rights to crèches, toilets, and disparity in 
wages and faced with a high risk of injuries, reported both widespread loss 
of paid work and failure to access relief announced by the Construction 
Workers’ Welfare Board in Delhi (ISST, 2020). With the economy col-
lapsing, the money could only have come from the government but even 
the Labour Departments across the country remained silent spectators to 
the misery of thousands of women migrant workers and their dependents 
exposed to suffering from ‘invisible poverty’ – a term which would need 
redefining. 
Security has not been an important indicator in migrant women’s pro-
tection. Analyses of migrant women’s security does not imply only physi-
cal but requires our probing deep into the reactions and contradictions of
the term ‘security’ itself. In this chapter we shift the word ‘security’ to
‘human security’, as it broadens the definition of the term. Reardon argues
that human security can be achieved only when understood in equivalence
with gender equality (Reardon, 2019: 7). We argue it can be used in the
in the case of migrant women who face tremendous violence in different
forms. We agree that our thinking of security must be transformed, and
viewed in relation to women’s daily lives and ‘gender particularities’. The
framework we propose seeks answers to women migrants’ perception of
security. What has been the role of the state in protecting them, whether
in place of destination or at home? The human security framework5 in the
context of this chapter includes, very simply, fulfilment of the basic needs,
physical security, and dignity. 
Overall, this chapter brings together snippets from a rich repertoire of 
studies conducted under difficult circumstances during the pandemic by 
civil society organisations and young researchers, who struggled to gener-
ate a body of knowledge which shall allow for deeper analysis in post-pan-
demic times. Clearly, two issues surface in readings of these reports: food 
and income loss. It was not surprising that more than the pandemic itself, 
the fear of starvation was a major cause of stress to women since providing 
food is primarily seen as their responsibility. Anticipating this, women’s 
organisations had from the start pushed for free distribution of rations and 
cash disbursal (AIDWA, 2020a). 
COVID-19 highlights the significance of an interdisciplinary, inter-sectoral,
and trans-sectional approach to understanding discrimination against women
across multiple sites, in the context of neoliberal policies in India, where the
state and government collude to deny women, workers, and citizens the right
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pandemic, food and livelihood security emerged as critical for social devel-
opment in the years to come. These also have very specific meanings in the
lives of women with regard to their assigned roles in society, their aspiration for
equality and a life with dignity and their special vulnerabilities. There are clear
indications that the pandemic is likely to be used as a pretext to impose further
constraints on democracy, given the inclination to meet the expectations of cor-
porate capital. The stifling of free debate has resonance in the homes, for those
who justify checks on democracy in the public sphere seek to also push back
efforts to democratise the home/domestic environment. India is already a wit-
ness to bizarre reactions to emerging issues of mental health and familial/mari-
tal discord. The emerging political narrative seeks to assert a homogeneity and
erasure of diverse familial forms, cultures, and identities – to fit them into a nar-
row sectarian hyper-nationalist frame. In such a context, discussions on domes-
tic violence and autonomy are likely to be brushed aside, even as the shadow
of violence which looms over the lives of women across different stages of
their life cycle acquires new, deeper meanings. Violence in the lives of women,
especially those from Dalit, minority, and tribal groups, remains entrenched
and intertwined with structural inequalities. These constitute the social world
in which women struggle to survive, confronting specifically gendered forms
of oppressions. The vocabulary and architecture of strategies to deal with the
pandemic signal the reinforcing of multiple exclusions, discriminations, and
vulnerabilities. What meaning these will hold for women in an overall climate
of heightened insecurities is a field which throws up more questions than this
chapter can answer. 
Notes 
1 Government of India, PIB, 2020. 
2 Text of prime minister’s address to the nation on 14 April 2020 released by 
Government of India PIB 2020. 
3 LFPR is at 18.6 for female compared to 55.6 for male. This gap is also reflected in
the WPR which is 52.3 for males in comparison to female WPR at 17.6 per cent. 
4 For example, a public request had to be made in 2018 not to tax sanitary
napkins. 
5 The human security framework calls for human well-being and fulfilment of 
four basic conditions, a life-sustaining environment, the meeting of essential 
physical needs, respect for identity and dignity of persons and groups, and pro-
tection from avoidable harm and expectation of remedy for unavoidable harm 
(Reardon and Hans, 2019: 2). 
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6 The long walk towards 
uncertainty 
The migrant dilemma in times of 
COVID-19 
S. Irudaya Rajan, Renjini Rajagopalan, 
and P. Sivakumar 
Introduction 
The onslaught of COVID-19 thrust upon humanity two major challenges, 
that of human health and that of the economy; our migrants are mired in 
both. It has both pushed the world economic order into chaos and chal-
lenged even the mightiest of economies. The initial advent of COVID-19 
sowed confusion within systems of governance as countries struggled to 
deal with its unprecedented threat. In order to control the spread of the 
infection, countries across the globe, including India, took to strictly limit-
ing movement of the masses. This severe and unprecedented curtailment 
of mobility through strict lockdown made evident that the first and worst 
victims of the pandemic are the marginalised, the migrants. 
In the context of COVID-19, rural–urban migration has attracted the
most attention given that the retreat of migrants from their urban centres
has been the most visible aspect of the pandemic. The pandemic has both
exposed the magnitude of India’s dependency upon internal migrants for
low-end jobs and the vulnerabilities they face in spite of such dependency.
Additionally, this is going to destabilise India’s aspirations in achieving
its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as the country will be com-
pelled to address poverty from scratch so as to bridge the inequities that
have cropped up as a result of the pandemic. Doing so will also require
us to rethink our strategies when it comes to migrant welfare and come
up with both short-term measures to alleviate migrant suffering and long-
term approaches that are able to address the systemic vulnerabilities and
injustices. 
The economic and social crisis generated by the COVID-19 pandemic 
is deeper and more pervasive than any other pandemic that has affected the 
world since the 1900s, affecting almost every sector and its workers (World 
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Bank, 2020b). When it came to migrant workers, the most affected section 
were unskilled and semiskilled migrants whose day-to-day livelihoods sud-
denly vanished. With many such migrants inhabiting the informal sector 
and working on a contractual basis, they faced the prospects of immediate 
termination of employment much before their formal counterparts. Many 
sought to go back to their villages, but the absence of transport prevented 
them from doing so. State governments sought to set up relief camps and 
shelters to accommodate migrants, but implementation was skewed. Faced 
with increasing economic distress and the prospect of utter destitution, 
many were compelled to break government norms on travel and curfew and 
walk hundreds of kilometres to reach their hometowns. For an unfortunate 
few, this ended in the tragedy of death. 
This chapter briefly summarises the Indian migrant experience during 
COVID-19. We look at existing and ongoing labour reforms, particularly 
with respect to labour rights and migrant welfare. In doing so, it looks at 
existing and ongoing institutional reforms, particularly with respect to social 
welfare, labour rights, and migrant welfare, and concludes that migrant wel-
fare needs to go beyond stop-gap arrangements towards enacting a compre-
hensive body of changes aimed at improving their overall circumstances. 
Trends and patterns of internal migration 
Migration has a history as old as humanity, and India is no exception to this. 
India has long been the land of the world’s largest voluntary and involuntary 
migration (Tumbe, 2018). On the basis of geographical movements, inter-
nal migration can be classified as rural–rural, rural–urban, urban–rural, and 
urban–urban, while its purpose can result in migration being time-bound 
and seasonal, or driven by other permanent or semi-permanent factors. Each 
of these patterns has been catalysts for India’s changing demography and 
deserves to be studied at depth. But the phenomenon of return migration 
and the possibility of remigration in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pan-
demic limit our focus to that of labour migration in the rural–urban context 
and the vulnerabilities of migrants occupying this space. 
There are significant studies on internal labour migration and how it con-
tributes to addressing poverty in low-income countries (Deshingkar, 2006; 
Rajan and Sumeetha, 2019). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
recognises, for the very first time, the contribution of migration to sustain-
able development (Migration Data Portal, 2019). Dwindling livelihood 
opportunities, meagre wages, and limited resources thus provide impetus 
for rural to urban migration. However, such migrants are often handicapped 
by the loss of their social and cultural identities, among other things. The 
absence of critical skills and adequate bargaining power further compels 
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them into exploitative environments where they are forced to engage in 
low-end, low-value, and hazardous work (Aajeevika Bureau, 2014).
However, government response to the phenomenon of internal migration 
has largely been one of apathy. A World Bank 2018 report highlights this 
indifference in the very documentation of migrants in India. Multiplicity of 
data points over years, and overlapping classifications aside, each have their 
own definitional shortcomings, including the incapability of adequately 
addressing gender concerns or certain classes of migrants such as circular 
or short-term migrants (Nayyar and Kim, 2018). Besides this, surveys and 
other data collection processes only count the respondents who affirm their 
presence at the time of such an exercise (Rajan et al., 2020). Invariably, it is 
likely that both our data and understanding of migrants are severely under-
documented (Government of India, 2017).
The 2011 census data indicates that internal migration in India accounts 
for 37.4 per cent of the total population as compared to 31 per cent in 
2001. With the total number of internal migrants in India numbering at 
453.6  million in 2011, we also see a 45 per cent increase as compared to 
2001. Besides the substantial increase in overall numbers, there is also 
considerable change in gender dimensions with regard to India’s internal 
migration (Figure 6.1).
The unprecedented growth of million-plus cities and dwindling eco-
nomic opportunities in rural areas are understood to be key factors of mas-
sive migration. According to the 2011 Census, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are 
the largest source of inter-state migrants, while Maharashtra and Delhi were 
seen to be receiving states due to their demographic dividend (Rajan, 2013). 
That said, much of the migration over the last few decades seems to be 















Figure 6.1  Internal migration in India, 1971–2011. Source: Census reports.
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Figure 6.2 Distribution of internal migrants by type of movement. Source: De, 
2019. 
A 2016 World Bank study on internal migration sheds light on this phe-
nomenon by highlighting how despite internal mobility being a key driver 
of economic growth across regions, it may remain inhibited in India by 
the existence of state-level entitlement schemes – primarily, the inability 
to port social welfare measures for migrants, across state borders (Kone et 
al., 2017). 
Migration, migrants, and the COVID-19 impact 
Socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on migrants 
The reverse migration generated by COVID-19 poses a massive chal-
lenge to migration governance. The problems with employment that pre-
dated the pandemic continue to remain at play with the added shock to the 
economy, making re-employment and income generation difficult. While 
many migrants remain resolute in not wanting to return back to the urban 
spaces that once housed them, they struggle to assimilate into their rural 
hometowns in the face of extreme impoverishment as well as suspicion of 
being COVID carriers (Migrants flee cities, 2020). In turn, officials in such 
rural hometowns grapple with ways by which the returning masses can be 
accommodated. Though MGNREGA has been touted as a possible short-
term solution, there is a limit to absorption of labour under it, and migrants 
will eventually be compelled to squeeze themselves into sectors like agri-
culture, which is already saturated. 
Over 90 per cent of working population in India is currently engaged 
in the informal economy, with states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar 
accounting for more than 80 per cent of workers in this sector, most of them 
migrants (Patel, 2020). For instance, Stranded Workers Action Network 
(SWAN) (2020) survey chronicling the hardships faced by migrant workers 
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during the initial weeks following the lockdown saw the largest number of 
respondents emerge from the states of Bihar (25 per cent), Jharkhand (28 
per cent), and Uttar Pradesh (13 per cent). Also, of all the Shramik trains 
transporting migrants operated in May, the highest were for the states of 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Dastidar, 2020). 
Investigations like SWAN (2020) highlight how migrant distress has far 
exceeded any relief provided. However, the pandemic has only exploited 
existing vulnerabilities and injustices plaguing migrants, the presence of 
which has been made apparent to governments well before the advent of 
the pandemic. Case in point is the 2017 Report by the Working Group 
on Migration constituted by the Ministry of Urban Housing and Poverty 
Alleviation, which was tasked to look into ways by which migrant wel-
fare could be uplifted. Their report identified 53 districts (based on Census, 
2001) seeing major male inter-state migration, of which 24 belonged to the 
state of Uttar Pradesh, followed by 20 districts from Bihar (Government of 
India, 2017). Yet, to-date their recommendations remain pending with the 
Government of India (Prabhu, 2020; Rajan and Sami, 2020); their delayed 
implementation will now adversely impact the dignified rehabilitation of 
India’s migrant labour. 
COVID-19, migration, and the gender lens 
Migrant women have been on the frontlines of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
even though the public narrative about migration has been largely masculin-
ised. Gender norms in particular prop up their own barriers when it comes 
to migration in the form of policy restrictions, discrimination, violence, and 
exploitation. Despite this, multiple women migrate internally and outside 
country boundaries for social, educational, and economic concerns. It is 
estimated that half of over 272 million migrants in 2019 who lived and 
worked outside their countries of origin were women, of which 66 mil-
lion were migrants (Anonymous, 2020). This is true for within India too, 
where the primary cause of internal female migration was seen to have been 
marriage or associated migration (Rajan and Sivakumar, 2018), but many 
who did so subsequently also entered the labour force, though surveys have 
failed to adequately capture this (Prabhu, 2020; Rajan et al., 2020). 
Gender norms and societal barriers result in women being excluded from 
the formal labour market, and even in an informal one, they are found at 
the bottom of the pyramid, employed in low-paid, insecure, and informal 
spaces like domestic workers, sanitation workers, and care givers. The ILO 
estimates the highest percentage of women (58.2 per cent) to be employed 
in the service sector (World Bank, 2020a) and they have been hardest hit by 
COVID-19 (Sharma, 2020; Sapra, 2020), putting women migrants in a far 
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more precarious situation as compared to their male counterparts. Rukmini 
(2020) estimates that in India alone, within 2 months of lockdown, 4 out 
of every 10 working women lost their jobs, resulting in over 17 million 
women being rendered jobless. Despite such sizeable distress, the absence 
of inclusivity in the labour economy and the general lack of gender sensi-
tive policy-making have rendered the suffering of women migrants invis-
ible (Sapra, 2020). 
Paid work aside, all other factors that constrain women in the labour 
force have also been exaggerated as a result of the pandemic. Women bear 
a disproportionate amount of the care work globally; UN Women 2015– 
2016 (Nandi, 2017) reveals how in India alone, women do 7 times as much 
unpaid work as men yet are treated as non-workers because they do not 
engage in work considered ‘economically productive’. During COVID-19, 
the lockdown, coupled with social and gender norms, has forced women to 
put in greater number of hours into domestic labour, which run counter to 
social distancing norms thereby increasing their risk of contracting virus 
(The Week, 2020). They have also been at the receiving end of greater sex-
ual violence as well as domestic abuse, and many report health issues due to 
their inability to access health, sanitation, and nutritional services due to the 
disruption and re-routing of, public services to fight the pandemic. 
The intersectionality of migration is such that women, who are urbane 
and educated, and who have overcome social, economic, and gender barri-
ers have fared better in general, and continue to do so regardless of the pan-
demic. But for those who are economically disenfranchised and those who 
belong to disadvantaged castes and communities, who form the vast major-
ity of migrant women, the economic downturn coupled with the vagaries 
of working in the informal sector has rendered them far more vulnerable 
than they have ever been before. Experts suspect that in the aftermath of 
the pandemic, problems of debt, loans and mortgage will end up burdening 
these women, resulting in distress sales of property, child marriage, and 
even prostitution (Rajan et al., 2020). Unless the gendered aspect of migrant 
distress is recognised, and sound, inclusive, and gender-responsive policies 
are quickly enacted, such women will be forced to contend with a far worse 
exploitative environment in the new economic normal. 
Institutional responses and state initiatives tackling the 
migrant crisis 
Cognisant of the deep economic impact of the COVID-19 lockdown on the 
economy, the Centre quickly galvanised its resources to introduce a financial 
stimulus package called the Pradhan Mantri Gareeb Kalyan Yojana, which 
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many others (PIB India, 2020). It provided a combination of food support 
and cash transfers through existing schemes like MGNREGA, PM-KISAN 
Yojana, Ujjwala, etc., and leveraged institutional mechanisms like PDS and 
Jan Dhan bank accounts for disbursement. While these measures may have 
no doubt proved beneficial for those already included within such scheme 
ecosystems, it nevertheless proved exclusionary to low-income groups not 
enrolled in the existing schemes and those on the move, a large number 
of whom happen to be internal migrants. This realisation has resulted in 
the Centre augmenting these measures by way of a compendium of initia-
tives under the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan’ or Self-Reliant India initia-
tive. However, as Iyer (2020) reports, its uptake leaves much to be desired. 
Attempts have also been made to collect migrant data so as to ensure their 
assimilation back into the workforce. The setting up of an online central-
ised dashboard – the ‘National Migrant Information System’ (NMIS) under 
the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) – to track migrant 
movement across states (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2020), and the proposed 
data bank dedicated to tribal migrant workers who are returning to their 
home states under the aegis of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (Mitra, 2020), 
are some such efforts. 
The pandemic has also forced all states, in particular those now at 
the receiving end of the return migration, to contend with migrant issues 
beyond the initial short-term rehabilitation measures of food and shelter. 
Faced with the possibility of long-term rehabilitation and reintegration of 
migrants, states have begun to undertake various measures, from collecting 
data on skilled and unskilled migrants (Rajasthan), to their skills mapping 
(Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand), to setting up platforms and authorities to 
address their specific needs (the Migrant Commission in Uttar Pradesh) to 
online platforms to enable the skilled migrants to connect to employment 
opportunities (Madhya Pradesh) (Venugopal and Gaur, 2020; Srivastava, 
2020; Sharan, 2020; Yadav, 2020). 
That said, some of these states (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, 
and Rajasthan) have also diluted existing labour norms for a set time period, 
in an aggressive effort to reclaim economic growth and revitalise the econ-
omy, prompting fears that they will end up accommodating migrant work-
ers in an economy devoid of basic legal protections for them (Jha, 2020; 
Rajan et al., 2020). 
The need for social protection systems for migrants 
Srivastava (2013) notes that India’s labour market has long been character-
ised by extreme inequalities that result in the most vulnerable being sub-
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vulnerability. The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 
(2019) Periodic Labour Force Survey found that among regular wage/sala-
ried employees in the non-agriculture sector over 71.1 per cent had no writ-
ten job contract, 54.2 per cent were ineligible for paid leave, and 49.6 per 
cent did not qualify for any social security benefit. 
Such inequities have become exacerbated as a result of the economic
disruptions caused by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus in India, 2020). The
World Bank estimates on global poverty looks at impoverishment in the
aftermath of COVID-19 across the globe, and offers ‘a sobering picture’
for India by stating that extreme poverty is likely to remain unchanged,
but that the country is expected to see more poor emerging post-COVID
(Mahler et al., 2020). Juxtapose this against the latest data on how India
has managed to lift approximately 273 million people out of multidimen-
sional poverty over the last decade (UNDP & the OPHDI, 2020) and one
realises that the recent economic shocks delivered to India’s economy by
the pandemic has the ability to derail any progress achieved over the last
ten years. This includes any gains made towards attaining the Sustainable
Development Goals, given how migration is a cross-cutting issue, finding
relevance under targets and indicators under 11 out of 17 SDGs (Migration
Data Portal, 2019). 
This is where social protection, namely the ability to access it, gains 
importance. Enabling strong systems of social protection offers a safety net 
that protects the poor and the economically vulnerable from deprivation. In 
times of unprecedented crisis, such as the one brought about by the current 
COVID-19, they offer a guaranteed safety net so that migrants do not fall 
back into poverty. 
The link between social protection and labour reforms 
India has had a plethora of social safety net programmes since the early 
1970s which have ranged from self-employment and wage employment 
programmes to food and nutrition schemes and health care. However, these 
programmes have traditionally sought to ameliorate deprivation via pro-
motional measures such as offering social assistance, rather than protective 
ones that help deal with contingencies like health shocks, death, or dis-
ability (Sharma and Arora, 2011). More tellingly, these programmes tend 
to cover only those belonging to the formal and organised sectors, while 
an overwhelming majority of India’s workforce languish in informal and 
irregular employment. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the nature of 
India’s labour laws whose applicability is confined only to India’s organised 
sector, while systematically depriving those in the informal sectors – like 
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However, India has not been entirely unaware of the need to protect 
informal and migrant workers. The Centre has devoted the last couple 
of years towards creating social security measures such as pensions (the 
Pradhan Mantri Shram Yogi Maan-dhan) and health insurance specifically 
catering to their needs, though the uptake has not been overly successful 
(Mitra, 2020). However, benefits of central government schemes are often 
tied to concepts of ‘domicile’, and relayed by state or local governments to 
those who permanently reside within their borders, thereby becoming inac-
cessible to inter-state migrants. Some states wilfully exclude migrants by 
way of domicile-based reservations in jobs, education, and service delivery 
(Mitra et al., 2020). However, there has been a growing recognition of the 
gap between how deeply entrenched migrant welfare and protection is to 
the space they occupy in the labour economy. Certain states like Kerala, 
home to migrant labour friendly policies from pre-pandemic times, with 
the Kerala Inter-State Migrant Workers Welfare Scheme, 2010, the Awas 
scheme, 2017, and the Apna Ghar Hostel Scheme, 2017, stood out for 
having successfully identified and housed its migrants, and securing them 
their entitlements during the pandemic (The Week, 2020; Rajan, 2020). 
The ongoing attempts of the government to reform India’s labour laws 
and converge them into 4 Labour Codes, in particular the introduction 
of the Code on Social Security 2019, must also be seen from the lens of 
migrant welfare. At its simplest, the Bill seeks to enhance the ambit of 
what constitutes a worker, and for the first time recognises categories of 
workers such as gig, platform, unorganised workers, freelancers, home-
based, and self-employed workers as those deserving of social security 
measures (Ministry of Labour, 2019). Recent discussions on the Bill by 
the Parliamentary Standing Committee vetting the same have also made 
a strong pitch for improving the coverage of Employees’ Provident Fund 
(EPF) and Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) to an estimated 
30 lakh migrant workers (Ray, 2020). However, critics have pointed out 
that efforts to broaden definitions of what constitutes a ‘worker’ and an 
‘employer’ to ensure greater inclusivity have resulted in definitions that 
are rather ambiguous, and that the Bill does not clarify if its schemes at 
all extend to the unorganised sector, thereby prompting fears that migrant 
households might find themselves doubly excluded by virtue of being 
migrants (Simran et al., 2019). Therefore, social protection policies must go 
beyond strengthening labour norms. 
Concluding remarks 
The contours of what a comprehensive migrant welfare framework might 
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various types of internal migrants as well as an in-depth inquiry into inter-
sectional concerns involving various sub-categories of the migrant demo-
graphics. That said, certain institutional reforms and policy interventions 
offer an axis from which to further future reform. An attempt has been made 
to briefly summarise the definitional discrepancies, suggesting robust cred-
ible data collection systems, ensuring portability of social welfare, and ena-
bling political franchise of migrant workers. 
Existing research pinpoints discrepancies in data collection regarding 
internal migrants and the circumstances underlying their migration. From 
definitional gaps that are unable to adequately capture the nature of migra-
tion such as seasonal or cyclic migration to those that ignore the eventual 
entry of female migrants into the labour force after marriage, there are many 
such concerns. This highlights a need for consistency and uniformity in 
the way migration is defined. One way to do this could be to appropri-
ately amend migrant classifications under the Census, and use it to survey 
migrants across the country. This can later be leveraged by Ministries of 
Women and Child Development, Social Justice, and/or Minority Affairs to 
better their dispensation of schemes or benefits to their target audience. 
While multiple surveys and research platforms – both government 
and otherwise – curate migrant data, they do not do so at regular timely 
intervals, and sample sizes greatly vary. Also, few states have been con-
sistently capturing migrant data, and national estimates vary greatly from 
state estimates. Kerala once again stands out here since it has had the ben-
efit of numerous data captures, beginning from Centre for Development 
Studies-Kerala Migration Surveys (Zachariah et al., 1999, 2000; Rajan and 
Zachariah, 2019), down to several government efforts (Narayana et al., 
2013). However, it is imperative that robust, regular, and credible data col-
lection that can be routinely accessed and updated be collected in a central-
ised manner and in real time. 
Many states have begun this enterprise now, and the Centre too has
set up the National Migrant Information System to capture migrant data,
though the former suffers from geographic limitations, and the latter stops
at migrants repatriated back to their home states. Therefore, it is important
to integrate these efforts to create a single, national online data repository
that is accessible across states, into which states can feed their migrant
data regularly. The ground work for such data collection can already be
found in legislations like the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation
of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 (replaced by the
Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020) and the
Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act, 2008. However, efforts will
have to be made to ensure that such a process is inclusive and captures
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Here, Jharkhand’s method of relying on Sakhi Mandals, the state’s SHG
networks, to help with data capture for skills mapping offers a good exam-
ple of creatively leveraging other institutional networks to help with such
efforts (Bisoee, 2020). Such steps will help governments design better
evidence-based welfare measures and dispense social security in a tar-
geted fashion for migrants in the long-term. More importantly, enabling
the timely collection of reliable data will also go a long way towards
‘facilitating the orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and
mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and
well-managed migration policies’, which is a direct target set under Goal
10 of the SDGs. 
With many social protections being tied to permanent residences, 
migrants remain perennially outside welfare loops. Even as they hope to 
migrate for better economic returns, the inability to access their welfare dues 
outside their state of origin renders them reluctant to migrate (Kone et al., 
2017). However, migration remains a key driver of economic resurgence, 
and in order to induce the same, it is important to dismantle administrative 
and other barriers that inhibit access to welfare programmes across bor-
ders. An online migrant database which is updated in real time and perhaps 
linked to a unique migrant number which can be cross-referenced against 
Aadhaar might help in this endeavour. Problems with Aadhaar verification 
notwithstanding, doing so might help in the more targeted dispensation of 
existing and proposed government benefits such as the ‘Migrant Workers 
Welfare Fund’, implementing the ‘One Nation, One Ration Card’ system, 
and enrolling migrant workers under the Ayushman Bharat scheme as well 
as in the potential expansion of the newly launched Garib Kalyan Rojgar 
Abhiyan which currently focuses only on 116 districts of the country. 
The inequalities facing migrants during COVID-19 cannot be addressed 
without rectifying existing migrant concerns, none more so than their 
political disenfranchisement (Rajan et al., 2019). It is a sad reality that 
migrants remain an ignored category because state governments do not see 
themselves gaining from addressing migrant concerns. Currently political 
rights, namely that to vote, remain tied to permanent residences, depriving 
migrants off the ability to politically participate in the state they currently 
reside in. Granting migrants political visibility would help make their con-
cerns take centre stage during elections. That said, the portability of politi-
cal rights and particularly its ties to social welfare, is a controversial one; 
migrant communities are usually excluded from mainstream societies in the 
states they reside in, and often viewed with suspicion; therefore, enabling 
political franchise could also lead to parochialism. Nevertheless, political 
franchise remains a key enabler to migrant welfare, so states should commit 
to it (Aggarwal, 2019). 
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Migrant concerns are unique, yet they cannot be seen in isolation of 
other concerns plaguing the Indian economy right now. COVID-19 has not 
created the migrant crisis but merely made its faultlines visible. With the 
pandemic likely to stretch on indefinitely, future migration patterns remain 
uncertain, likely to intercept with reverse migration and remigration, both. 
What is certain, however, is the need for a paradigm shift from the piece-
meal way migrant worker issues have been framed thus far. Instead, it is 
apparent that the crisis requires not a stop-gap arrangement but a humane, 
dignified, and long-term solution to address migrant needs. 
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7 Contestations of citizenship 
Migrant labour, a benevolent 
state, and the COVID-19-induced 
lockdown in Kerala 
Praveena Kodoth 
Introduction 
The mass exodus of migrant labour in the wake of the national lockdown 
in March 2020 exposed more than the central government’s lack of plan-
ning and sensitivity to the conditions of this labour force; it provided a 
sudden but spontaneous visibility to the full force of the distress and inse-
curity of migrant workers. To make sense of this harsh reality, it is nec-
essary to go beyond the relationship between this precarious workforce 
and the nation-state at a time of crisis and to reckon with the more routine 
failures of citizenship that metamorphosed into a crisis in the first place. 
The central government was caught off guard by the swiftness with which 
migrant workers headed back home, indicating a serious lack of awareness 
and understanding of this workforce.1 Kerala, however, stood out for the 
speed with which the government announced a relief package, mobilised 
volunteers, and instituted measures to mitigate distress with an emphasis 
on workers who depend on daily earnings and migrant labour. With co-
ordination at various levels of government and communication through the 
media, the government showed readiness to address gaps in the design and 
implementation of relief measures. In several migrant hubs, when workers 
mobilised in public demanding to go back home, government authorities 
intervened quickly to diffuse protests. 
The state government’s response to the humanitarian crisis was marked 
by a rare degree of concern. However, the government employed a rhetoric 
of care that, along with some hostile public perceptions of migrant work-
ers, brought into view the undermining of the citizenship of migrant work-
ers. The government’s insistence on addressing migrant workers as ‘guest 
workers’, while suggesting that Kerala as the host state was obliged to 
provide care steered away, inevitably, from a language of citizenship obli-
gations and rights. Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2020) points out: ‘There is some-





















the state. What we need from the state is not compassion; it is a minimum 
sense of justice. In fact, the appeals to compassion destructively depoliticise 
social policy by appealing to sentiment’. Thus, the depiction of protests 
by migrant workers in everyday conversations as ‘ingratitude’ fitted well 
within the state’s approach. 
Migrant labourers are considered indispensable to Kerala’s economy. If
their exodus forced them into full public view across the country, they were
already visible in Kerala, i.e., there was recognition of their presence, albeit
in specific forms. A form of state-conferred visibility in the form of pioneer-
ing welfare schemes offered migrant workers the possibility of at least mini-
mal social protection.2 But migrant workers laid claim to a more contentious
form of visibility. For instance, they have sought to mark their identity and
achieve solidarity by coming together in public places like a Sunday mar-
ket in Perambavoor, a large migrant hub near Ernakulum, and by engag-
ing sporadically in protests (Prasad, M., 2016). Migrant hubs have theatres
screening Hindi, Odiya, and Bengali films and churches that hold mass for
migrant workers in their languages (Sudhir, 2016), which also merit study as
distinctive spaces for marking identity. The state-society complex in Kerala,
which includes the police and other government agencies, mainstream trade
unions and the Malayali public have been implicated in curtailing freedoms
of expression, assembly, and association of migrant workers. For instance,
Prasad Aleyamma (2017) points out with reference to Perambavoor that
migrant workers are produced as a threat to public order, which serves to
legitimise police harassment and to justify demands for surveillance. 
I examine contestations of citizenship of migrant workers in Kerala dur-
ing and before the lockdown as have been apparent in the stoking of sus-
picion and fear against them in the context of protests or when a crime 
is committed in a migrant hub. As public perceptions, police actions, and 
underlying social relations produce migrant workers as ‘outsiders’ and 
expose the fault lines of a benevolent state, I argue that state-conferred vis-
ibility in the form of welfare does not guarantee enfranchised citizenship. 
The undermining of migrant citizenship becomes even more apparent in 
contrast to Non Resident Keralites (NRKs) who are an important political 
constituency and are appealed to by the state in a language that grants them 
a position of privilege and power. 
Migrant labour and the lockdown response in Kerala 
A widely cited estimate derived from a study by the Gulati Institute 
of Finance and Taxation in 2013 puts the current number of inter-state 
migrant workers at more than 3.5 million.3 The major source states, West 
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of migrants, with each of them contributing between 20 and 15 per cent. 
However, only 5.09 lakh migrant workers are registered under the Awas 
scheme (see note 2), a health insurance scheme administered by the labour 
department and a survey by the labour department during the lockdown 
enumerated a little over 4.34 lakh migrant workers in camps in the state. 
This may be only a fraction of migrant workers in the state. Problems of 
estimation of migrant workers, encountered nation-wide, are intertwined 
with the failure of governments to design and implement social protection 
(Samaddar, 2020b). 
It is obvious that Kerala had better outreach and documentation of camps 
compared to other states. The first report submitted to the Supreme Court 
on 31 March 2020 in response to a PIL showed that Kerala accounted for 
65 per cent of migrant shelter camps (18,912 migrant camps) and housed 
nearly 50 per cent of migrants (over 3 lakhs) documented across the country 
(Writ petition (Civil) No 468/2020). Considering Kerala’s small population 
share and that it accounts for only a very small share of all migrant labour 
in the country, these are disproportionately large figures. 
The state labour commissioner, who has received praise for his proactive 
responses, observed that ‘the idea of camp was conceptual, rather than in 
physical terms’ (G Plus news, 2020). The reference here is to the distribu-
tion of migrant labour in shelter camps arranged by the state government, 
employer-provided camps, and the difficult-to-enumerate rented accom-
modations across the state. However, it elides over the possibility that a 
large section of migrant labour were not enumerated. Nevertheless, official 
categorisation according to the nature of employment and residence stream-
lined planning. Decentralised executions of plans meant that there were 
variations according to districts, but it was apparent that workers in shelters 
were relatively well taken care of compared to workers whose contractors/ 
employers were expected to provide for their food and other basic needs 
(Arnimesh, 2020). Migrant protests were fuelled at least partly by the dearth 
of essential provisions among those who resided in rented accommodation 
(The Hindu, 29 March). 
Reports indicate that officials acted on specific complaints when
employers/contractors failed to make provision for food and water for
workers. But in some instances, repeated appeals were made and higher-
level officials responded with alacrity where local officials had failed. The
SWAN report noted that cases reported from Kerala were resolved with
help from the local administration, but in one instance no action was taken
even after follow-up. ‘The workers also said that they were reluctant to
call the control room as they were afraid of being harassed. The SWAN













The labour commissioner’s direct intervention enabled migrant work-
ers from Kalahandi in Odisha who were detained by their employer to
return home and ensured that the workers were paid their wages which
their employer had held back (Jena, 2020), a tactic that is used by employ-
ers in the state to prevent workers from leaving. When it was reported
that plantation owners and managers in Idukki were not able to provide
food for migrant labour, the state government, based on investigation
of a report from the Idukki district labour officer, gave instructions that
migrant workers employed on plantations in Idukki district and not in
possession of ration cards should be provided free rations that would be
financed from the CMDRF/SDRF (G O no. 113/2020, Public Distribution
Division). 
Interventions by the state government underlined carefully devised strat-
egies to prevent unrest. Measures were taken to reach out to migrant work-
ers in their own languages through call centres and pamphlets, to ensure that 
they were able to communicate with their families back home, provision 
was made for monitoring of health, counselling services were set up, and 
even recreation facilities were provided in shelters. Recognising that the 
distress of migrant workers went beyond essential provisions, the state gov-
ernment was among the first to appeal to the Centre to run trains for them 
to return homes if they so desired. By June, nearly 58 per cent or 252,444 
migrant workers enumerated in camps had left the state in 180 special trains 
from across the state (Sai Kiran, 2020). The measures taken by the state 
government during the lockdown were consistent with a pre-existing wel-
fare approach but they must be seen alongside expressions of hostility and 
xenophobia against migrant workers (discussed in the following section). 
Inter-state migrant workers and citizenship in Kerala 
Explaining Kerala’s performance in keeping the infection and death rates 
low in the first few months of the pandemic, Patrick Heller (2020) under-
scored the ‘robust nature of Kerala’s social compact’ and likened the pan-
demic to a ‘physical exam of the social body’ that put public trust to its 
biggest ever test. However, if public trust has defined the state’s ability in 
Kerala to ‘elicit compliance’ (a reference to the willingness of citizens to 
comply with the measures taken by the state), we also need to be attentive 
of the fractures in the social body in Kerala. With the rapidly increasing 
numbers of migrant workers in Kerala and as a section of them reside with 
their families, educate their children, and develop stronger stakes in local 
society, the social body in Kerala is clearly becoming more diverse. This 
reality pushes against the problems with an approach that evades the ques-
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A case in point is the use of the term ‘guest workers’, which was meant to 
convey a caring approach. However, as migration scholar, Binoy Peter was 
quick to point out, by using the term, the ‘government seems to be remind-
ing them to leave after their work is finished, which is discriminatory. They 
have the right to be here’ (cited in Paliath, 2020). The term is reminiscent of 
the guest worker programme in postwar Germany, which politely spelt out 
temporality in residence and the Kafala (guest) system in the Middle East 
that gives impunity to the police and nationals to discipline the immigrant 
workforce (Kodoth, 2020). 
This is not merely an issue of nomenclature. In response to allegations 
of illegal migration and criminal activity, successive governments in Kerala 
have sought to increase bureaucratic controls over migrant workers. At one 
point, migrant workers were required to obtain police clearance cards that 
vouched for their credentials – their place of birth and lack of criminal ante-
cedents (Prasad, 2017). Such mechanisms of control also recall immigra-
tion regimes for as Caroline Vandenabeele points out: ‘Legal identity, or 
the right to be recognized by the government of the country of which one 
is a citizen, is a primary right that exists regardless of whether one has 
a document to prove this citizenship … [O]fficial, government-issued and 
-recognized documents … do not confer legal identity; they merely confirm
it’ (cited in Bhabha, 2011: 5). 
Ironically, in Kerala, where workers’ protests are staple fare, protests 
by migrant workers during the lockdown were used to stoke suspicion 
and fear. A sample of messages circulated on social media read: ‘Migrant 
labourers from West Bengal, Assam, Bihar and UP could take control over 
Perambavoor town in less than 10 minutes. They will not allow us to flee. 
Our situation would become worse than that of Pandits, who fled Kashmir 
valley’ (Ameerudhin, 2020). 
The idea that migrant workers pose a threat to the territorial sovereignty
of the Malayali people raises fundamental contestation of migrant citizen-
ship. This notion of sovereignty is not threatened, however, by existing
state-conferred visibility. A recent expression of state-conferred visibility in
the form of the celebration of the achievements of the daughter of a migrant
worker from Bihar is instructive. On 23 August 2020, Payal Kumari made
headlines when she secured the first rank in the final examination of the
history and archaeology course at the MG University in Kottayam.5 She
was feted by the chief minister: ‘What makes her success special is the
fact that her parents are guest workers’ (cited in Phillip, 2020). Interviewed
widely, she was quoted as saying that her success belonged to Kerala and
that she could not have made this kind of progress had her family remained
in her home state (Kuriakose, 2020). As the media recounted the many






enabled her and her family to overcome seemingly unsurmountable odds, it
was difficult to miss how the girl’s achievements were presented as seam-
less with those of a socially progressive and caring state and a generous
society. 
Contrast this with the responsibility for crime committed by migrant 
workers which is systematically displaced on to the social body of migrants. 
A slew of allegations, mostly unsubstantiated, are levelled against migrant 
workers, suggesting that they are a threat to public order and public health 
as they engage in criminal activities, alcohol, and substance abuse, lack 
basic hygiene, and offer a safe haven for law breakers, terrorists, and illegal 
migrants. A reporter pointed out: 
The locals, including the contractors, plot a direct correlation between 
the unhygienic circumstances in which they live and their ‘criminal 
tendencies’. ‘They don’t care about anything else but money. They 
want to come to Kerala, live in the dirtiest of ways, commit a burglary 
and then leave’, says Joseph Babu, a contractor. 
(Thomas, 2013) 
The contention that the problem lies with migrant workers diverts attention 
from state practices, policies, and social relations. Pointing out that it is the 
government and not migrant workers who are responsible for addressing 
problems of cleanliness and illegal activity, an activist described that it is 
the living conditions of migrant workers that foster ill health: 
There is scarcity of clean water. They [migrant workers] do not have 
adequate toilet facilities. Ten to 20 people live in small huts. They are 
anonymous and there are no records. There is no system to provide vac-
cinations or other forms of necessary medical care to them. 
(TB Mini cited in Shaheena, 2016) 
The rape and murder of a young law student in 2016, which was eventually 
traced to a migrant worker, was a defining moment in mobilising legitimacy 
for surveillance of migrant workers. Multiple forms of marginality inter-
sected in representations of the victim and the suspect. In the immediate 
aftermath of the crime, the media treated the victim, a Dalit from a poor 
family, with insensitively revealing her name and questioning her academic 
credentials before catapulting her into the position of ‘Kerala’s daughter’
even as it generated paranoia about migrant labour (Zacharias, 2016). 
Amidst growing tensions, a mob lynched a migrant worker who arrived 
in the state soon after the incident, reportedly on the suspicion that he was a 
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This is only a symptom of the abhorrence and intolerance that Malayalee 
society displays towards migrant workers. Now public demands for 
registering them with the police are on the rise … Why police? The 
government has other mechanisms to keep a record of migrants coming 
to Kerala. Even local self-governments can play a role. 
(Cited in Shaheena 2016) 
The question exposes the failures of a benevolent state in protecting the 
rights of migrant workers in Kerala. Notably, fear of the police can prevent 
migrants from speaking openly. As ‘the already existing xenophobia has 
increased’, migrant workers were reluctant to speak of police interroga-
tion or even their living or working conditions (Thomas cited in Shaheena, 
2016). 
But displacing the responsibility for crime on to migrant labour also 
diverts attention more specifically from the state’s responsibility to ensure 
women’s safety. A migrant activist is forced to state the obvious – that the 
problem of gender-based crime is not confined to migrant labour: 
Instead of keeping the migrants under the scanner each time a rape is 
committed, Kerala’s government and society must find ways to make 
the state a safer place for women to live in. The statistics being bandied 
about in the media amount to this: In 2015, every 43 minutes saw a 
new crime against a woman in the state. And, on average, a woman was 
raped almost every six hours. Few migrants, if any, have anything to do 
with this astounding crime rate. 
(Fr PA Chacko, cited in Prasad, S. 2016) 
An environment of suspicion that is generated in the wake of crime has 
served to remind migrant workers of their ‘outsider’ status. The rape and 
murder of a woman in Perambavoor in 2019 ‘brought back that by-now 
familiar sense of alienation that visits the likes of Rajendar [a migrant 
worker] every time a migrant is hauled up by police’ (Praveen, 2019). 
Rajendar, who has spent the past two decades in Kerala, arriving in the state 
at the age of 16, told the reporter that people ‘need to realise that every land 
has its share of good and bad people, and there is no place full of good peo-
ple alone’. He lives in Perambavoor with his family in circumstances that 
could not be very different from those of Payal Kumari, whose academic 
achievement was celebrated. Both spoke fluently in Malayalam and their 
families worked hard to make a living in Kerala. Payal Kumari was quoted 
as saying that she felt so safe in Kerala that she could walk on the streets at 
night without causing concern to her parents and that she was never made 




fluidity and layering in the experiences of migrants, the association of crim-
inality with migrant workers exposes a bed rock of congealed hostility. 
In contrast to individual achievements of migrants, whether in educa-
tion, sports, or art, the marking of identity and difference are political acts 
that may be perceived as threats to sovereignty. What emerges from the 
above analysis is a binary view of migrant labour as a threat to public order 
who must therefore submit to state surveillance or quintessentially apoliti-
cal actors, whose achievements showcase the progressive credentials of the 
state. It is instructive, in this light, that the state sees welfare and surveil-
lance as inextricably bound together. Epitomising this is the Awas scheme 
(see note 2), which was launched in the aftermath of the 2016 rape and 
murder case that exposed migrants to heightened suspicion. The objectives 
of the scheme were ‘to ensure collection of information about inter-state 
migrant workers in Kerala and to provide health security’. Information 
referred to bio metrics and personal data of migrant workers (GO (Ordinary) 
no. 1365/2016, Department of Labour and Skills). 
Crucially, the problem of migrant citizenship cannot be seen in isolation 
from the larger question of labour rights in Kerala. Routine forms of dis-
crimination against migrant labour are evident in comparatively low wages 
(than that of local labour) and poor working and living conditions. Migrant 
labour is excluded from the significant gains made by local labour in both 
the formal and informal sectors. Mainstream trade unions are embedded in 
local structures of power and have colluded with big business interests to 
undermine the bargaining power of migrant workers (Prasad-Aleyamma, 
2017). In this context, Prasad, M (2016) notes that migrant workers have 
sought to claim citizenship by forging alliances with their employers in the 
face of collusion by mainstream trade unions with the state and big busi-
nesses interests. 
The All India Trade Union Congress, affiliated to the Communist Party 
of India, formed a separate Migrant Workers Union in 2013 but efforts to 
organise migrant workers are stymied by the conventional approach of 
organising designed for factory labour. The first state conference of the 
Kerala Migrant Workers’ Union in 2017 acknowledged that rights achieved 
by local labour ‘a long time ago’ were not extended to migrant workers, 
who suffered from non-payment of minimum wages; exploitation by con-
tractors; lack of proper living space; and proper service conditions, includ-
ing health and shelter (The Hindu, 2 April 2017). 
Interestingly, trade unions and the police fail to see that mobility is a 
condition that demands fundamental reworking of social and political insti-
tutions. The present structure of trade unions is too rigid to accommodate 
migrant labour except in separate unions that undermine labour solidarity. 
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a model as it registers membership in an umbrella organisation, irrespective 
of the place of work and occupation of the worker. Another way is to think 
in terms of portability of membership from place to place and even occupa-
tion to occupation given the nature of the times where necessary skill sets 
are subject to rapid change. 
Expatriate Malayali labour 
An estimated 3.0 million Keralites work in the Middle East. Of the approxi-
mately 3 lakh NRKs who had returned from COVID-19 hit countries by 
mid-April 2020, 1.65 lakh had lost their jobs (Kuttappan, 2020). The rela-
tions of the state with inter-state migrant workers, on the one hand, and 
NRKs, on the other, provide some instructive insights. The state appeals to 
NRKs in a language of merit that grants them a position of power and privi-
lege. During the lockdown, for instance, the need to facilitate their return 
home was justified repeatedly with reference to their economic contribu-
tions or what the state owes to them as ‘gratitude’. Also the two major polit-
ical blocs in the state, the United Democratic Front and the Left Democratic 
Front, compete to be seen as the protectors of NRK interests. During the 
lockdown, the opposition accused the government of not being in earnest 
about facilitating the return of NRKs. A government order refusing to pro-
vide free quarantine for returning expatriates which said that Pravasis and 
‘guest workers’ could not be treated as equal became hugely controversial, 
notwithstanding the substantially different costs that would be involved. 
The efforts to woo NRKs are evidence of their collective power. Unlike
in the case of inter-state migrant labour, state-conferred visibility of NRKs
coincides substantially with visibility carved out by NRKs. Kerala is a
pioneer in establishing a separate government department (Non Resident
Keralites Association – NORKA) to serve the interests of NRKs. NORKA
offers several welfare schemes for NRKs and returnee workers and has
been organising the Loka Kerala Sabha, an occasion that like the Pravasi
Divas celebrates expatriate achievements. During the lockdown, the gov-
ernment announced the Dream Kerala Project to tap the skills and experi-
ence of return migrants and also distributed Rs. 5,000 each to over 20,000
NRKs who were prevented from returning to the jobs. Going beyond wel-
fare to a measure of political voice, representatives of NRKs are on the
board of NORKA, whereas inter-state migrant workers are not involved in
the design and governance of welfare schemes. NRKs also have their own
associations to intervene in matters concerning them and to lobby with the
government. 
However, NRKs are not one homogeneous bloc. The celebration of 





(MDW), comprising women mostly from economically distressed families 
who are possibly the single largest occupational group of women migrants 
from the state. There is little recognition of their substantial contribution 
to the betterment of some of the most socially marginal households in the 
state, those of widows and separated women (Kodoth, 2020). A discourse of 
merit that defines the government’s response to male migrant workers and 
more affluent migrants has deleterious implications for groups that are not 
seen as worthy of celebration. 
The visibility of MDWs in Kerala is defined usually by narratives of 
abuse and harassment, but these narratives have fallen strangely silent since 
the pandemic hit. Reports from the Middle East suggest that MDWs may 
be subject to increased workloads, paid lower salaries, at greater risk of 
contracting COVID because their jobs involve tasks of cleaning and close 
proximity with employers (Aoun, 2020). The Indian government outreach 
to domestic workers is usually poor and during the crisis there have been no 
specific measures to protect them. Many MDWs defy unjust state regula-
tion, which restrict their right to mobility, and migrate to the Middle East 
through irregular channels. The government’s approach to MDWs exposes 
the intersecting gender, class, and caste divide within Kerala and under-
mines citizenship (Kodoth, 2020). 
Conclusion: Search for justice-based solidarity 
Inter-state migrant labour in Kerala was granted a form of visibility through 
at least minimal social protection prior to and during the lockdown. At 
the same time, state practices and social relations have been implicated in 
producing them as ‘outsiders’ and denying them political rights. Thus, I 
have argued that state-conferred visibility has not guaranteed enfranchised 
citizenship. The analysis in the chapter presents two kinds of contrasts 
that underscore the failures of citizenship of inter-state migrant workers 
in Kerala and expose the faultlines of a benevolent state. While the exten-
sion of welfare to migrant workers and the celebration of their individual 
achievements are presented as seamless with a socially progressive and car-
ing state and society, migrant protests are represented as a threat to sov-
ereignty and the responsibility for crime committed by migrant workers 
is displaced en masse on to migrant labour. The second contrast is in the 
position of NRKs and inter-state migrant labour. Whereas the state appeals 
to NRKs in a language that grants them a position of privilege and power 
and state-conferred visibility coincides substantially with visibility sought 
by NRKs, the rhetoric of benevolence used to appeal to inter-state migrant 
workers and the discordance between state-conferred visibility and visibil-
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However, NRKs are differentiated and among them MDWs are not seen 
as meritorious which indicates some similarities between the position of 
MDWs and that of inter-state migrant workers. 
Mehta (2020) has pointed out that ‘genuine solidarity, that speaks the 
language of justice, will ask hard questions about rights, institutional obli-
gations, processes and accountability’. Labour rights are crucial to the 
issue of justice-based solidarity for migrant workers. At present, inter-state 
migrant labour is excluded from the substantial gains made by local labour 
in Kerala and has an uneasy relationship with the mainstream trade unions. 
Going further, as Samaddar (2020b: 39) observes the struggle for justice 
calls for the recognition of the vulnerabilities and struggles of people, which 
mandate a caring model of power that is socially regenerative, enriching 
of life, and produces solidarity. He argues that workplace rights and social 
protection are inadequate as migrant workers are invisible in politics (p 33). 
Indeed, in Kerala the spatial clustering of migrants could favour the emer-
gence of migrant workers as elected representatives at the local level. The 
fear of and push back against migrant efforts to register their political exist-
ence and the binding of social protection to bureaucratic controls may be 
seen in this light. 
Notes 
1 Samaddar (2020a) points out that the exodus demonstrated the conditions in 
the informal economy and the near absence of social protection which fosters 
the circulation of workers between their villages and the cities, giving migrant 
workers little reason to remain in the destination and many reasons to leave. 
2 The Kerala Migrant Workers Welfare Scheme, 2010, the first of its kind in the
country, to provide accident/medical care for up to Rs. 25,000; Rs. 1 lakh to
the family in case of death; children’s education allowance; and termination
benefits of Rs. 25,000 after five years of work to registered migrants. Awas
offers registered workers free treatment of up to Rs. 25,000 from government
empanelled hospitals and if a worker dies, the family receives Rs. 2 lakh as
compensation. There is also the Roshini project aimed at inclusion of migrant
children in schools and Changathi, a Malayalam literacy initiative for migrant
workers. 
3 The study estimated that there were about 2.5 million inter-state migrant workers 
in Kerala in 2013 and that the numbers could be expected to increase by about 
2.35 lakh every year based on data on mobility from the railways (Narayana and 
Venkiteswaran, 2013). 
4 SWAN (2020). For a discussion of gaps in implementation and responsiveness 
of higher-level state authorities, see also Roy (2020: 78). 
5 Earlier in the year, a migrant woman from Bihar was similarly feted when she 
topped the Malayalam literacy exam with full marks (The Hindu, February 16, 
2020). There are other examples as well such as an exhibition of paintings by a 
migrant worker from Bengal in Kozhikode (Shaheena, 2016). 
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8 Protecting livelihood, health, 
and decency of work 
Paid domestic workers in times of 
COVID-19 
S. Anandhi and E. Deepa 
Introduction 
The COVID-19 virus, combined with the state measures to contain it
through lockdowns, has severely affected one of Chennai’s indomitable
informal workforces, the paid domestic workers. In the last three decades,
Chennai has seen a phenomenal growth of paid domestic work along with
the growth of other service sectors. A large section of poor women who
live in the slums of the city have taken up paid domestic work as viable
employment for their family’s survival. There are roughly about 1.8 mil-
lion poor women in Tamil Nadu who work as paid domestic workers. Their
work is primarily a dually informalised work since it is performed in the
private informal sphere of the domestic with women who are often invis-
ible as ‘workers’ in addition to the work being contractual with no employ-
ment protection or worker benefits such as the provident fund, health
insurance, accident benefits, or old age pension. For example, the paid
domestic workers are not covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act
as they are not treated as ‘workman’ by a narrow definition given in this
conservative act1 that excludes any employment of ‘casual nature’ or the
ones that are not seen as involving ‘trade’ or ‘business’. The paid domestic
work is also excluded from a range of worker’s protective and welfare
acts such as the Minimum Wages Act 1948, Maternity Benefit Act 1961,
and the Contract Labour (regulation and Abolition) Act 1970;2 therefore,
they are not entitled to even minimum worker’s benefits such as weekly
holidays, sick leave, and maternity leave. There is also a problem of fixing
the categories of domestic work as skilled and unskilled, with most works
being categorised as unskilled, leading to low pay for these workers. For
example, in a recent minimum wage notification even cooking, child care,
and elderly care have been categorised as unskilled work, leading to low
pay for such arduous care work (Sarkar, 2019). The minimum wage fixed
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has not taken into account the specific nature of vulnerabilities and the
intense physical labour involved in this work.3 Working as part-time or full
time and as live-in for 8–10 hours a day either in one house or in multiple
houses these workers are subjected to various forms of gendered exploita-
tions, sexual harassment at the workplace, for instance. Further, with their
labour being expropriated without adequate compensations or any work
security, the livelihood of the domestic workers is extremely fragile and
uncertain. 
With the pandemic, paid domestic workers are facing the crisis of 
employment and nonpayment of salary, in addition to the pre-existing social 
stigmas against them. Some of them are forced to go for work amidst the 
virus crisis, risking their life with no health security. A large contingent 
of these women workers belongs to the slums of Chennai with inadequate 
housing and sanitation facilities and with lack of income to meet any health 
crisis. Under these abject living conditions, they also share the undue bur-
den of the social distancing policy of the state. Keeping in mind the many 
woes and challenges faced by the domestic workers during the pandemic, in 
this chapter, we suggest various measures for social and health protection of 
these workers along with other labour welfare measures that are on records 
for many decades without being strictly implemented. 
Challenges faced by the paid domestic workers in the 
context of COVID-19 
Crisis of employment 
The impact of COVID-19 on women domestic workers is profound and 
sometimes immeasurable. The first major problem faced by these work-
ers is sudden unemployment, which is no less a threat to their lives than 
the virus itself. In compliance with the lockdown, many employers have 
requested their domestic workers not to come for work until they are called 
back (ILO News, 7 May 2020). This has created enormous uncertainty for 
the paid domestic workers who have begun to fear job loss. A domestic 
worker from north Chennai, in her interview with us, captured this anxi-
ety thus: ‘If I stay at home without work my family will starve, if I leave 
home defying the lockdown, corona will get me. I dread to think but dared 
to go for work [uyirai panayam vechuthan velaikku pogiren]’.4 Though at 
present we do not have adequate data on the extent of job loss among the 
paid domestic workers,5 the recent protest by the domestic workers belong-
ing to Pen Thozholalar Sangam (Women Workers’ Association) and their 
demand that the state immediately issue an order to the employers to take 
back the domestic workers make clear that the crisis of job loss is real, 
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intense, and that it has severely affected the livelihood of these workers 
(The Newsminute, 2 September 2020). 
Some employers have shrewdly dismissed these workers just before the 
lockdown and promised to take them back once the lockdown is eased. 
However, some of these workers are not convinced about getting their jobs 
back. After 21 days of lockdown, a worker in her interview said that much 
of her trepidation is about her employers, who might get used to doing their 
housework by themselves and not call her back and that as they too would 
get only half pay, they would not pay her salary during the lockdown. ‘I am 
not sure if they will call me back for work [yenna velaikku vetchipaanga-
laanu theriyala]’ was her remark on the plight of unemployment. Several 
domestic workers in Chennai city have not received their monthly wages 
for the past two months. Some of them have received only half pay for 
the month of March and nothing for the following months (Ramakrishnan, 
2020). A woman who works for bachelors said her employers paid only half 
the salary for three months and were also demanding her to be present for 
work when she faced the problem of transport. According to her, they were 
also unwilling to advance loan for any health contingency. Some workers 
have risked police vigilance and, putting their own health at risk, have gone 
to work so that they do not lose the job. They also undertook more work 
in these households where the demands of care work as well as sanitation 
work have increased due to the COVID-19 crisis. 
Reverse migration of families in search of rural livelihood have forced 
some of these domestic workers to leave Chennai without a hope of get-
ting back to their work in the city. Our prediction is that due to job loss 
in other sectors of informal work, with no employment guarantee scheme 
for urban workers, there could be a huge supply of domestic workers from 
poor women seeking job for survival. This would not only increase the 
competition among the workers but also reduce their bargaining capacity 
in terms of wages and other benefits, including their capacity to negotiate 
their demands for toilet facilities within employer’s home or for any other 
health security. 
Low pay, liquidity crunch, and welfare crisis 
A large proportion of women domestic workers are middle-aged married 
women, among whom a substantial number are widows or divorced or liv-
ing with alcoholic, abusive husbands with financial instability in the family. 
We may note that men in these families too lack any stable income and most 
of them are casual workers who work in the informal sector as construction 
workers, sanitary workers, and so on, or are self-employed as auto drivers, 
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to the lockdown, thus multiplying the family’s hardship. With a monthly 
income, these women workers are often the main providers for their fam-
ily and therefore are encountering the worst situation of liquidity crunch in 
their homes at a time when the cost of essential commodities has gone up 
and their familiar neighbourhood stores where they have monthly accounts 
or loans to purchase household items are shut for a while. Some of them 
told us they could not venture out to borrow money from their employers 
who could also not transfer the same through phone banking since many of 
these workers were not familiar with such technologies. The divorced or 
separated women workers often do not hold ration cards or bank accounts 
to avail the government welfare schemes during the pandemic. 
Pressure to pay rent on time despite the Tamil Nadu Government order 
(G.O. no.195, 30 March 2020) not to collect rent for these two months has 
forced many of them to borrow money for high interest. One single woman 
worker narrated her experience of being harassed by her landlord thus: ‘I 
am living in a hut paying Rs. 2,500 per month as rent. The owner has been 
harassing me to pay the rent and I had to fight with him two days reminding 
him of the Government order not to force collect rent. Finally he relented 
but it is still like a dagger on my neck’. The state welfare provisions, as 
many pointed out, are not adequate to meet the needs of the entire family.6 
Though Tamil Nadu Domestic Welfare Board has been allocated special 
relief funds to manage the crisis of the workers during the pandemic, the 
Board suffers from long years of inactivity with no proper registration of 
the domestic workers to deliver the welfare schemes. It is estimated that the 
Greater Chennai alone would have 5.5 lakh domestic workers, whereas by 
2009, only 64,825 women workers were registered with the Board. Among 
the registered, only 17,066 members have received any benefits from the 
Welfare Board and many of them are not even aware of manual workers’
welfare schemes. 
Return to work: New woes 
In Chennai, ever since the slums have been relocated in faraway Kannagi 
Nagar and Perumpakkam, the paid domestic workers living in these reset-
tlement colonies travel a long way to the central parts of the city for work, 
spending a huge amount as transport cost. One may note here that in the 
case of domestic work, trust, loyalty to employers, and regularity bring the 
workers several benefits. Therefore, women workers endure long-distance 
travel to keep their relationship and work intact. In order to retain their 
work with their previous employers, these workers shell out a huge amount 
of their salary as travel cost (Coelho et al., 2013). With the easing of the 
lockdown when these workers were expected to return to work, many of 
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them could not do so since their mobility was severely hampered by the lack 
of transport facilities. The anxiety of losing work due to the lack of trans-
port was expressed thus by a young worker who lives in Perumpakkam and 
works in Mylapore: ‘I do not know what to do. If I do not take up the work 
when called, the employers might go for other workers and I stand to lose 
these houses of work. I cannot walk such a long distance for work; I am in a 
fix and caught in a dilemma [En nilamai, iruthalai kolli erumbu madhiri]’. 
Care workers or carriers of virus? 
‘Will we come to work with the virus when we care for them? [avangala 
paathukira nanga noiyoda velaikku varuvoma?]’, asked a worker during 
our interview with her. With the spread of virus, the stigma attached to the 
domestic work and the workers are reinforced through means of identifying 
these workers as carriers of virus (Viswanath, 2020). In Chennai, taking into 
consideration the upper-caste class anxiety about manual workers as being 
the carriers of any disease, many resident associations have barred entry of 
domestic workers and drivers into their premises. This is despite the state 
relaxation of lockdown rules (DT Next, 10 June 2020). Karpagam, a worker 
from the Pen Thozhilar Sangam, noted that the ‘members of Residents’
Welfare Associations (RWAs) of various apartments have told them not to 
visit the apartment for work until next year’. She further observed that the 
affluent apartment dwellers ‘are not ready to take workers who hail from 
homes in the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board’ (The Newsminute, 2 
September 2020). Similarly, A. Kumari, who works for several houses in 
an apartment complex, said that she was asked to leave immediately once 
the employers got to know that she lives in the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance 
Board tenements in Perumbakkam (The Hindu, 3 September 2020). ‘It has 
been three months and I am struggling to find a job’, she said. In cases 
where they have been called back to work, severe restrictions and surveil-
lance are put in place to the extent of denying the dignity of the workers. 
One worker confided that after the lockdown, new kinds of surveillance 
practices are put in place in her employer’s house, making her feel uneasy 
and self-conscious about her hygiene status. ‘Interrogating me as to whether 
I keep my house clean and whether everyone at home bathed, etc., in addi-
tion to the routine wash of my feet with turmeric water before entering 
their house have become a new routine making me feel conscious of my 
working class status’. Another worker felt that though maintaining hygiene 
and self-distancing are good to keep the virus away it should not be used 
to stigmatise or cast aspersions on the workers. In some residential apart-
ments domestic workers are prohibited from using the lift to reach houses 
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distancing given to these workers is used in subtle ways to reinforce the 
pre-existing stigmas against the workers who seem to risk their own life for 
want of adequate provisions for hand-washing, self-isolation, and wearing 
of masks or any other personal protective gears. 
Paid domestic workers and the unpaid care work 
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the persistent inequality in the gen-
der distribution of unpaid care work with all of them indicating the unusual 
burden of domestic responsibilities with no assistance from men in doing 
household chores. ILO observes that prior to the COVID-19 crisis, over two 
third of 16.4 billion hours were spent by women in unpaid care work every 
day across the world. This has now increased manifold (ILO Brief, 2020a). 
This is more so in the case of poor domestic workers whose low pay and 
temporary employment has always undermined their capacity to hire paid 
labour to do care work in their families, thus adding to their paid care work 
responsibilities. During the lockdown and due to the pandemic, this unpaid 
care work in their own houses has intensified for the paid domestic work-
ers. The absence of day care centres, schools and permanent presence of 
unemployed men demanding care along with the elderly care and increasing 
attention to sanitation have added to the woes of domestic workers doing 
unpaid family work. In addition, there are everyday ordeals of erratic water 
supply, lack of transport, lack of time to access ration shops, public hospi-
tals, and corporation dispensaries faced by these workers. 
Altogether, COVID-19 has exacerbated the crisis of existence for
women domestic workers with their lack of access to labour and social
protection including health care and maternity protection, especially when
many of them with their reduced immunity are forced to work even under
such life threatening conditions. Therefore, these women workers are,
as ILO observes, likely to be more impoverished and marginalised from
income replacement and from social protection schemes than the formal
workers. It is also worth taking note of ILO’s warning on lockdown meas-
ures here. It has said, ‘[l]ockdown measures will worsen poverty and vul-
nerabilities among the world’s two billion informal economy workers’ 
(ILO, 2020b). 
Need for a coordinated social and health policy for
domestic workers 
More than ever before, in the present context of the pandemic it becomes 
important to recognise the domestic workers’ economic productivity and 
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effective measures in this direction. Incidentally, India has not even rati-
fied the ILO Convention on Domestic Workers which mandates nations to 
provide occupational safety and health of these workers (ILO Domestic 
Workers Convention, 2011). 
Given the vulnerability of paid domestic workers, prioritising monetary 
and health support along with meeting their immediate needs becomes a 
state responsibility. In particular, the state has to attend to their special needs 
of sanitation and health care and evolve specific social protection schemes. 
About ten Central Trade Unions in India have already demanded immediate 
measures from the state to protect the livelihood of vulnerable workers in 
the informal sector including the migrant workers and for the inclusion of 
trade unions in the COVID-19 response task force. The Central government 
so far has not responded to these demands (ILO, 2020b). 
Rethinking the role of Tamil Nadu Domestic Workers’
Welfare Board 
In consonance with the demands of the trade unions, the Tamil Nadu 
Domestic Welfare Board may initiate few consultative processes with trade 
unions that work for the welfare of domestic workers and include them as 
part of the task force to address the specific needs of the domestic work-
ers. In this regard, the Board must recognise specific gendered nature of 
discriminations and exclusions that are faced by these workers during the 
pandemic in order to prioritise their occupational health and livelihood 
issues (ILO Brief, 2020b). In this regard ILO guideline on this might help 
the state to evolve a coordinated health and social policy: ‘[s]trengthening 
occupational safety and health, adjusting work arrangements, preventing 
discrimination and exclusion, and providing access to health care and paid 
leave (and also to food and social services for the most vulnerable) are all 
indispensable strands of a coordinated health and social policy response 
to the crisis’ (ILO Policy Brief on Covid-19, Pillar:3). Treating domestic 
workers as essential service workers and providing them with necessary 
personal protective equipment along with reliable and accessible informa-
tion and affordable health services is the responsibility of the Tamil Nadu 
Domestic Workers’ Welfare Board, who can be helped by the domestic 
workers’ unions. Simple measures like having mobile COVID-19 testing 
centres placed in various public places where the workers could easily get 
tested will help them and the state to contain the spread of virus. Similar 
such demands have been placed by the International Domestic Workers’
Federation (IDWF, 18 March 2020). 
Established in 2007, the Tamil Nadu Domestic Workers’ Welfare Board
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from children’s education, marriage, and maternal health expenses of the work-
ers, death-related benefits for the worker’s heir, a nominal pension amount,
and so on. Unfortunately, the Welfare Board has not even paid attention to the
compulsory registration of all domestic workers to benefit from these schemes.
Domestic workers are not even aware of the existence of the Board. For this, the
Board must adequately publicise their activities and schemes and evolve new
norms and rules for compulsory registration of the workers. 
In fixing the minimum wages for the domestic workers, the state has 
overlooked the problem of fixing the categories of domestic work as 
unskilled labour – cooking and childcare for instance – leading to low pay 
for these essential care workers. All these have serious implications for the 
dignity and decency of work for the domestic workers. 
Being in informal work, no domestic worker has any legal entitlement
to sickness leave benefits. In the present context of COVID-19, as ILO
has pointed out, there is a need for a coordinated health and social welfare
response to the crisis so that the state can ensure occupational safety, better
working environment for these workers without discrimination and exclusion
(ILO Policy Brief on Covid 19, Pillar: 3). To address specific health needs of
the workers in times of pandemic like this, employers should be made to pay a
nominal amount towards insurance scheme or other benefits for the workers. 
Work from home (WFH) policy, mainly for the private-sector employ-
ees, may affect the paid domestic workers who work in such houses, as
some workers anticipate increasing workloads with houses multiplying as
office space with no additional wage for doing any extra cleaning or sanita-
tion work. Some workers even expressed their anxiety about working for
houses with bachelors who would be working from home.7 Extending the
laws related to sexual harassment at work to the domestic work sphere and
improving wages for the increasing workload would enable these workers
to feel safe at work. As we noted elsewhere, two legislations concerning
domestic workers, The Unorganised Workers’ Social Security Act, 2008 and
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition
and Redressal) Act, 2013, at present are inadequate in addressing the specific
forms of exploitations peculiar to this work (Rajkotwala and Mehta, 2020). 
With the postponement of school education, the likelihood of inducing 
young girls into paid domestic work will result in an increase in child labour 
in small towns and in rural Tamil Nadu (Kundu, 21 April 2020). Providing 
accessible technology-based educational solutions for vulnerable families 
could become an important solution to mitigate the problem of child labour 
(ILO Brief 2020a & 2020b). 
As long-term measures to mitigate the vulnerability of paid domestic 
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1) Formalisation of the domestic work sector through mandatory registra-
tion of domestic workers with the corporation divisions/wards. 
2) Employment of only registered domestic workers and punitive meas-
ures for employers violating such norms. As the trade unions perceive 
such registration to have a benefit to both employer and domestic 
worker, it is a workable option. 
3) Registered workers should be entitled to (a) living wage (time-rated or 
job-specified wages) to be fixed by the labour department; (b) decent 
working conditions to be clearly laid out; (c) guidelines for treatment 
of domestic workers; (d) leave, annual bonus, transport, etc., as part of 
the contract; (e) right to associate and freedom to participate in union 
activities; (f) right to access good public health centres near their 
homes; (g) right to information related to their welfare provided by the 
government through the Domestic Workers’ Welfare Board. 
4) The state could additionally levy tax through corporation to cover 
the cost of social security and insurance. The money collected from 
worker, employer, and the additional levies could form part of the 
Domestic Workers Fund. The existing Domestic Workers’ Welfare 
Board could be the nodal body for the welfare and oversight. 
5) Mandatory savings could be introduced through means of some co-
operative efforts which might enable the domestic workers to utilise, 
borrow, and lend to other women during this kind of crisis. 
6) Housing security could be provided for women workers to avoid evic-
tion threat by landlords, state, and lenders. This is especially impor-
tant in the light of rural migrant workers selling their small-sized patta 
lands in the village to buy non-patta land in the city for their permanent 
dwelling with little housing security. 
7) Displacement of workers within the city which has huge social, eco-
nomic, and health cost for the workers should be stopped. 
For carrying out some of these welfare measures, the state Domestic 
Workers’ Welfare Board could collaborate with Penn Thozhilalargal 
Sangam, Centre for Women’s Development and Research (CWDR, 
Chennai), and ILO, Decent Work Program, Delhi, to create a framework or 
guidelines in the light of the present crisis and to look into aspects of laws, 
and their implementation. 
*** 
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Notes 
1 According to this central government act, ‘workman’ connotes ‘any person other 
than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed oth-
erwise than for the purposes of the employer’ s trade or business’. The Act’s def-
inition of an employer and the contract labour though clearly applies to the paid 
domestic workers and their employers, the provisions of the Act have not been 
extended to cover the paid domestic work. See, ‘The Workmen’s Compensation 
Act, 1923’, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1806623/. (accessed on 20 October 
2020). 
2 Applying this Act to paid domestic work would have helped regulate this con-
tractual work since one of the regulatory requirements under this statute include 
registration of the principle employer and the issue of licence to recruitment 
agencies as contractors. As of now these provisions exist only for work that 
involves establishments in which 20 or more workers are employed as contract 
labour and that they do not apply to ‘establishments in which work only of an 
intermittent or casual nature is performed’. 
3 In 2018, the Tamil Nadu government has fixed their minimum wage at Rs. 37 
per hour and the monthly minimum wage at Rs.6,836 for 8 hours of work per 
day. 
4 We have carried out few tele-interviews with a small number of domestic work-
ers from north, south, and central Chennai and also received notes on challenges 
faced by the domestic workers during COVID-19 from domestic workers’
forums led by Pen Thozhilalar Sangam (north Chennai) and Manushi, Centre 
for Women’s Development Research (Greater Chennai Corporation). 
5 In an informal chat, Sujatha Mody, an activist scholar with Pen Thozhilalar 
Sangam, claimed that more than 80 per cent of the women domestic workers of 
Chennai were not paid salary for at least two months during the lockdown. 
6 Those with a ration card have received an allowance of Rs.1,000 along with 
substandard rice and lentils. This is not adequate for even a small family. 
7 A domestic worker who works for the bachelor IT workers said that previously 
she used to enter their house only after they have left for work and therefore felt 
comfortable working for them. She expressed her fear that they might make it 
inconvenient for her to work when they are present in the house all the time and 
without any woman employer around in the house. 
8 The ILO labour standards on employment, social protection, wage protec-
tion, and workplace cooperation already contain specific guidance on policy 
measures for various sets of workers such as paid domestic workers affected by 
COVID-19 related crisis. While drawing up our specific suggestions we have 
kept this in mind. See, ‘ILO Standards and COVID-19 (coronavirus): Key pro-
visions of international labour standards relevant to the evolving COVID-19 
outbreak’, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/ 
documents/genericdocument/wcms_739937.pdf. (accessed on 15 June 2020). 
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9 Controlling journeys, 
controlling labour 
COVID-19 and migrants 
Pushpendra and Manish K Jha 
Introduction 
The complete lockdown announced by the prime minister of India on 24 
March 2020 was followed by episodes of hundreds of thousands of migrants 
defying the lockdown and walking towards their home, sometimes cover-
ing more than a thousand kilometres. These journeys not only exposed the 
vulnerabilities of migrant labourers but also brought the issue of their return 
into political discourse. However, the majority of workers, particularly 
long-distance ones, remained stranded for want of public transport. The 
media extensively reported their ordeal at the destination and their protests 
in different parts of the country demanding return journey. Questions were 
asked as to why the Government of India did not anticipate the mass exo-
dus of inter-state and intra-state migrants before announcing the lockdown. 
Why did the government not give a one-week window for the migrants to 
return to their homes by public transport, particularly trains, when the case-
load of coronavirus was minuscule?1 Why did the government take the risk 
of alienating this vast number of the workforce of the country despite India 
being an electoral democracy? 
The chapter attempts to engage with these questions by using the con-
cept of labour-control regime. The analyses of various events and incidents 
during the pandemic illustrate how the regime of labour control is embed-
ded in the state’s strategy of dealing with the pandemic which shaped the 
state’s policy towards journeys of migrants. We discuss how the state’s 
strategy of labour control has created a crisis of legitimacy for the state and 
given rise to new conflicts that define the emerging state-labour relations. 
We also look at various measures by the state aimed at exerting control over 
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Labour-control regime: How the state and capital strategise? 
The labour-control regime refers to the social need in capitalism for inte-
grating labour into the production system and labour processes by a vari-
ety of means, directly and coercively, as well as indirectly and reciprocally 
(Jonas 2009). Various factors facilitate workers’ integration – knowing the 
employer, social networks around the place/region, developing skill in the 
work, specific practices such as employer allowing the workers to use the 
workplace as accommodation, caste- and region-based recruitment, and the 
presence of a labour contractor. 
Labour control is easier particularly when the labour market has migrants 
and casual workers, production takes place outside of the organised sector, 
where trade unions are weak or absent, and labour market allows flexibility 
in terms of sub-contracting and flexible work schedules. Labour control 
also demands that state regulations be weak, allowing unregulated terms 
and conditions of employment, unwritten contract, with weak oversight and 
redressal system for abuses of labour rights. The fragmentation of produc-
tion processes at multiple layers through work process sub-contracting has 
made labour relations complicated in which employers turn out to be distant 
and invisible. Violation of workers’ rights is easier in the absence of a clear 
lineage of accountability. The control regime is premised on the understand-
ing that the protection regime, its nemesis, is antithetical to ease of business, 
which in turn is construed as a sine qua non for attracting big-ticket invest-
ments, particularly foreign direct investments. In a capitalist economy, the 
state works on behalf of capital to ensure a conducive institutional environ-
ment. It uses regulation as a function of control, a crucial tool for establish-
ing a regime of labour control. 
The labour control is exercised through the institutional measures
aimed at incorporating labour either through restriction or through co-
option (Fishwick 2018). Institutional co-option measures are less explic-
itly authoritarian and intended to domesticate labour (O’Donnell 1988).
Capital and regime friendly trade unions, the network of labour contrac-
tors, and co-opting labour relations through caste, kinship, region, reli-
gion, and other identity markers contribute to creating disciplined and
docile labour in non-conflictual ways. Other ways of co-option are re-
organisation of the workplace to make it informal, employer’s paternal-
istic relations with the labour and social welfare measures by the state.
However, for the state, the most crucial role lies in creating a restrictive
institutional environment through various institutional measures involving
various arms of the state – legislative, juridical, and executive. The most
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representing workers, dilution of wages and collective bargaining rights,
removal of legal protections, and autonomy to the employer in exercising
labour control practices (Fishwick 2018). State violence is integral to it as
the state often resorts to using brute force to create a general sense of fear
for seeking compliance, and whenever there are protests and resistance
against its agenda. 
In the following pages, drawing from published empirical accounts in 
newspapers and news portals, we intend to discuss the configuration of con-
trol over migrants’ return exercised by the state and employers through state 
and private institutions during the pandemic. 
The first wave of workers’ return migration 
Let us return to the question – did the government not anticipate the exodus 
of migrant workers when it announced a very stringent lockdown from the 
midnight of 24 March? The sequence of events, reported in newspapers, 
television channels, and news portals strongly suggests otherwise. Below 
we try to reconstruct the chronology of some important events to make our 
point. 
With the declaration of COVID-19 a national disaster on 14 March, 
most of the state governments instructed shutting of multiplexes, cinema 
halls, educational institutions till 31 March. By this time, jobs had started 
dwindling as factories, shops and establishments, transport, construction, 
and service sector were either closing or reducing the scale of their activi-
ties. Workers were staring at an uncertain future. They feared for their lives 
as they continued to live and work in too crowded conditions and, hence, 
unable to follow instructions like ‘social distancing.’ 
The exodus of migrant labour from megacities had started quite early. 
Newspapers reported large crowds at the Mumbai, Pune, Delhi, and other 
railway stations. Many of them had the stamp of ‘quarantine’ on their 
hands. On 21 March, the Indian Express reported how in the aftermath of 
Maharashtra government’s order to shut down shops and establishments 
until 31 March, the exodus began in Mumbai and Pune with tens of thou-
sands of workers lining up at ticket counters and gathering on platforms 
as they waited for trains to take them home, mostly in Uttar Pradesh and 
Bihar.2 
A similar multi-city report on 21 March 2020 carried out by the news 
portal, Scroll.in reported widespread return of migrants from various cit-
ies as the migrant workers faced the prospect of increasing loss of liveli-
hoods, hunger, fast depleting savings, and uncertain futures.3 On the next 
day, 22 March, a news item in the Indian Express reported similar situation 
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Delhi. Migrants feared that the Railways could potentially switch off their 
services.4 
Unaware of the Centre’s plans, the Central Railway announced to run 
special trains, mostly with sleeper and unreserved coaches, to the eastern 
and northern parts of the country to deal with the rush for the return journey 
by migrants. However, to mark the Prime Minister’s call for Janata Curfew, 
the Railways cancelled all 3,700 trains across the country scheduled for 
departure between 21 March, midnight, and 10 pm on 22 March. 
That the political establishment knew the exodus had already begun is 
corroborated by the fact that ahead of the Janata Curfew on 22 March, Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi appealed to the migrants on 20 March, ‘I appeal 
to my brothers and sisters who are moving to their villages over the fear of 
the coronavirus to stay where you are for the next few days. Travelling in 
the crowd increases the risk of the virus spreading. It puts at risk the peo-
ple from your villages, and will add to the difficulties of your families’.5 It 
would have been anybody’s guess that migrants would attempt to get home 
if they lost their job or means of livelihood. Clearly, despite the evolving 
migrant crisis, the prime minister decided to go ahead with announcing the 
nationwide lockdown, perhaps the strictest in the world. By assuring people 
of winning the war against the epidemic in 21 days, the government was 
projecting COVID-19 as a short-term disaster, so that migrant workers need 
not leave their workplace. We contend that the sequence of events from pre-
lockdown to post-lockdown till date, as we will discuss later, clearly estab-
lish the state’s efforts to control the labour but without any accountability 
of their well-being. More than the spread of the virus, a future spectre of 
labour shortage was haunting the capital and the government. 
Our argument is based on four observations: first, the electoral promises 
of the Modi government to overhaul ‘restrictive’ labour laws in India to 
align with its slogan of ‘Make in India’ and ‘Ease of Business’. The govern-
ment had proposed drastic changes in the existing labour laws and amal-
gamating 44 central labour laws into four labour codes. The Parliament had 
already passed the Code on Wages before the pandemic; the rest three were 
passed during the lockdown. The pandemic provided the right opportunity 
to push labour reforms with little possibility of opposition, particularly on 
the streets. Second, the government was on a privatisation spree of the exist-
ing public sector companies. Besides being an important economic agenda 
of the government, privatisation promised to be a vital source for generating 
revenues in the backdrop of the state’s inability to raise revenues under the 
new Goods and Services Tax. Sweeping changes in industrial relations were 
deemed necessary to create a trouble-free private labour market and market-
labour relations. Third, the sickeningly unsafe living conditions in workers 
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by migrants given their low earnings (Pushpendra and Singh 2020), and the 
hostile middle class (Jha and Deeksha 2021) cannot be addressed in short-
run, that too during an epidemic. That migrants’ well-being does not matter 
and they are disposable did reflect in the Garib Kalyan Yojana which did not 
provide direct cash support to migrants. Besides, the existing social security 
architecture does not offer any substantive support during disasters. There 
was little room for any co-option measure. Fourth, a general lack of clarity 
about the virus which led the establishment to believe it as a short-term epi-
demic. In the backdrop of an ailing economy, on a steep downward slope, 
the government and the private capital were anxious to ensure availability 
of labour immediately after the lockdown was relaxed and eventually lifted. 
The strategy of control over labour through control over return jour-
ney of migrants gradually became apparent, particularly in the next phase, 
starting with the complete lockdown from 25 March. How the state and its 
institutions changed from largely passive observers to active enforcers of 
control regime will be discussed in the subsequent pages. 
Exodus after lockdown: The second wave 
While the migrants were gradually leaving the cities, the announcement of 
a ‘curfew-like’ lockdown proved to be the tipping point. Migrants defied 
the lockdown and started to flee the cities. The most haunting images that 
all of us confronted were of those lakhs of migrants who, in the absence 
of any public transport, trekked hundreds and, in innumerable cases, even 
more than a thousand of kilometres. Forced upon them, these were peril-
ous journeys – by foot, on the bicycle, hiding in trucks or tankers, along 
railway tracks, or using a mix of all these and several others means, with-
out or with little money and food. As the receiving states of Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and 
West Bengal looked helpless and inadequately prepared to respond to the 
unfolding humanitarian crisis, the Centre asked state governments and 
union territories to seal borders to stop the movement of migrant workers 
effectively. Migrants encountered emergence of unanticipated new borders, 
officials with an obsession to contain the contagion through travelling body/ 
spreader, accidents, and death. The instances of travelling workers beaten 
up, sprayed with disinfectant chemicals, and harassed and harangued by 
lockdown enforcing hostile administration on highways, city/town borders, 
and zones were abounding as they had supposedly disturbed the lockdown 
prescription, the disease containment plan, and other control mechanisms. 
The Centre had clearly asked for anyone on the roads to be treated as a vio-
lator of the lockdown, leaving them vulnerable to more mistreatment and 
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Though Delhi and Uttar Pradesh governments initially took a lenient
view on the transfer of inter-state workers from Delhi to Uttar Pradesh
(and also Bihar), the Centre on 29 March instructed to effectively seal
the district and state borders and not to allow any movement of people
across cities or on highways.7 Following this, the DGP of Haryana stated
that those travelling by foot on highways and roads ‘should be picked up,
placed in buses and left in localities from where they started’. He went on
to say that big indoor stadiums or other similar facilities be turned into
‘temporary jails’ so that people who refused to obey the lawful direc-
tions of district administration could be arrested and placed in custody
for the offence committed by them under the Disaster Management Act.8 
Numerous control mechanisms were put in operation through a series of
notifications. 
On 29 March, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), issued an order9 
that all the employers, be it in the industry or the shops and commercial 
establishments, shall make payment of wages of their workers, at their 
workplaces, on the due date, without any deduction, for the period their 
establishments are under closure during the lockdown. However, a rapid 
survey by Safe in India and Agrasar (n.d.) of 100 migrant workers, who 
had decided to stay back in Gurugram, revealed that around 75 per cent of 
the workers were not paid for April which was a ‘massive worsening’ over 
March 2020, for which around 25 per cent did not receive their full wages 
in clear violation of the government order.10 Newspaper reports suggest that 
such violations were the rule rather than an exception. Later, on 4 June, the 
Supreme Court ordered not to take any coercive action against employers 
concerning the MHA order mentioned above. Legal validity apart, the order 
seemed to be designed to fail, at best as camouflage for the state’s unwill-
ingness to adopt any co-option measure for workers. 
The state’s intention to aggressively follow restrictive measures was evi-
dent not only in controlling the transport but also in its other measures. The 
prime minister had set up a COVID-19 Economic Response Task Force 
on 19 March to create an emergency package. The package, announced 
on 25 March, focused on domicile-based relief and had hardly anything 
for migrants stranded at the destination.11 The government knew that most 
of the social security schemes did not have portability provisions. A good 
example is the fund available under the Building and Other Construction 
Workers Welfare Boards. The Centre directed the states to support construc-
tion workers from the fund. However, due to domicile-based registration 
and the absence of portability, migrants had little access to the funds. In 
Bihar, for example, the state government did not register any new con-
struction worker under the fund after the Centre’s directive. Only those 
migrant workers who had prior-registration in the state could get Rs. 2,000 
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transferred by the state board. However, in the absence of disaggregated 
data, there is no way to know the exact number of beneficiary migrants.12 
The institution of judiciary supplemented the regime of labour control in 
several instances of omission and commission in its approach to the migrant 
issue. In response to a petition seeking relief for migrants attempting to 
return home during the 21-day lockdown, the Supreme Centre accepted the 
Centre’s submission that there were no migrant workers on the roads ‘as of 
11 am on 31 March’, and they had all been taken to the nearest available 
shelter. The Court did not even feel the need to verify facts independently. 
Moreover, the Court expressed satisfaction with the steps taken by the gov-
ernment and declined to intervene. The court even went to the extent of say-
ing that the migrants’ exodus was due to the panic created by fake news.13 
While police everywhere turned ruthless in controlling the mobility of 
migrants, protests erupted at several places, sometimes turning violent. On 
30 March, the situation took a violent turn in Surat when police tried to stop 
about 500 textile factory workers who were mostly migrants from Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh. On 10 April, 80 migrant 
labourers were arrested in Lakshana area of Surat for defying the lockdown 
and going on a rampage. The workers were demanding that they be handed 
over their wages and allowed to return to Odisha, their home state. Most of 
these workers were employees of the power loom textile factories which 
had been shut and were not paying the workers their daily wages.14 
Hoping that trains would resume on 14 April after the end of the 3-week 
lockdown, at least 3,000 migrant workers gathered at Bandra station in 
Mumbai, but the police dispersed them by using force.15 On 27 April, a 
group of construction workers protested and pelted stones at the office of 
Dream City Diamond Bourse in Surat. Alleging that they were made to 
work amid coronavirus lockdown, workers demanded that they be sent back 
to their native places. The state government had permitted construction to 
go ahead with conditions applied in order to meet the revised target date of 
completion of the project by March 2021.16 
Even in rural areas, migrants were put under confinement and forced to 
work. A case in Bardoli in South Gujarat was reported of sugarcane harvest-
ers who were not allowed to return to their villages after completing their 
work for one sugar factory by another factory which was facing a shortage 
of labour. In order to avoid disruption in production, the district administra-
tion allowed sugar factories to send lorries to various villages across the 
Dang district to transport workers back to the fields, but the same adminis-
tration would not let workers go back home.17 
As the above narratives suggest, the fact that the state went in full force to 
restrict the mobility of migrants even without a contingency plan to address 
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to put constraints on the state policy. Instead, they are subject to the exercise 
of state power, in its most callous and violent forms. It also exposed the 
fragmentation of labour and their organisation. Did the state lose legitimacy 
before labour? What did the state achieve through restrictive policy when 
ultimately it had to loosen restrictions on mobility? There are analytical 
limitations on answers to these questions, as the impact of state action will 
take a longer time to unfold. 
The third wave of the return journey: New tricks of 
control 
The Centre announced Shramik special trains from 1 May on May Day. 
However, the journey was highly controlled, and the system was proce-
durally complicated, migrant unfriendly, and created confusion. The unpre-
pared, hence reluctant, receiving states gave consent for a limited number 
of trains. Then arose the issue of who will pay the train fare. Initially the 
fare, with a corona surcharge of Rs. 50, was collected from the workers. 
Later, state governments agreed to pay the fare. The Railways, which could 
run more than 12,000 trains every day before the pandemic, ran just a few 
hundred for months. On top of it, the routes of some trains were diverted 
delaying their journeys by several additional days. Moreover, inadequate 
food and water arrangements added to the woes of the passengers. Ninety-
six passengers reportedly died during the train journeys.18 
This approach of the government was in sharp contrast to the usual
approach of the state regarding workers journey. The state has been inter-
ventionist in expediting the journey of workers by facilitating journeys of
migrants from labour surplus areas to labour deficient areas or areas/sectors/ 
industries that prefer migrant labour. When the Green Revolution was intro-
duced in the mid-sixties in selected regions of the country, it introduced new
trains to specifically ensure functional connectivity between source and des-
tination geographies (Das 1992). An elaborate but systematic rail and road
network operated to ensure the smooth supply of cheap labour for meeting the
demands of several sectors in the cities and also rural areas. At the same time,
the state has remained non-interventionist in various dimensions of labour
life worlds such as rental housing market, wages, labour welfare, and their
working and living conditions which remain firmly in the grip of the market
mechanism. Both measures of intervention and non-intervention are selec-
tive. The state’s facilitating role of labour’s journey in the pre-corona times,
and its muted response to the issue of their return journey during corona
times, served the same purpose – controlling the labour flow for the industry. 
The influence of builders’ lobby that prompted the Karnataka govern-
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of how the anxiety of the capital prevailed over migrants’ right to return
home. Following a meeting between the Confederation of Real Estate
Developers’ Association of India (CREDAI), Karnataka and Chief Minister
B.S. Yeddyurappa, the state government wrote to the Railways cancelling
all inter-state trains from Karnataka. The CM told that the state was looking
to restart its construction sector, for which migrant labourers were the back-
bone. An exodus would have affected the sector. Bengaluru MPTejasvi Surya
hailed the decision as a ‘bold’ move to help migrants ‘restart their dreams’ in
the city. Subsequently, labour agitations and even some confrontation with
the police were reported across the city. It is to be noted that between 3 May
and 5 May, the state government received online registration on its portal
from over 2.13 lakh migrant workers for their return journey by train. The
state government finally relented and formally requested the Railways for at
least 14 trains between 8 May and 15 May to key sending states.19 
Legislative route to labour control during the pandemic 
Controlling the journey was also accompanied by making changes in labour 
laws through ordinance routes. At least ten states, including Haryana, 
Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Assam, 
Maharashtra, Goa, Punjab, and Uttarakhand, have changed their labour 
laws by amending provisions or suspending some others. The changes allow 
industries in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh to 
force labourers to work 72 hours a week, an increase of 24 hours from the 
earlier stipulated 48 hours. In effect, a labourer could be forced to work up 
to 12 hours a day on 6 working days of a week, from an earlier schedule of 
eight hours a day. That went against the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Convention on hours of work to which India is a signatory.20 In 
Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh, the industries were not even required to pay 
‘overtime’ to labourers working in the factories. Except for Haryana, all 
other states announced this change to be in force for three months. Gujarat 
announced that except for laws pertaining to the payment of minimum 
wages, safety norms and compensation for workers in case of industrial 
accidents, no other provisions of the labour law would apply to all new 
companies that wished to operate in the state for at least 1,200 days, and for 
those that had already been operational for that period. The state govern-
ment also offered land and infrastructure for companies and projects that 
were looking to shift base from China.21 These measures shed light on the 
approach of state governments on state-labour relations which are headed 
towards extreme exploitation of labour. 
However, more extensive labour reforms, with far-reaching conse-
quences, came in the form of three new labour codes passed on 23 September 
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by the Parliament – Industrial Relations Code, Code on Social Security, 
and Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code. The scope 
of the chapter does not allow us to discuss the merits of these codes in 
detail. However, it is worth noting that all labour unions of the country have 
vehemently opposed them for imposing legal restrictions on organising and 
representing workers and their collective bargaining rights, for removing 
several legal protections and bestowing enormous power to employers to 
exercise labour-control practices. On the crucial Industrial Relations Code, 
Sundar (2020) suggests that it will fail to create a conducive and efficient 
industrial relations environment, and will neither promote the ease of doing 
business nor serve workers’ welfare. These three codes, together with the 
Code on Wages, have not only dashed any hope for workers rights and 
decent work condition but also given a massive push towards further flexi-
bilisation of work and employment. 
Conclusion 
This chapter engages with the idea and strategies of controlling the flow 
of migrants’ return journey which has so far been a neglected subject. As 
Samaddar (2020: 44) points out, ‘In the annals of migration the issue of 
return was never given importance to the degree attention was paid to the 
issue of entry and work, whether in refugee and migration literature or in 
the discussion on racism and xenophobia that makes migrants the victim 
within a country’. Controlling the onward journey of internal migrants is 
likely to be an act of son-of-the-soil politics or xenophobia or competition 
between local and outside workers – more associated with the social and 
political domain. However, the capital and, for its sake, the state seek to 
ensure the flow of incoming workers. The return journey must follow a 
predictable pattern which is often based on trade-offs between the interests 
of the capital and labour, with the balance heavily tilted towards the former. 
Any exodus threatens to disrupt the predictable pattern triggering the need 
for control measures. 
The pandemic and resultant exodus presented a real possibility of disrupt-
ing the pattern. The government could effectively control the return jour-
ney, which exposed the fragmentation of labour and their vastly diminished 
power to exercise constraints on the state policy. The proliferation of work 
outside the organised sector has created the ground for this situation. The 
state could get away with virtually disowning the responsibility of feeding, 
safety, and security of migrants in cities, making them further pauperised 
and traumatised. Legislative and legal institutions have further strengthened 
the labour-control regime. The state has been successful in creating a new 
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However, the state’s attempts to control migrants’ return journeys and 
also fundamentally change the state-labour relations through newer con-
trol mechanisms have met with resistance and struggles of migrants. Their 
silent defiance of the lockdown has also exposed limitations of the state’s 
capacity to enforce complete control over workers’ decision-making and 
their body. As the impact of the labour-control regime will gradually unfold 
its impact in the times ahead, we may witness a renewed and sustained 
struggle between the state and market forces on the one side and migrants 
and other workers on the other. 
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